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AGAM-P (M) (5 Jun 67) FOR OT

19 June 1967

SUBJECT: Operational Report - Lessons Learned, 11th Armored Cavalry Regiment

TO: SEE DISTRIBUTION

1. Forwarded as inclosure is Operational Report - Lessons Learned, 11th Armored Cavalry Regiment for quarterly period 31 January 1967. Information contained in this report should be reviewed and evaluated by CDC in accordance with paragraph 6f of AR 1-19 and by CONARC in accordance with paragraph 6c and d of AR 1-19. Evaluations and corrective actions should be reported to ACSFOR OT within 90 days of receipt of covering letter.

2. Information contained in this report is provided to the Commandants of the Service Schools to insure appropriate benefits in the future from lessons learned during current operations, and may be adapted for use in developing training material.

BY ORDER OF THE SECRETARY OF THE ARMY:

Kenneth G. Wickham


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(Continued on page 2)



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OPERATIONAL REPORT LESSONS LEARNED



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11th ARMORED CAVALRY REGIMENT
"THE BLACKHORSE REGIMENT"

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FOREWORD

This Operational Report - Lessons Learned is the second submitted by the 11th Armored Cavalry Regiment since its arrival in the Republic of Vietnam.

It has been prepared in accordance with AR 1-19 and covers the quarter 1 November 1966, thru 31 January 1967. Pertinent facts concerning the Regiment's combat operations, civic action activities and base camp development during the quarter are included in this report.

/s/

Wm. W. COBB
Colonel, Armor
Commanding

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OPERATIONAL REPORT FOR QUARTERLY PERIOD ENDING 31 JANUARY 1967

SECTION I

SIGNIFICANT ORGANIZATION ACTIVITIES

1. (U) General. Activities and events involving the Blackhorse Regiment ranged from counterinsurgency operations to participation in Civic Action and Revolutionary Development programs. During the reporting period the people of BIEN HOA, LONG KHANH, BINH TUY and BINH DUONG Provinces witnessed the 11th Armored Cavalry in the relentless pursuit of the Viet Cong. Lines of communications hitherto the private domain of the Viet Cong have been opened and secured from BIEN HOA in the west to TANH LINH in the northeast. Neither tasks assigned nor terrain traversed proved to be a deterrent factor in the Regiment's successful accomplishment of its missions.

From its initial convoy escort operations in Vietnam, the Regiment has attested to its versatility and flexibility by the varied and far-reaching jobs it has accomplished. The troopers of the Blackhorse have operated both as an independent force and as part of a larger force (Operation CEDAR FALLS) without hinderance. During the reporting period it has engaged in search and destroy (mounted and dismounted), cordon and search, search and clear, route security, route clearing, rear area security and show of force operations throughout the III Corps Tactical Zone (III CTZ).

In the Regiment's never ending quest of the Viet Cong and his installations, terrain of all types has been experienced. From the dense, almost impenetrable jungle of the HAT DICH area in the southwest portion of the Blackhorse TAOR to the rice paddies of the "Rice Bowl" area northeast of VO DAT. Maneuver elements have not confined their operations to the roads and trails but in many cases forged their own paths through the mass of tropical flora to root the enemy from his jungle lair.

Simultaneously with its combat operations the Blackhorse Regiment provided materials, technical assistance and foodstuffs (dry milk, cooking oil, bulgar wheat, and rice) for the people of LONG KHANH Province. The efforts of the Regiment have been two fold in bringing about the defeat of the Viet Cong forces in III CTZ and assisting the Vietnamese people in their efforts to make their land a better place to work and live.

With the arrival of the main body of the Air Cavalry Troop in December, the last organic unit to depart CONUS joined the Regiment. For the first time since its re-organization in October 1965, the 11th Armored Cavalry had its full combat complement. In late January after many delays the Air Cavalry Troop aircraft arrived at VUNG TAU where they were deprocessed and flown to the base camp.

In December, General Harold K. Johnson, Chief of Staff of the Army, accompanied by the Sergeant Major of the Army, visited the Regimental Base Camp. During his visit he received a briefing by the Regimental Commander on the Regiment's missions and combat operations. Following the briefing, he had lunch, inspected some captured weapons and prior to his departure addressed the assembled troops at the heliport. During Operation CEDAR FALLS, Secretary of the Army, Stanley Resor visited the Blackhorse and observed it in action in the Iron Triangle.

Elements of the 11th Armored Cavalry were continuously engaged in combat operations (92 days) throughout the quarter varying from troop to regiment in size and scope.

2. (C) Personnel and Administration.

a. General. During the quarter the overall personnel situation remained relatively constant. January had the highest number of casualties (100) of any one month since the Regiment's arrival in-country. The majority of the losses sustained resulted from Operation CEDAR FALLS. Replacements continue to arrive without unnecessary delays or causing critical shortages within the combat elements.

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b. Services.

(1) Religious. During the reporting period, there were a total of 470 religious services conducted with a total attendance of 20,234. Generally, the Catholic services numbered one half of the number of Protestant; during the period, both the number of services and attendance decreased each month. This condition appears to be directly attributable to the progressive increase in tactical operations and has now probably reached its lower limit.

(2) Red Cross. During the months of November, December, and January, a total of 657 cases were handled. From this experience factor, it appears that the Regiment can expect to handle approximately 230 cases per month, which will result in approximately 20 Emergency Leaves. Reaction, speed, and accessibility of ARC Field Director have been improved during this reporting period by the location of an ARC team at the Blackhorse Base Camp.

(3) Special Services. During this period, the Special Services facilities grew from almost nothing to a well organized program. The primary emphasis during this time frame lay in the establishment of recreational facilities and obtaining Special Services equipment. Positive plans were developed for a comprehensive Special Services program, to include a Community Services Center in the Blackhorse Base Camp. The fruits of these planning efforts will be forthcoming during the next quarter.

(4) Postal. Throughout the reporting period, the mail service to the Regiment was either unsatisfactory or marginal. This difficulty was the result of a lack of USAF aircraft to fly mail from SAIGON to the supporting APU at XUAN LOC. This problem, as well as insufficient money order and parcel post coverage, have been brought to the attention of the USARV Staff Postal Officer. A solution should be effected during the next quarter.

c. Morale. During the reporting period, the Regiment's morale continued to increase. This was partially the result of increased Post Exchange coverage which is discussed below, and a greatly improved Rest and Recuperation program. Over this 3 month period, the Regiment utilized a total of 882 out-of-country R&R allocations and 60 in-country allocations. Indications are that during the next quarter the Regiment can expect approximately 1200 out-of-country and 90 in-country allocations. While this out-of-country utilization will enable all members of the Regiment to take advantage of the program, the in-country R&R program remains a matter of command interest. A lack of facilities at VUNG TAU will permit only marginal increase in the number of allocations for the Regiment and appears to be an insurmountable problem.

d. Information. Throughout the quarter, information coverage for the Regiment increased and at the end of the period a total of 596 editorial, pictorial, and radio releases had been made. The number of media representatives visiting the Regiment also increased each month, with a total of 27 arriving during the quarter.

e. Post Exchange. During the entire reporting period, the Regimental Exchange had a total receipts of \$139,459.92. The expected receipts for the exchange during the next quarter should exceed \$300,000.00, due to a planned expansion begun during January. This expansion doubled the sales of January as compared to previous months and the increased stockage of luxury items should result in a vastly improved facility and service in the immediately foreseeable future.

f. MOS Shortages. During the reporting period, this organization did not experience any particular high density MOS shortages. As could be expected in any personnel management situation, there were certain low density MOS shortages, particularly in the field of chemical personnel. However, in none of these cases was the combat readiness of the organization impaired.

g. Quality of Replacements. Throughout the reporting period, the quality of replacements remained good, with the exception of one short period during Operation CEDAR FALLS. This one occasion was as a result of relatively high casualties in two troops, and an emergency personnel requisition was submitted. In response to this requisition, the number of enlisted men reporting in with adverse information (Article 15, etc.) in their 201 files increased markedly. The training level of all replacements appears to be acceptable.

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h. Maintenance of Discipline, Law and Order.

(1) Courts Martial. During the quarter, the Regiment processed the following Courts Martial, by type:

<u>General</u>	<u>Special</u>	<u>Summary</u>
1	10	18

(2) Serious Incidents. There were a total of six serious incidents reported during this quarter.

1. Personnel Problem Areas. The primary personnel difficulty experienced during the quarter was attempting to reach a solution to the Regiment's rotational hump during the months of July and August 1967. Detailed plans were submitted to Headquarters, USARV, to attempt to infuse sufficient officers so that the rotational hump difficulties would be greatly reduced. As of this report, only insignificant implementation of this organization's program has been accomplished. However, within the next quarter, significant improvement and expansion of the Regiment's infusion program is expected. This infusion program will be conducted in conjunction with the 9th Infantry Division primarily. When completed, it is expected that there will be no more than 25% of the Regiment's personnel in any grade or MOS who will rotate out of the Regiment in any one calendar month. While this will still mean that the Regiment will face a period of considerable personnel turbulence during the months of July and August, the impact of this rotational hump will be considerably reduced.

3. (C) Intelligence.

a. VC Activity: Contact with the Viet Cong by units of the 11th Armored Cavalry Regiment during the quarter consisted of a mortar/recoilless rifle attack of the base camp area (16 Nov 66), an ambush of a convoy escorted by a platoon from Troop C, 1st Squadron (21 Nov 66), an ambush of a convoy escorted by 3 ACAVs and 2 tanks from 1st Squadron (2 Dec 66), 87 cases of small arms sniper fire, 25 cases of automatic weapons fire, 35 mining incidents, 16 grenade incidents, 23 cases of aircraft receiving ground fire, 14 cases of mortar fire, 4 cases of recoilless rifle fire, and 3 booby traps. The Regiment suffered only light personnel casualties and light vehicle damage as a result of these Viet Cong initiated incidents.

b. VC Losses:

(1) Personnel - VC KIA (BC) 175, KBA (BC) 32, VC KIA (Poss) 133, Detainees 425, Fws 15, CHIEU HOI's 12.

(2) Weapons and ammunition: 60mm Mortar-1, 57mm RR-1, 57mm RT Tripod-1, 75mm RR-1, 75mm RT Tripod-1, RPG-2 AT Launcher-2, Thompson S&W-1, Chaing Kai Shek 7.92mm (Mauser)-7, CHICOM type 56 carbines-5, US M1 carbine-7, US M1 rifle-3, US M14 rifle-1, French 8mm rifle-1, British Enfield rifle-1, Russian Mosin Nagent rifle-1, US M1917 Cal .30 M3-1, CHICOM type 56 M3-5, CHICOM type 58 M3-1, US Cal .45 pistol-1, homemade pistol-1, homemade rifle-1, CSU bomblats-98, 100 lb bombs-5, 250 lb bombs-6, 500 lb bombs-1, 60mm mortar rds-23, 81mm mortar rds-18, 57mm RT rds-2, 75mm Rds-9, RPG-2 AT rds-12, 12.7mm rds-20, Cal .50 rds-10, Cal .30 rds-724, 7.92mm rds-100, 7.62mm rds-4070, Cal .45 rds-60, mines (all types)-82, grenades (all types)-283, 105mm rds-10, 155mm rds-5, TNT-32lbs, composition C-3-10lbs, composition C-4-17lbs, crossbow-1.

(3) Foodstuffs: Rice 567.3 tons, Wheat 600 lbs, Salt 210 lbs, Peanuts 1000 lbs.

(4) Miscellaneous: Ammonium nitrate 50 lbs, documents 170 lbs, medical supplies 13 lbs, bicycles 16, clothing 55 lbs, barbed wire 7 rolls, shovels 11, mattock 1, batteries 165, SVN Plasters 52,000, NVN Plasters 3,000, flashlight 1, antenna 1, corrugated roofing 20 rolls, wire 1200 ft, camera 1, radio 1, burlap bags 150, 8" bolts 1 gross, 300 gal fuel tank 1.

c. Intelligence Sources:

(1) General: A study was conducted of 177 separate facilities found during Operation CEDAR FALLS ranging from foxholes and trenches and to bunkers and

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tunnel complexes, and to rice caches of all sizes. A comparison of each of these locations with all previously available intelligence information showed that 156 or 88.1% fell within 500 meters of a reported installation. The average error for these 156 installations was 135m(E-W) by 147m(N-S) or an average error of slightly over 200m. These results show that reported installations are an excellent point of departure for any operation.

(2) Red Haze: Red Haze has proved to be useful in detecting VC groupings, especially prior to the 2 December ambush on Highway 1. However with the advent of the dry season, brush fires increased, which markedly reduced its usefulness.

(3) SLAR: Due to the nature of the terrain and the lack of suitable targets in the TAOR, SLAR has been of very little assistance to the Regiment.

(4) Agent Reports: Agent reports constitute the bulk of intelligence reports received by the Regiment, the majority of these reports are of doubtful value unless corroborated by other intelligence sources.

4. (C) Combat Operations.

a. General.

(1) November. Operation ATLANTA (See Inclosure 6) initiated in October continued throughout the month. As the development of the base camp progressed more and more equipment was being transported from the staging area in LONG BINH to the base camp. By the end of November the Regiment less the 3rd Squadron had departed the staging area, and was busily organizing and securing the base camp. ROADRUNNER operations were conducted on National Highway 1 as far north as GIA RAY and west to LONG BINH. On 21 November a sizeable convoy travelling from LONG BINH to the base camp was ambushed by Viet Cong units of the 274 Main Force Regiment. Immediate reaction by the escort and ready reaction forces kept friendly losses to a minimum.

Troop and company sized search and destroy operations were conducted within the TAOR interdicting lines of communication and resupply. Active patrolling, aerial reconnaissance, and H&I artillery fires curtailed Viet Cong offensive operations during November with one exception. On 16 November, the base camp received an estimated 37 rounds of 82mm mortar fire and 32 rounds of 75mm recoilless rifle fire from high ground to the northeast of the camp adjacent to Interprovincial Route 2. Subsequent tank, artillery and aircraft fires from the camp neutralized the suspected firing positions and assisted in keeping friendly casualties light (8 WIA).

Operations to the north toward VO DAT were temporarily halted when the 1st Squadron was dispatched to LAI XHE to participate in Operation ATTLEBORO.

The 2nd and 3rd Squadrons assumed the security of the base camp and staging area respectively. Elements of the 3rd Squadron were also employed as a security force for the LONG BINH ASP.

(2) December. On 2 December a resupply convoy (3 ACVs, 2 tanks and 24-ton trucks) returning from the GIA RAY Rock Quarry was ambushed by the 275 Viet Cong Regiment. In the space of ninety minutes 99 VC (BC) were killed with at least another 100 possible kills. The Regiment received no KIA's and only 4 WIA's. One engineer driver was killed. Numerous crew served weapons and small arms were captured including a 75mm recoilless rifle. With the termination of Operation ATLANTA, the 1st Squadron supported by the 3rd Battalion, 43rd Infantry Regiment of the 18th Division launched Operation DAN TANH 81 into the "Rice Bowl" area north of VO DAT. In addition to securing the rice harvest, route security was provided for bridge and airfield construction efforts. As a result of this operation civilian commerce has started to flow into this once Viet Cong dominated area.

Operations continued to be conducted in the Blackhorse TAOR, with the 3rd Squadron conducting joint cordon and search operation with the 1st Battalion, 43 Regiment (ARVN) on 5 December of the villages of XA BANG and AP HERN resulting in 277 detainees and 44 confirmed Viet Cong apprehended. Limited search and destroy operations and convoy escort missions were also performed by the 3rd Squadron in conjunction with its base camp security activities. Security was also provided for engineer elements operating the GIA RAY Rock Quarry.

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Early in the month the 2nd Squadron under the operational control of the 173rd Airborne Brigade helped secure Route 15 from VUNG THU to BEAR CAT, for the movement of the 199th Infantry Brigade and the 9th Division.

Psychological operations increased in intensity within the TIGR. Over one million leaflets were dropped in support of operations while 5,000 posters were distributed in LONG KHANH Province.

(3) January. The 1st and 2nd Squadrons terminated their respective operations with the 2nd Squadron remaining in position at BEAR CAT to prepare for Operation CEDAR FALLS. The 1st Squadron returned to the Base Camp for maintenance and resupply after almost 60 days of continuous field operations.

Prior to the initiation of operations in the IRON TRIANGLE the 3rd Squadron conducted a cordon and search operation (Operation GLEN BURNIE) of BINH LOC Hamlet. Supported by the 52nd Ranger Battalion and the National Police an interrogation and records inventory was made along with the dispensing of foodstuffs and medical assistance as part of the Revolutionary Development Program.

On 8 January the Regiment (-) moved to forward assembly areas in the vicinity of the IRON TRIANGLE near BEN CAT. The following morning a multi-division operation was launched lead by the armored columns of the Blackhorse Regiment. Experiencing only light resistance, objectives were quickly seized. Maintaining its (Regiment) momentum, one squadron was shifted to the apex of the triangle to form a blocking force denying the Viet Cong potential escape routes. Concurrently with the move to the south the remaining squadron moved to secure service and support areas to the north. Search and destroy operations continued within the IRON TRIANGLE until Operation CEDAR FALLS was terminated on 24 January.

Returning to the base camp, the Regiment initiated Operation MURKIE, a cordon and search operation in the northwestern (1st Squadron) and southeastern (2nd Squadron) portions of the TIGR. Operations continued through the remainder of the month with only light contact. The 3rd Squadron in the meantime was conducting operations with the 9th Division in the KAT DIKH area and along Route 15.

b. Engineer Activities.

(1) Base Camp Development. November was the first full month the Regiment occupied the permanent base camp at LONG GIAO. Priority of engineer support at that time was the clearing of fields of fire, to be followed by initiation of construction of the interior road net. The 919th Engineer Company (Armored), attached to the Regiment worked simultaneously to clear fields of fire, and in conjunction with the 27th Engineer Battalion (C), constructed road nets within the base camp area to a distance of 12.27 kilometers.

Support provided by both engineer units included the construction of sixty-three perimeter bunker frames and six watch towers. In addition, construction of mess halls, latrines and showers for every company size unit in the base camp was started in December by the engineer support units.

(2) Combat Support. Combat engineer support of 11th Armored Cavalry Regiment and subordinate squadron operations was provided by the 919th Engineer Company (Armored).

From 8 to 20 November, one engineer platoon supported the 1st Squadron as it participated in Operation ATTLEBORO, OPCON to the 1st Infantry Division. During the operation, the platoon conducted extensive mine clearing operations on roads in the areas of operation. In addition, the platoon constructed two hasty crossings at sites of enemy cuts in the road.

On 21 November and on 2 December elements of the Regiment were ambushed. During and after counter-attack operations at both ambush sites the 919th destroyed over seventy-five bunkers and tunnels per site.

In December, elements of the 919th conducted an engineer reconnaissance of National Routes 25 and 320. During the same period, that the reconnaissance was being conducted other elements of the company cut a trail from the Regimental Base Camp to BEAR CAT Base Camp creating a direct link from the Regiment's location to National High 15.

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In December three Class 60 and one Class 20 bridges were built in the area of National Highway 15 near LONG THANH village.

The most dramatic engineer support provided during the quarterly period covered in this report occurred on Christmas Day as the company emplaced an M4T6 floating bridge 141 feet long, deep-in Viet Cong Territory north of GIA RAY on the south edge of the VO DAT Rice Bowl.

Engineer Support rendered by the 919th Engineer Company during Operation CEDAR FALLS was quite effective. Over fifty acres of jungle were cleared as were four helicopter landing zones. Over 3000 meters of Viet Cong tunnels were searched and at least 1700 linear meters destroyed. In addition 120 enemy bunkers, trenches, and spider holes were destroyed. The company cleared 63 kilometers of road during the operation.

Throughout the reporting period, engineer support was rendered to squadrons maneuvering in the Blackhorse TAOR. Most common types of support were road clearing and mine clearing operations, as well as demolition of enemy structures and fortifications.

c. Chemical Activities.

(1) Chemical Operations conducted by the 11th Armored Cavalry Regiment during this period involved the following:

- (a) Use of herbicides on the base camp perimeter at LONG GIAO.
- (b) Use of riot control agent CS to deny enemy tunnel systems.
- (c) Evaluation of the E28 smoke marker.

(2) Defoliation of the base camp perimeter was accomplished with the following results and agents:

(a) Agent WHITE (TORODON). WHITE is a water-soluble herbicide that was disseminated by the M9 Power Driven Decontaminating Truck. Its advertised strong points include, long duration of effectiveness and minimal agent drift. Our experience with this agent extends over a period of three months and was used against both broad leaf plants and grass. We have drawn the following conclusions:

- 1 Agent WHITE has little effect on grass.
- 2 Agent WHITE acts very slowly on most jungle trees and is unsuitable for clearing perimeters because of this slow functioning time.
- (b) Agent ORANGE (2,4,D2,4,5,6,7,8). ORANGE is soluble in either water or diesel oil and has been disseminated in the Power Driven Decontaminating Truck and ground-based power insecticide sprayers. Following three months experience with this agent, the following conclusions have been made:

- 1 ORANGE, when mixed with diesel provides a fast kill for most vegetation in Vietnam.
- 2 During the dry season it is effective for several months.

(c) Agent BLUE (Gacodylic Acid). BLUE was used only once by this unit and only on grass. Our experience with this agent is limited but it is felt that this agent has a quicker kill time than ORANGE when mixed with diesel and may be the most satisfactory of the three.

(3) Use of Riot Control Agents: The 11th Armored Cavalry Regiment has employed riot control agent CS to deny tunnels to the Viet Cong when complete destruction was improbable. CS has always been utilized with high explosives provided for dissemination. Units entering these tunnels after contamination with CS have had to mask and there have been no reports of VC reusing these tunnels.

(4) The Regimental Chemical Officer, in January helped evaluate the E28 smoke marker and Eli Launcher. The launchers were mounted on the UH-1B helicopter and smoke markers were launched in a practice rocket run. This experimentation produced the following conclusions:

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- (a) The E28 smoke marker is unpredictable in its burning time.
- (b) The launcher is completely unsatisfactory and will launch the marker upon a rough takeoff or landing.
- (c) Marking with this munition requires direct overflight of the target.
- (d) The electrical firing mechanism failed to function on one of the two models tested.
- (e) The 11th Armored Cavalry Regiment has no requirement for this marker at the present time nor expects to have such requirements in the future.

d. Signal Activities.

During the months of November, December and January, the Regiment participated in diverse and widespread operations which posed a real challenge for the organic communications capability within the Regiment. The bulk of operational traffic was inherently passed over the various FM radio nets. These nets provided facilities for command and control of the entire Regiment.

AM RATT Nets were established to support the FM nets by providing a hard copy capability over a great range. Due to the distance involved in operating away from Blackhorse Base Camp, the organic AN/VRC-29 radios were often operated over their maximum range. For major operations the Regiment has received support of personnel and equipment from the 53rd Signal Battalion, specifically an AN/GEC-26 to terminate the AM RATT Nets at the base camp.

Due to the necessity of having the capability of terminating telephone and teletypewriter circuits, support was again provided the Regiment by the 53rd Signal Battalion with an AN/MGC-17 Communications Center to provide teletype termination at the base camp. A VHF facility was provided during Operation CEDAR FALLS by the 173rd Airborne Brigade, thus telephone and teletypewriter circuits were made available to round out the Regiment's organic capability. This outstanding support materially aided the Regiment in the accomplishment of its mission.

As each operation occurs the Regiment will continue to require this signal support unless organic equipment is assigned. A solution to this continuing requirement would be the mounting of VHF and teletypewriter equipment in the organic Communications Platoon M5 7A1, thus providing the necessary communications means capable of moving with the Regimental Command Post through difficult terrain. In addition, a field switchboard could be moved with the GP in this same vehicle thus providing telephone service throughout the Command Post area. A vehicle with this equipment available would constitute a true Communications Central for the Regiment in the field.

e. Support.

(1) Air Force

(a) General. On 3 November 1966, a Tactical Air Control Party consisting of two officers (ALO/FAC) plus 3 radio operators and two MARK 107 radio vehicles, were deployed to operate at the new Regimental Base Camp at LONG GIAO. This Air Force unit was made a part of the Regiment TOC complex. Later, in November, the remaining six enlisted personnel moved to the base camp. The basic structure of the USAF operation remained the same throughout this period. One forward Air Controller plus radio operators and the four-net radio (FM, HF, UHF, VHF) equipment operated as a part of the Regimental TOC. The officer on duty at the TOC was available to assist in planning joint Air Operations and advise on application of Tactical Air Power on an immediate or pre-planned basis. Continuous airborne and/or ground alert coverage during daylight hours was provided by USAF O-1 aircraft operating out of BIEN HOA Air Force Base. This was the result of the centralization of all Forward Air Controllers at regimental level under direct supervision of the Air Liaison Officer. This insured the highest degree of flexibility and efficiency. It permitted the ALO to plan and determine, with the Regimental Staff, priority of activities of airborne coverage and still permit maximum utilization of USAF resources. This system of operation proved its merit in the rapid response of Tactical Air to the ambushes of 21 November and 2 December 1966.

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(b) Resources.

1 Aircraft - Three O-1-G aircraft were assigned and utilized during this period. Two aircraft were hit by ground fire resulting in very minor damage.

2 Personnel - The normal complement of 1 Air Liaison Officer and 7 Forward Air Controllers was reduced to 1 ALO/5 FACs in mid November. More urgent USAF requirements directed 2 FACs to be placed on extended TDY on a classified project. Operations were not effected by the absence of these two FACs.

(c) Operations. During this period USAF FAC personnel participated in both independent regimental operations and several squadron operations to include coverage of squadrons OPCON to their units. Coordination by the ALO with his counterpart during OPCON operations such as CEDAR FALLS developed full airborne FAC coverage with continuing pre-planned air strikes. This plan gave both units maximum coverage and provided concentrated and centralized targeting data. Also, in several incidents pre-planned strike aircraft were in the operational area when an immediate need arose for an air strike. This was a product of the combined effort and development of targeting and flight scheduling of both the 11th Armored Cavalry Regiment, and the unit to which the Regiment was OPCON.

(d) Problem Areas.

1 FM communications between airborne FAC and ground units. The O-1-G aircraft is equipped with the older FM radio unit. The 11th Armored Cavalry Regiment is equipped with newer equipment which operates in the higher (more desirable) FM frequencies. This leaves a void, and causes communication time lapse under periods of enemy contact. Without constant contact between the FAC directing an airstrike and the ground commanders, no air strike can be employed. Consequently, full development of the resources available to the ground commander can not be used. One squadron did lower its command frequency into the range of the FAC aircraft and this greatly increased the squadron commander's ability to be in full control of all resources at his disposal for tactical operations. At present, the Air Force has no plans for replacing the FM sets in the O-1 aircraft. The O-1 aircraft, themselves, will be replaced this year with newer O-2 aircraft which should have the newer FM units.

2 Flight Facilities - During this period it was necessary to operate the three O-1 aircraft out of BIEN HOA AFB, twenty-five miles west of the base camp due to the lack of landing facilities at the Blackhorse Base Camp. This required approximately 40% more flying in order to provide the coverage desired and did not permit close daily coordination of flight, operational and intelligence information. This problem will be resolved with the completion of an airstrip at the base camp in February.

STATISTICAL DATA ON AIR FORCE SUPPORT NOV - JAN

SORTIES FLOWN:

Visual Reconnaissance	Forward Air Control	Convoy Escort	Artillery Adjustment	Administration	Combat Strikes
202	78	146	13	11	278

TYPE AIRCRAFT FLOWN

F-100	E-5	P4C	B-57	AC-47	A-1	O-1
180	77	7	18	2	4	450

TOTAL FLYING TIME O-1 AIRCRAFT

1029:40

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ORDNANCE EXPENDED

1K-65	1000# Bomb	46
1K-117	750# Bomb	78
1K-81 250# or 260#	Fragmentation	80
1K-82	500# Bomb	354
BLU/1B or BLU 27B	750# M&M	435
CANISTERS OF CBU	(ALL TYPE)	58
2.75mm FEAR		570
ILLUMINATION FLARES		71
20mm	Rounds	11,900*
30 CAL	Rounds	15,000
50 CAL	Rounds	15,000
7.62mm	Rounds	12,000

* An additional 32 missions used 20mm, number rounds fired not recorded.

(2) Artillery

(a) General: Artillery fire support provided during the quarter assumed two principal roles; one the delivery of harassing and interdiction (H&I) fires and secondly in support of ground operations and engagement of known or suspected Viet Cong positions. The organic artillery batteries habitually provided direct support for the maneuver elements (squadron) with reinforcing fires being provided by the 54th Artillery Group for operations in the Blackhorse TAOR. On operations such as CEDAR FALLS reinforcing fires were provided by the divisional general support artillery battalion.

Coordination and clearance of howitzer batteries and 4.2" mortar fires for units located within the base camp are handled by the Regimental Tactical Operations Center (RTOC). This is necessary since a Fire Support Control Center (FSCC) has not been established nor is it provided for under the present TO&E. The RTOC duty officer assumes this mission and coordinates ground and air clearance of artillery fires.

(b) Employment:

1 Organic artillery (the three Squadron Howitzer Batteries) was employed dependent on the mission assigned the Regiment and their parent unit (squadron). Missions involving only a squadron, the battery was in direct support; while if the Regiment was operating with two squadrons in the field, one or both of the batteries would be in direct support of a committed squadron(s). During Operation CEDAR FALLS, the Howitzer Batteries from the 2nd and 3rd Squadrons were placed under the operational control (OPCON) on 173rd Airborne Brigade with the primary mission of providing direct support to the Regiment. This arrangement proved to be quite satisfactory and eliminated the need for the Regiment to operate a FSCC. Additionally, it made the artillery support more responsive to the needs of the 173rd Airborne Brigade and eliminated the requirement for individual security forces to secure the artillery positions.

2 General Support artillery is employed from its own base camp firing positions (54th Artillery Group), Blackhorse Base Camp or in forward firing positions. Long range fires are provided daily for convoys operating between the base camp and LONG BORN and on call for targets of opportunity within the Blackhorse TAOR.

3 Mortars organic to the Armored Cavalry Platoons are normally employed in battery at troop or squadron level. Whenever a squadron is assigned the mission of securing the base camp the mortars are placed under squadron control and

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tioned in with its Howitzer Battery. There were several reasons for the decision to employ the mortars in battery: 1) the minimum range of the 4.2" mortar, 2) the requirement for providing security for the guns, and 3) the absence of platoon operations which cover wide areas like those that would be encountered in Europe. The mortars for the most part have been fired dismounted due to their range and the slower rate of advance in counterinsurgency operations. By dismounting the mortar it also makes the M106 mortar carrier available for the security of the firing positions.

(c) Combat Operations:

During the ambush of 2 December reinforcing fires were provided by Battery C, 1st Battalion, 35th Artillery displaced to SUOI CAT to provide general support for the 1st Squadron's Howitzer Battery. On 4-6 December, Battery B, 2nd Battalion, 35th Artillery moved to the base camp to provide reinforcing fires in support of 3rd Squadron's (operation ATLANTA) search and destroy operations in the southern portion of the TAOR. On Operation DAN TAM 81, Battery B, 2nd Battalion, 35th Artillery (155 SP) and Battery C, 7th Battalion, 9th Artillery (105) were attached to the 1st Squadron from 8 thru 29 December in support of operations north of VO DAT in the "Rice Bowl" area. To facilitate coordination, a liaison team from the 54th Artillery Group was provided the Squadron's Fire Support Coordinator (FSCCOORD) to assist in coordination and control of the three batteries (How 1-11, B-2-35, C-7-9). Howitzer Battery, 2nd Squadron was placed OPCON to 3rd Battalion, 319th Artillery Fire Direction Center (FDC). Operation CEDAR FALLS was the first time the Regiment (minus the 1st Squadron) operated its artillery from an artillery base instead of remaining with the squadrons. The two howitzer batteries were placed OPCON to the 3rd Battalion, 319th Artillery which was providing support for the 11th Armored Cavalry and the 173rd Airborne Brigade from fire support bases (FSB) in the vicinity of BEN CAT. The result of the consolidation facilitated coordination and enabled fires to be massed with minimum delay.

(d) Ordnance Expended:

NOVEMBER

Howitzer Battery, 1st Squadron	2960
Howitzer Battery, 2nd Squadron	3040
Howitzer Battery, 3rd Squadron	924
Totals	6924

DECEMBER

Howitzer Battery, 1st Squadron	3196
Howitzer Battery, 2nd Squadron	2077
Howitzer Battery, 3rd Squadron	2589
Totals	7862

JANUARY

Howitzer Battery, 1st Squadron	1480
Howitzer Battery, 2nd Squadron	9378
Howitzer Battery, 3rd Squadron	7365
Totals	18223

TOTAL ROUNDS EXPENDED FOR THE QUARTER . . . 33009

5. (U) Training.

a. Unit Training, Unit level training included maintenance OJT, and weapons familiarization and proficiency firing conducted regularly throughout the period. During the month of November an increase in operational commitments prevented extensive unit level training, however periods between operations were utilized to evaluate and

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improve skill levels in village operations, tunnel exploration and destruction, patrolling, and small unit tactical employment. Support squads in Armored Cavalry Platoons were trained for employment in battery, and skill levels in mortar FDC operations were improved. Similar training was continued when possible through December and January.

b. Replacement Training: In accordance with USARV and II FFORCE V requirements, replacements newly arrived in the Regiment from assignments out-of-country received a program of instruction aimed at filling the gap between Vietnam-oriented training conducted out-of-country, and actual combat operations. During the month of November and thru 12 December, the individual squadrons were required to present their own forty-hour program of instruction for replacements, based upon guidance provided in USARV Regulation 350-1, II FFORCE V Training Circular Number 1 and a recommended program of instruction published by the Regimental S-3.

Effective 12 December, a fifty-two hour program of instruction was initiated under the supervision of the Regimental Training Officer, and conducted by a cadre of six HCO's (two from each squadron), with assistance from 919th Engineer Company, 37th Medical Company, and the Regimental Aviation Platoon. (See Inclosure 4).

The expansion of the program from forty to fifty-two hours was done to provide additional time necessary to present training in tactics peculiar to armored cavalry units in Vietnam, and familiarization training on the numerous new items of equipment employed in the Regiment.

During Operation CEDAR FALLS in January, as a result of increased personnel losses due to casualties, coupled with normal projected losses, it became necessary to initiate an accelerated program of instruction for replacements, aimed at reducing the time lag between the arrival of a replacement, and his availability for employment as a member of his new unit. The fifty-two hour program was reduced to forty hours, to be presented over a four day period. While operating under the accelerated program was continued only until the shortage of personnel in line units was alleviated, at which time the program reverted to the fifty-two hour, six and one half day schedule.

Based upon experiences during Operation CEDAR FALLS, the accelerated program was reviewed and standardized for use as a contingency plan, in the event of a personnel shortage similar to that which occurred during that operation. (See Inclosure 4).

Due to the impossibility of predicting the date of arrival of a given number of replacements, it is necessary that the program be conducted on a continual basis. Whether the class receiving the instruction is one man or one hundred men, the classes are prescribed in the same sequence. As a result, a replacement can begin the course on any day of the week, and have received all the instruction at the end of seven days.

During the period 12 December 1966 to 31 January 1967, a total of 148 replacements completed the program of instruction.

c. New Equipment Training: Since arriving in-country, the Regiment has received a number of new items of equipment, which, because they are new to the inventory of items available to units, are unfamiliar to personnel within the Regiment. In order to provide personnel with the basic knowledge necessary to train at unit level with these items, training teams from both within the Regiment and from commands outside the Regiment presented classes to selected personnel. These personnel were later utilized as instructors at squadron, troop/company/battery level to familiarize individuals on a need to know basis on the various items of new equipment.

(1) AGAV Bridging. Following the development of the AGAV launched bridging system by the US Army Engineer School, and the delivery of the equipment to troops within the Regiment, a training advisory team was established to assist units in assembly of the various components of the system and some of the techniques utilized in its employment.

(2) M16EL. Based upon experiences of the various units in-country armed with the M16EL, the Army Weapons Command determined that the source of the majority of the malfunctions experienced with the weapon in the field was a lack of knowledge on the proper methods of care, clearing, and maintenance. During November a training team from Weapons Command presented eight hours of instruction to selected personnel from

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the squadrons on the XM16E1, its magazines, and its ammunition. These personnel were subsequently utilized by the squadrons in presenting similar instruction at unit level.

(3) XM148 Grenade Launcher. As with the XM16E1, a training team from the Weapons Command presented instruction to selected personnel from the squadrons, who subsequently presented similar instruction at unit level.

(4) XM147 System. As a result of restrictions placed upon the employment of this system, a training team was requested through II FFORCE V in January and instruction was subsequently received by selected personnel in the Air Cavalry Troop. As a result, the Regiment now has five personnel who have been certified as qualified in the handling of this munition, and four aircrews certified as qualified to employ the system.

(5) M109 Howitzer. During January, the three Howitzer Batteries in the Regiment exchanged their M108 Howitzers for M109s. In order to facilitate the retraining of the gun crews, twelve men per battery were sent to various batteries in the 54th Artillery Group equipped with the M109, to become familiar with the equipment and its operation.

d. Specialized Training:

(1) Tunnel Operations. During November, 5 EM and one officer from 919th Engineer Company attended a six hour block of instruction on tunnel operations, which included techniques of exploration and destruction. Training was conducted by the 588th Engineer Group at CU CHI. These six personnel were utilized to assist in training other tunnel teams within the Regiment.

(2) Recon School. As a first step in organizing a Long Range Reconnaissance Patrol (LRRP) within the Regiment, twelve men were selected from the squadrons and the Air Cavalry Troop to form the nucleus of two six man teams. These two teams were to be used to establish operational techniques and investigate problems which might arise in supporting a LRRP. As a means of insuring a high state of training within these two teams, all twelve men were sent to the MACV Recon School at NHA TRANG. Of the twelve, only one man completed the three week course. The principal shortcoming on the part of the eleven men who failed to complete the course was a lack of knowledge of basic map reading. Six of the eleven also failed to meet minimum physical fitness standards. It is felt that those dropped for map reading as well as the ones for physical conditioning would probably have been able to complete the course, but for those two areas. The two principal causes of the failures was the lack of definitive guidance of entrance requirements coupled with the need for pre-school refresher training on particular areas stressed by the school.

6. (U) Aviation.

a. General: During the reporting period, the last aviation element (Air Cavalry Troop) organic to the Regiment arrived in-country in December. The following month its equipment arrived by ship and was off loaded at VUNG TAU. Prior to the arrival of the Air Cavalry Troop's aircraft its flight personnel flew missions with other aviation units in-country and assisted the Regimental Aviation Platoon. Aviation operations were varied and experienced a marked increase over the last quarter. Activities included: 860 combat sorties, 7,953 combat support sorties, 9,424 troops airlifted, and 199 tons of cargo moved. These results achieved within the resources of the Regimental Aviation Platoon and the Squadron Aviation Sections.

b. Employment: Aviation resources were utilized and employed based on the type of aircraft and weapons systems available. UH-1C helicopters provided:

- (1) Reaction forces against ambush forces and sites;
- (2) River surveillance coverage and route reconnaissance;
- (3) Escort for UH-1D's during medical evacuations, combat troop lifts and resupply missions into unsecure areas of operations.

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UH-1D aircraft were principally utilized for speaker and leaflet-drop missions, command and control, combat troop lift, logistical troop lift, cargo missions, and medical evacuation (DUSTOFF). Liaison and administrative support were also provided by the UH-1D's.

The OH-23G's were utilized mainly for command and control, reconnaissance, and fire adjustment at squadron level.

c. Techniques: The organic aircraft provide the Regiment with command and control support for the Regimental Headquarters, command and control for each squadron and for the Air Cavalry Troop, aerial fire support in the form of a rapid reaction force (Aero-Scout Platoons), aerial artillery support (Heavy Weapons/Aerial Artillery Platoon for employment against known targets, and a mobile air-ground intelligence gathering and limited reaction force (Aero-Rifle Platoon).

Each of the three aviation sources (squadron aviation sections, regimental aviation platoon and air cavalry troop) within the Regiment have been tailored to meet the needs of the unit being supported. The Regimental Aviation Platoon provides five OH-23's for command and control support within the Regimental Headquarters, one UH-1D equipped with command and control radio console for the Regimental Commander and five UH-1Ds for general support of the Regiment. Each squadron has 4 OH-23Gs for command and control support.

d. Maintenance:

(1) Aircraft availability for the reporting period of the Regimental Aviation Platoon's and squadron aircraft were as follows:

	NOV	DEC	JAN	AVG
UH-1C	81%	86%	Transferred	83.5%
UH-1D	89%	91%	67%	82.3%
OH-23G	59%	82%	51%	64.0%

Equipment deadlined for maintenance:

UH-1C	9%	14%	Transferred	11.5%
UH-1D	11%	9%	33%	17.6%
OH-23G	19%	16%	48%	27.6%

(2) The increased equipment deadlined for maintenance (E.D.M.) for the month of January, resulted from a rash of tail boom failures on the UH-1D's.

(3) During the month of January, the 398th CHRM Detachment started to move into the Blackhorse Base Camp, thus providing on site direct support maintenance for the Regiment's aircraft. This move should produce greater efficiency and facilitate maintenance support for the forty-eight helicopters currently stationed in the base camp.

7. (U) Logistics.

a. General: During the reporting period the 11th Armored Cavalry Regiment and attached units have been adequately supported by the 29th General Support Group, 34th General Support Group and the 44th Medical Brigade.

b. Evaluation of the logistical support rendered the Regiment.

(1) Class I - Class I support has been provided by the 1st Logistical Command Forward Support Area (FSA) located in the Regimental Base Camp at LONG GIAO (YS 4497). Support has been adequate with the exception of ice deliveries to the FSA. The average delivery has been 5000-5500 pounds which when divided equally amounts to 600-900 lbs per 1000-1100 headcount. The basic components of an ice plant were delivered on 19 January to the base camp for installation by Pacific Architects and Engineers (PA&E). However, since the initial delivery, construction has not started. The basic materials

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required to construct the facilities that house the plant have never been delivered even though the construction manager is available on site. Since the arrival of the components the cooling tower has since been retrieved by PA&E officials at LONG BINH to replace one at that location that was damaged by a carelessly operated bulldozer.

(2) Class II and IV. The only major item of equipment not yet received is; 9 Launcher M60A1; FSN 5420-889-2020; UIC WAY6TO; RQN No. A23640-6082-0093; IPD-02. Until January 1967 the Regiment was required to return to the field depot to pick up Class II and IV major end items and supplies. Since then Class II and IV supplies and equipment have been shipped to the 506th Supply and Service Company located at the FSP in the Regimental Base Camp.

(3) Class III - The Regiment is supported by the 64th QM Battalion (POL), Class III support has been outstanding throughout the reporting period.

(4) Class V - The Regiment receives Class V support from the 3rd Ordnance Battalion ASP located at LONG BINH. Planned construction of an ASP in the 11th Armored Cavalry Base Camp has been postponed pending the availability of engineer support in accordance with established base camp development priorities. The ASR on selected items of Class V has restricted the employment of 105mm howitzers, 4.2" mortars, M79 grenade launchers, aerial rockets, claymore mines; however the ammunition available has been adequate to support all operations planned or conducted to date.

(5) Maintenance. Direct support maintenance is provided the Regiment by the 188th Maintenance Battalion. In all areas, with the exception of signal, the maintenance support has been excellent. Signal support has not been satisfactory due to an insufficient float stock at direct support (DS) level and an apparent shortage of signal repair parts at all echelons of maintenance support. Currently 71 radio components have been job ordered to DS for more than 30 days. 17 radios have been ordered for over 90 days.

c. Transportation: The Regiment lacks organic transportation to effect unit distribution for supplies from the Regimental Trains FSA to its subordinate units. A request for additional transportation assets has been submitted by command letter.

d. Services:

(1) Laundry. Laundry facilities have been provided by Quartermaster Laundry Contract #RJSE157-C-86, since 6 December 1966. During the period 12 December 1966 to 14 January 1967, the service was unsatisfactory because of an uncontracted input of laundry. Since 14 January the service has been exceptional. One laundry and bath team from the 506th Supply and Service Company provides services in the base camp and during combat operations.

(2) Graves Registration - Graves registration is provided by the 506th Supply and Service Company.

e. Medical:

(1) General. Medical activities during the reporting period dealt primarily with the initial treatment of wounds, and evacuation of casualties and the diagnosis and treatment of individual afflictions. Services were also rendered in the form of MEDCAPS in conjunction with civic action projects conducted in the LONG KHE and BINH TUY Provinces. Over a thousand Vietnamese received medical attention ranging from respiratory disorders to acute diet deficiencies. Evacuation of casualties is principally by air (90%) utilizing DUSTOFFS and/or organic helicopters. All wounded patients in the field were air evacuated.

(2) Diseases. Malaria continues to be the most frequently encountered infectious disease during the quarter. In the month of December there were 21 cases; an increase over November. However there were only 9 cases in January. The resultant decrease can be traced to greater emphasis on individual protective measures at the lower levels of command and the more liberal use of aerial and ground spray insecticides. It is expected that this downward trend should continue in February.

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(3) Evacuation and hospitalization.

(a) Type:

- 1 Disease - 193
- 2 Injury - 69
- 3 ERHA - 91

(b) Location:

- 1 93rd Evacuation Hospital - 287
- 2 3rd Field Hospital - 11
- 3 3rd Surgical Hospital - 23
- 4 1st Medical - 4
- 5 24th Evacuation Hospital - 26
- 6 12th Evacuation Hospital - 2

(c) Evacuation (transfers):

- 1 36th Evacuation Hospital - 36
- 2 6th Convalescence Hospital-Cam Rahn Bay - 21
- 3 21st CSF TSN AFB (CONUS or Japan) - 54

f. Problem Areas:

(1) Problem - the 11th Armored Cavalry Regiment does not have an organic support battalion or support command.

(2) Discussion.

(a) The 11th Armored Cavalry Regiment is not organized or equipped to provide regimental level combat service support for subordinate and attached units. Complete dependence is placed on the Field Army Support Command (FASCOM) for logistical support. Tactical operations in Vietnam require FASCOM elements to be tailored to provide responsive direct support. Combat support must be provided on an attached, supporting or mission-type basis as required by the regimental mission and the distance that its elements are operating from the logistical base. Field Army Support should include the following units or elements thereof:

- 1 Engineer water purification team
- 2 Signal direct support detachment
- 3 Medical company and aeromedical evacuation units
- 4 Direct support maintenance units
- 5 Army Postal Unit
- 6 Quartermaster bath and clothing exchange team
- 7 Quartermaster graves registration team
- 8 Direct support aircraft maintenance company
- 9 Transportation medium truck company elements

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10 Transportation heavy truck company (tank transporters)

11 Mobile supply points

12 Military police platoon

13 Civil affairs team

(b) Some of the above support units have been provided to the Regiment by attachment such as the 919th Engineer Company, 37th Medical Company, and 11th AA Plt, 2nd CA Co Civil Affairs team. Maintenance support is provided on an area support basis from the 29th General Support Group by the 188th Maintenance Battalion with the 551st Light Maintenance Company attached. A postal team from the 41st APU attached to the 188th Maintenance Battalion is located in XUAN LOC to provide area postal service. In addition the 266th QM Battalion has the mission of operating a forward supply point in the Regimental Base Camp which includes a laundry and bath detachment and a graves registration team from the 506th Supply and Service Company. The 506th Supply and Service Company is presently moving from the LONG BINH area to the Regimental Base Camp to provide a formal stock record account for Class II and IV supplies. The 506th Supply and Service presently operates a Class I point and a Class III-III A point in the base camp. The Regiment receives direct support aircraft maintenance on an area basis from the 34th General Support Group and has received attachment of a Transportation Aviation Maintenance detachment.

(c) The Regiment does not have transportation truck elements, mobile supply points or a military police platoon; these units are required to provide complete combat service support to the Regiment.

(3) Action taken by the Regiment to correct the problem - A command letter requesting attachment of a support battalion has been submitted thru CG II FFORCE V to CG USAFV.

8. (U) Psychological Operations and Civic Action

a. The psychological warfare effort of the 11th Armored Cavalry Regiment is supported by the 10th Mobile Field Propaganda Team from the 246th Psychological Operations Company in BIEN HOA. In the period November 1966 thru January 1967, the team conducted 58 psychological warfare operations, in which there were 2,955,500 leaflets dropped and 52.2 hours of broadcast time. The psychological operations for this quarter can generally be divided into two types; direct tactical support of squadron operations at the request of the squadron and operations which are originated by the Field Team itself based on its intelligence and targeting. Significant psychological warfare activities of the quarter were as follows:

(1) The establishment of rapport and intelligence sources with the various government agencies operating in the area around the base camp at LONG GIAO. Associations developed with Sub-sector and Sector officials has enabled the Regiment to conduct psychological operations without duplicating the efforts of other agencies or leaving gaps in the areas covered. The establishment of a close working relationship with the LONG KHANH Province Chieu Hoi Center has provided the team with material for broadcasts and leaflets and intelligence for potential PSYOPS targets. Intelligence gained by the team was also used in tactical operations by the Regiment. HOI CHANS (returnees) procured by the team have led 11th Armored Cavalry Regiment forces to two VC base camps on one occasion and identified forty VC families on another occasion.

(2) The team has supported six cordon and search operations using aerial broadcasts immediately after the area was sealed off telling the people the purpose of the operation and to give them general instructions. For the most part, the instructions were complied with thus facilitating the operation.

(3) Loudspeaker missions were employed extensively during Operation CEDAR FALLS appealing to the VC in the area to surrender. This produced a number of ralliers who were utilized to make live broadcasts to their former comrades within a few hours after they turned themselves in. This proved very successful in producing more ralliers. On one occasion, six VC came out and turned themselves in while a former comrade was broadcasting to them.

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(4) During the month of January, the team planned, in conjunction with Provincial agencies, a joint TET Campaign for LONG KHANH Province to encourage VC of the area to rally during or after the TET season. A copy of the plan is attached as inclosure 2. In support of the Blackhorse psychological warfare effort, the 246th Psychological Operations Company produced eight special leaflets for the Regiment. The special and stock leaflets dropped during the quarter are inclosed in inclosure 3 to this report.

b. Civic Action: Civic action (CA) activities during the quarter included MEDCAPS, transporting and dispensing of foodstuffs to needy Vietnamese families and the initiation of English language classes. An effective and responsive system was also devised for affecting coordination between the many local agencies concerned with CA matters and projects.

(1) In November the Regimental S-5 established excellent and valuable relationships with the local Vietnamese officials, from Province level down to many of the local villages. This firm foundation of good will has been of great value on subsequent CA projects.

(2) During the month of December, the 11th Armored Cavalry conducted MEDCAPS in SUI GI, CAM MY and TAM PHONG, treating a total of 520 patients. During the MEDCAP of CAM MY, the village school officials asked for assistance from the Regiment. Acting on their request, supplemental foodstuffs were donated and CARE school kits were requested. During the month, 5,500 lbs of milk, cooking oil, and rice were donated to needy families. The Blackhorse co-sponsored with District officials a Christmas party at TAM PHONG on 24 December 1966. Two bridges and eight culverts were constructed during the period, and one playground repaired. Effective 15 December 1966, the 11th AI Platoon of the 2nd Civil Affairs Company was attached to the Regiment.

(3) During the month of January, the 11th Armored Cavalry performed MEDCAPs at BINH LOC, feeding over 400 people while they were being screened and questioned during a cordon and search operation. Of the rice captured during Operation CEDAR FALLS, the Regiment arranged for the evacuation of 175 tons, which were subsequently donated to USAID for distribution to needy families. MEDCAPs continued to be conducted throughout the month; a total of 450 patients were treated during the month. In addition, the Regiment assisted the sub-sector advisor and his counterpart in drawing up a rehabilitation plan for the District Headquarters Compound, which included Popular Force dependent housing. This plan will serve as the basis for a civic action project in which the 11th Armored Cavalry will be a participant. English classes were started at the end of January with an initial class of 25 students.

(4) During the quarter, continued emphasis was placed on the necessity for close liaison and coordination between US and Vietnamese personnel responsible for the conduct of civic action projects. This coordination has helped reduce duplication of effort and brought about a free exchange of information and ideas.

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SECTION II
COMMANDER'S OBSERVATIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

1. OBSERVATIONS (Lessons Learned)

a. (U) Operations.

(1) Item: Air Strikes.

Discussion: When light Viet Cong contact is gained in jungle terrain the immediate use of TAC Air often momentarily delays the ground elements from moving against the enemy. Thus immediate contact is frequently lost and in some cases never regained.

Observation: Air support should be used judiciously and commensurate with available ground forces and firepower and the enemy force being engaged.

(2) Item: Treatment of Villagers.

Discussion: In villages of considerable size being searched early in the morning (prior to breakfast) consideration should be given to the feeding of the villagers. It becomes a real hardship and a source of agitation for families held hours in the open awaiting interrogation. Women and children should be segregated, checked, and released as soon as possible, thus minimizing the hard feelings generated by the search. This enables the wives to return home and go about their household tasks while the search for concealed men continues. It also allows the families to return with food and water for the men awaiting interrogation.

Observation: To avoid alienating an entire village during search operations, women and young children should be checked and released as quickly as possible.

(3) Item: Control of aerial fire support.

Discussion: The problem of achieving maximum utilization of gunships over the battle area can best be attained by placing them under the control of the airborne FAC. Since the FAC is already oriented on the battle area while the gunships are usually responding to a request for fire support from the ground commander the FAC can immediately direct the aircraft to the area in need of support.

Observation: The employment of airborne FAC's for control of gunships over the battle area increases their (gunships) tactical utilization.

2. RECOMMENDATIONS

a. (U) Intelligence

(1) Observation: Combat operations frequently require selected elements (IPW Teams) of the military intelligence detachment to accompany each maneuver squadron. In most cases this involves traveling cross country over rough terrain in hostile territory. Under the detachment's current configuration (only wheeled vehicles) it is afforded only a limited mobility capability and no protection against mines and hostile fire.

(2) Recommendation: That military intelligence detachments attached to armored units be equipped with four M113 Armored Personnel Carriers. (This recommendation has also been presented to the MACOV Team currently visiting Vietnam).

b. (U) Training and Organization.

(1) Observation: Combat operations have demonstrated the need for an M113 Armored Personnel Carrier (modified) for each engineer platoon leader. The feasibility of using a ½-ton truck as a command and control vehicle in counterterrorism

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operations is out of the question. Consequently, each platoon leader must satellite himself on one of his already overcrowded squad vehicles for transportation.

(2) Recommendation: That the 4-ton truck authorized for each platoon leader be deleted and a modified M113 be issued in its place. A USARV Form 47 (request for Equipment in Excess of Authorized Allowances) has been submitted requesting the substitution by the 919th Engineer Company (Armored).

(3) Observation: Operational requirements habitually require the engineer platoon leader in direct support of an armored cavalry squadron to monitor two radio nets. Radios currently authorized call only for an AN/GRC46 mounted on a 4-ton truck for each platoon leader. As a result he is only able to monitor either the squadron or platoon net but not both.

(4) Recommendation: Add an AN/VRC 125 to the presently authorized AN/GRC46 and mount the two sets in the M113 previously requested for the platoon command and control vehicle. A USARV Form 47 has been submitted requesting this addition by the 919th Engineer Company (Armored).

(5) Observation: Numerous suspension failures involving the M105A2, 1 1/2-ton Cargo Trailer were experienced on Operation CEDAR FALLS. At least three trailers towed by M113's and carrying engineer equipment, demolition gear and ammunition for engineer squads sheared the rivets securing the front springhanger bracket to the frame. A combination of weight and type of terrain traveled contributed to the failure. As a field expedient case hardened bolts were utilized eliminating any further problems.

(6) Recommendation: Design a new trailer or modify existing ones to compensate for the added stress and strain placed on tracked towed trailers. A temporary solution could be the replacement of sheared rivets with Bolts, case hardened, 3/8" x 1 1/2", FSN 2530-737-3260. A UER has been submitted through channels indicating this deficiency.

(7) Observation: The present TO&E for a separate Engineer Company (Armored) calls for a 12-man squad with transport provided by one M113 Armored Personnel Carrier. Continuous combat operations have proven that the squad is too large for the vehicle. This is especially true when it is fully combat loaded with four engineer squad toolsets and a complete basic load of ammunition.

(8) Recommendation: The squad should and can be reduced in size to 10 men including the driver and squad leader without reducing its overall combat effectiveness. A request for a change was submitted in October as a modification to the TO&E.

(9) Observation: There are no provisions for loading equipment in the separate Engineer Company (Armored) to support the seven organic 5-ton dump trucks. In order to utilize these trucks the company must parasite itself on other units possessing loading capabilities. A pending request for modification of TO&E 5-127F authorizes three Leader, Scoop, Multisegment bucket, 2 1/2 cubic yard.

(10) Recommendation: That this unit's attached engineer company be issued two loaders to enable it to more effectively and efficiently accomplish its engineer combat support mission.

(11) Observation: There is an apparent shortcoming within the electrical system of the M113 Armored Personnel Carrier as the Audio-Frequency Amplifier AM 1780's are failing. The fault appears to be in the A520 module board. At the present time technical representatives from the Electronics Command (ECCM) are studying the problem in an attempt to find a solution.

(12) Recommendation: That this problem be thoroughly analyzed and that some type of voltage suppressor which has been developed, be expedited to the Regiment for field testing. Arrangements have been made through the ECOM representatives to divert approximately 400 voltage suppressors to the Regiment when they arrive in-country.

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(13) Observation: The Radar Set AN/TPS-33 has proven to be an extremely sensitive item of equipment. Consequently, after being jostled about in a tracked vehicle, it does not operate properly. In addition, in dense undergrowth and in rubber plantations its range is greatly reduced almost rendering it useless.

(14) Recommendation: Permission is being requested to turn in the AN/TPS-33 since it is ineffective and seldom used.

c: (U) Logistics.

(1) Observation: With the increase in the number of armed helicopters in the inventory, each major army installation needs to have qualified technical personnel available to service and install these weapons systems. As the demands for more and more aviation units grow the greater will be the need for these technicians.

(2) Recommendation: Plans should be formulated and initiated to provide each major army post with qualified technical personnel to install and check helicopter weapons subsystems. For smaller posts like Fort Verde contact teams could be dispatched to the Post to assist technical units supporting the aviation unit requiring assistance.

(3) Observation: Aircraft received directly from the factory (Bell) for the Air Cavalry Troop arrived without their weapons subsystems installed. In the case of the M-5, 40mm subsystem it required installation by depot maintenance and required approximately a week per aircraft at the New Cumberland Army Depot. This had an adverse effect on the troop's training. Only 60% of its assigned aircraft were available for the troop's training test.

(4) Recommendation: Future contracts should contain provisions for the factory installation of weapons subsystems on the aircraft prior to delivery to the using unit.

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ROSTER OF COMMANDERS

1 November 1966 - 31 January 1967

11th Armored Cavalry Regiment - COL William W. Cobb

Headquarters and Headquarters Troop, 11th Armored Cavalry Regiment -
CPT Harven L. Doerr

Air Cavalry Troop, 11th Armored Cavalry Regiment - MAJ Francis B. Martin

1st Squadron, 11th Armored Cavalry Regiment - LTC Martin D. Howell

Headquarters and Headquarters Troop, 1st Squadron - CPT Richard H. Fanning
(1 Nov - 23 Nov) LTC Franklin F. Wing (24 Nov - 5 Jan) CPT John E. Bailey (5 Jan -)

Troop A, 1st Squadron - CPT John E. Bailey (1 Nov - 25 Dec) CPT John F. Votaw (25 Dec -)

Troop B, 1st Squadron - CPT John R. Landry

Troop C, 1st Squadron - CPT Robert W. Garrett Jr.

Company D, 1st Squadron - CPT Bill Peasley

Howitzer Battery, 1st Squadron - CPT William K. Fraase

2nd Squadron, 11th Armored Cavalry Regiment - LTC Kibbey M. Horne

Headquarters and Headquarters Troop, 2nd Squadron - CPT Bob E. Shamberger

Troop E, 2nd Squadron - CPT Richard M. Miller

Troop F, 2nd Squadron - CPT Howard C. Batt

Troop G, 2nd Squadron - CPT Glen J. Thorson (1 Nov - 24 Jan) CPT Fredric H. Field (24 Jan -)

Company H, 2nd Squadron - CPT John G. Russell

Howitzer Battery, 2nd Squadron - CPT William R. Perry

3rd Squadron, 11th Armored Cavalry Regiment - LTC Palmer A. Peterson (1 Nov -
26 Dec) LTC Arthur F. Cochran (26 Dec -)

Headquarters and Headquarters Troop, 3rd Squadron - CPT Calvin J. Reese
(1 Nov - 6 Dec) CPT Todd A. Walsh (6 Dec -)

Troop I, 3rd Squadron - CPT Peter P. Horoschak (1 Nov - 9 Nov)
CPT Joel R. Parker (10 Nov -)

Troop K, 3rd Squadron - CPT Wayne P. Halstead

Troop L, 3rd Squadron - CPT Larry L. Mangel

Company M, 3rd Squadron - CPT Herbert C. Hertel Jr.

Howitzer Battery 3rd Squadron - CPT Leonard Deege

37th Medical Company - CPT Dennis J. Blais

919th Engineer Company (Armored) - CPT Donald J. Crocker

409th Radio Research Detachment - CPT Lee Gentry

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Incl 1

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51st Military Intelligence Detachment - CPT Alfred J. Dirska (1 Nov - 18 Nov)
MAJ Cornelius L. Grey (19 Nov -)

33rd Chemical Detachment - 1LT James T. Price

17th Public Information Detachment - MAJ Paul Blackwell (1 Nov - 7 Dec)
CPT Owen Ditchfield (8 Dec -)

28th Military History Detachment - MAJ Bruce R. Nilsson

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TET CAMPAIGN - 1967 LONG KHANH PROVINCE

1. The 1967 TET Campaign in LONG KHANH Province is a joint effort of province and district officials, USAID, VHC and the S-5 of the 11th Armored Cavalry Regiment.

2. The objectives of the campaign are:

- a. To produce the maximum number of Viet Cong/NVN defectors thus reducing the Viet Cong's effectiveness.
- b. To consolidate the results of the past year through a program for the returnees and their families.
- c. To exploit the Psy war potential of any ralliers during TET.

3. On 5 January 1967, a planning conference was held with the various participating agencies. Responsibilities were delineated with the 11th Armored Cavalry Regiment:

- a. Procuring Safe Conduct Passes.
- b. Making taped recordings by ralliers for employment against main force and guerrilla units and Viet Cong supporters. The texts for the ralliers to be furnished by the CHIEU HOI Center.
- c. Producing a rallier leaflet displaying two recent ralliers. Texts will be supplied by the CHIEU HOI Center.
- d. Procuring supplies for a tea party to be given to returnees and their families. An estimated 200 persons are expected to be in attendance. In addition toys, cakes, clothes, blankets, cooking oil and sports equipment will be needed.

4. The Regiment's plan for the preparation and reproduction of the special TET leaflets consists of four phases.

a. Phase I - Preparation (1 - 24 January)

- (1) Organization and planning conference.
- (2) Preparation of leaflets, letters from province chiefs to returnees and Viet Cong families, banners, slogans, and community bulletin boards.

b. Phase II Pro-TET (27 January - 5 February)

- (1) Presentation of films by a mobile audio - visual unit throughout the villages and hamlets of LONG KHANH Province telling about TET and GVN policies.
- (2) The air drop (Blackhawk aircraft to be utilized) of a letter from the province chief appealing to the Viet Cong to return to the Government.
- (3) Erection and display of banners, slogans and bulletin boards in the villages and hamlets.
- (4) Preparation and broadcasting of prerecorded appeals by returnees to their former comrades.
- (5) Request Viet Cong families to write letters to their menfolk appealing to them to rally under the CHIEU HOI Program.

26-27

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Incl 2

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(6) Obtain the assistance and develop the confidence of the religious organizations by inviting their representatives to an orientation tour of the CHIEU HOI Center.

c. Phase III - TET (6-14 February)

- (1) Air drop locally produced and Blackhorse Tet leaflets and Letters from Premier Ky and the province chief.
- (2) Conduct aerial, vehicular and stationary broadcasts.
- (3) Disseminate Tet posters through Revolutionary Development cadres.
- (4) Present films with cultural drama groups augmented by armed propaganda teams extolling the CHIEU HOI Program.
- (5) Conduct tea party for returnees and their families at the CHIEU HOI Center. Local officials and prominent citizens will also be invited to attend.

d. Phase IV - Post Tet (15 - 25 February)

- (1) Continue leaflet drops and broadcasts.
- (2) Encourage Tet ralliers to write letters to former comrades and make recordings, appealing to them to rally to the GVN.
- (3) Continue sending letters to families of Viet Cong soliciting them to have their loved ones return to the GVN.

2 Inclosures

- 1 - The Spring Letter
- 2 - Air Missions for TET Campaign

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THE SPRING LETTER

FROM: Lieutenant Colonel....., Chairman of the CHIEU-HOI Committee of LONG-KHANH Province.

TO: My Friends of the Liberation Front of South Vietnam Operating in LONG-KHANH Province.

My Dear Friends,

More than 20 years ago, the spring flowers did not bloom. Now after 20 years, blood and tears are still flowing in our lovely land.

Tet is coming - But there are no more festivals in the spring and there can be no more beautiful firecrackers or delicious cakes. The smiles on peoples faces cannot hide the great misery of our fellow citizens.

Who is responsible for this unfortunate situation? Certainly it is not you, but the communist leaders. They are destroying human sentiments while on the home front, in South Vietnam, the people are living a wonderful life, gathered around the fireplace and waiting for the new spring.

At this time, when our people are preparing to enjoy the New Year, I remember associating with you, dear sons of the fatherland, who remain in the enemy's lines of the battle field. I do not know where you are, along the springs, up in the fields, down in the valleys, or in the wilderness. What are you doing during these spring days? Do the communists give you time to rest and to think about Tet or are you oppressed by your cruel masters, the VC chiefs?

The communist leaders compel you to struggle on without regard for the welfare of your families and loved ones. They offer you a year filled with the uncertainties of war, a year in which you face the risk of sudden death - this is the so called VC Happy New Year.

At this time you dare not think about the happiness of your families, during Tet, with red watermelon, green rice cakes, good smelling tea and good wine. Do your family's letters reach you? What are your parents, wife and children thinking about you? You are far away. I know you think of them and miss them very much, especially at the end of the year. The New Year is coming, but how can you join your family to enjoy Tet and share in the mutual happiness, meet your obligations to your parents as their grateful son and be a good husband and good father? It is almost impossible for you, because you are always oppressed by the VC in the jungle.

Your absence is the cause of endless sorrow for your family. Your parents, wife and children weep so much because they have not seen or heard from you in a long time. Of course Tet is not complete if one member of the family is absent. All the people are happy, except you and your family. I am sorry for the unhappiness in your family, but you alone can provide the cure for it.

At the spiritual time of the New Year, DINH MUI TET, I do not know what comfort I can give you in your sorrows. I hope you are willing to accept my sacred wishes for good health, perseverance and your successful escape from VC slavery. You have enough time to think it over and return before Tet, everyone is waiting for you. During these holidays all the army and civilian agencies are instructed to find every way possible for you to join the CHIEU HOI Program so that you can join your family soon and share with them the love and warmth of being together once again.

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I wish you a very happy New Year and hope that you may answer the CHIEU HOI call soon so that we can join together in building this nation, Vietnam, to glory and greatness, so that you may live a worthy life, with your warm and lovely family and our fellow citizens.

Lovingly yours,
Province Chief

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
SCHEDULE OF AIR MISSIONS 1967 TET CAMPAIGN

SCHEDULE

<u>DATE AND TIME CONSUMED</u>	<u>LOCATION</u>	<u>ACTION</u>
18 January 1967 (2 Hours)	CNO QUS	Tape - Civilian Assistant OWN/PWF
20 January 1967 (2 Hours)	VC Villages	Rallier Leaflets
24 January 1967 (3 Hours)	VC Area	Tape - Dai Uy Song
*26 January 1967 (3 Hours)	VC Base Camp Areas	Rallier Tapes and Safe Conduct Passes
27 January 1967 (3 Hours)	Civilian Areas	Broadcast - Province Chief Leaflet - Premier Ky Leaflet
30 January 1967 (2 Hours)	VC Hamlets	Broadcast - Rally - Safe Conduct Passes
*5 February 1967 (3 Hours)	Probable VC Areas	Broadcast - Rally - Leaflet Drop
*6 February 1967 (2 Hours)	Highway #1	(Morning) Broadcast - TET Greeting Leaflets
*7 February 1967 (3 Hours)	Highway #1	(Afternoon) Broadcast - TET Greeting Leaflets
*8 February 1967 (3 Hours)	VC Centers	(Morning) Latest Tape

* Indicates Priority Missions

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SUBJECT: Leaflet Translation


TEXT: Tet

V.C. Soldiers - ATTENTION

We hope you will have a happy Tet. We know that you do not have as much food for Tet as the Free Vietnamese people. We, the soldiers of the 11th Armored Cavalry Regiment, hope that you will rally now so that you can have a happy Tet with your families and friends. When you have rallied, you will have enough food, medicine and a good job. This is a good occasion for you to rally and make a new life in the year of 1967.

Incl 3

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SUBJECT: Leaflet translation

TEXT: Typhoid Fever


Do you ever have the chills or a fever? Do you suffer from serious headaches? If you do, these are symptoms of the jungle fever (Typhoid Fever).

As you know many of your friends have died because of this sickness. For several months they gradually became weaker and thinner. Only your Commanding officer gets medicine. If you the soldiers don't want to get sick and die you must rally to the national cause. The GVN will help you. Come and rally at the Chieu Hoi Center where there is medicine and a doctor who will treat you well.

Inc. 3

33

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SUBJECT: PSYOPS Message

THEME: 20 Years More???

ENGLISH TRANSLATION: Soldier in the VC Ranks:

Your communist leaders in NVN are willing to go on fighting. The high party officials in Hanoi are with their families every day. They do not suffer the hardships of living in the jungle. They do not risk their lives. Their families never worry about their well being, but how about you, the fighters? Are you willing to go on fighting? Just think of it friends! What will become of your families as time passes? Will your parents still be alive? Will your children grow up not knowing their father? And how about your wife? Don't go on fighting for the high officials in Hanoi, or for the empty promises you hear day after day. Rally to the GVN. The GVN guarantees that you and your family will be properly fed, clothed, and medical treatment. Don't wait any longer. Rally Now!!!!

Incl 3

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SUBJECT: Leaflet Translation

TEXT: Attention VC Soldiers of the 275th Regiment

Do you wish to die in an unmarked grave?
100 soldiers of the 275th VC Regiment were killed
by the U.S. Army when they tried to ambush an
11th Armored Cavalry convoy on 2 December 1966.
Many more were wounded. Your lives will always be
endangered by bombs and artillery, and you must be
separated from your family. You must rally to the
GVN which will help you create a new and prosperous
life for your families. If you do not rally you
face only a lonesome death or capture with the VC.

Incl 3

34a



TRUNG ĐOÀN 11 KỸ BINH THIẾT GIÁP HOA KỶ CHÚC CÁC
BẠN MỘT CÁI TẾT VUI TÚC VÀ THỊNH VƯỢNG.

SUBJECT: Leaflet Translation

TEXT: New Year's Greeting

The Blackhorse Regiment wishes the people of Long Khanh a prosperous and happy New Year. In the year the VC will be destroyed by the Blackhorse soldiers. In cooperation with you the people, the VC will lose in the year of the Goat and together we will achieve peace and prosperity for all the Vietnamese people. We wish you a most happy New Year.

Incl 3

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GIỚI NGHIÊM-ĐÃY LUI BỌN VIỆT CỘNG.

SUBJECT: PSYOP Message

THEME: Curfew

FRONT: CURFEW - SURPRESSES THE VC BANDITS

BACK: People of Duc Thanh District, the soldiers of the 11th Armored Cavalry are helping the soldiers of the GVN to drive the VC from your land.

To do this we must have your cooperation. If you know any VC or their activities you must let us know. With this information we can give you a better protection.

You must return to your homes by 1800 hours and remain in your home until 0600 hours in the morning. Anyone moving about between the hours of 6PM and 6AM will be thought a VC and shot. You must not travel at night under any circumstances.

Incl 3

34c



SUBJECT: Leaflet Translation


TEXT: Appeal to VC to Rally

People of Hoi Duc and Thanh Linh Districts

The soldiers of the 11th ACR are operating in this area to help the GVN protect you from the VC. They will repair roads, build bridges and treat sick. You can help by giving them information about the VC. If VC rally they will be treated well but if they continue to stay in the VC ranks they will be found and destroyed by the Blackhorse soldiers.

Incl 3

34d



SUBJECT: PSYOPS Message

THEME: Scare

ATTENTION VC SOLDIERS

You have witnessed only a small part of the death and destruction that await you soon. The mighty air power of the GVN and Allied forces will destroy you and all you represent.....Your only hope for survival is to rally to the GVN at once. There can be no doubt in your mind as to the desolation that our air strikes bring and they will continue with greater force eachtime until you are completely destroyed. You can save your life and the life of your comrades.....Rally at once to the GVN.

Incl 3

34a



CÙNG CÁC BẠN TRONG HÀNG NGŨ VIỆT CỘNG

Khi các bạn trở về với Chính Nghĩa Quốc-Gia, Chính Phủ Việt Nam Cộng Hòa cam kết sẽ tiếp đón các bạn một cách nồng hậu, và sẽ đối xử tử tế. Bạn sẽ được trở về đoàn tụ với gia đình. Nếu bạn và gia đình cần thuốc men hay một sự trợ giúp nào khác Chính Phủ sẽ đặc biệt giúp đỡ. Các bạn sẽ được lãnh thưởng từ 800 đến 20 ngàn đồng tùy theo loại vũ khí bạn mang về.

SP-1389

SUBJECT: Rally Program

TEXT: Attention soldiers of the VC Forces

The Government of the Republic of Viet Nam assures you that you will be welcomed and treated well when you rally to the National Government. You can return to life with your families again. If you or your family needs medicine or other supplies the government will gladly help you. You will be rewarded from \$800 to \$20,000 depending upon the weapons you turn over or reveal to the GVN.

BACK:

If you want to rally to the GVN - follow these instructions. You can contact Civil servants or National Police Station. Also you can contact soldiers of the GVN or Allied forces. They are all ready to welcome you.

In any event for your protection observe the following procedures:

1. Hide your weapons in a safe place. After you rally you can show the GVN soldiers where you have hidden them and you will be rewarded.
2. When you report to a military unit or a civil servant with your weapon you must do so in daylight hours with your hands raised over your head to indicate your intention to rally. Show any safe conduct pass or leaflet you have.
3. You can rally to the GVN though you don't have a leaflet or pass. All you have to do is to raise your hands over your head and the Allied or GVN forces will know your intention to Rally.

Incl 3

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ĐÂY LÀ MỘT LẤM GIẤY THÔNG HÀNH CÓ GIÁ TRỊ VỚI TẤT CẢ CƠ QUAN QUÂN CHÍNH VIỆT-NAM CỘNG-HÒA VÀ LỰC-LƯỢNG ĐỒNG-MINH.

SAFE-CONDUCT PASS TO BE HONORED BY ALL VIETNAMESE GOVERNMENT AGENCIES AND ALLIED FORCES



SAFE-CONDUCT PASS TO BE HONORED BY ALL VIETNAMESE GOVERNMENT AGENCIES AND ALLIED FORCES



Đây là một Lăm Giấy Thông Hành có giá trị với tất cả cơ quan Quân Chính Việt-Nam Cộng-Hòa và lực lượng Đồng-Minh.

이것은 각 양측은 여가려 인정 된 안전 보장 카드입니다



*Những tờ Giấy Thông-Hành có giá trị hơn vàng ,
vì nó có thể cứu sinh-mạng những người thân yêu*


TEXT: TO THE MOTHERS AND WIVES WHOSE HUSBANDS ARE IN THE VC RANKS

Keep the Safe Conduct Passes distributed by the Government bearing the pictures like the ones on this leaflet. Each pass is an official document of the Government! Each is numbered and officially recorded. These passes are invaluable for those VC cadres who wish to use them to return to the Government side. Save as many as you can of these passes in order to save the lives of your husbands, sons, and friends. Give these passes to them when they return for visits. If possible, take the passes to them. These small passes are more valuable than gold because each of them can save the lives of your loved ones.

CAPTION: These safe conduct passes are more valuable than gold because they can save the lives of your loved ones.

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WGI 111. 11 a

SUBJECT: Psy Ops Message

THEME: Explanation of Shortcomings in VC Taxation

English Translation: Unjust taxation:

The VC tells you that their tax is for protection for your family, but they do not protect you. They run and hide like frightened chickens. They know that the allied forces are invincible. The Allied Forces do not take from you, they give to you. Your GVN and its Allied Forces give you food, clothing, medical care and help you rebuild your homes that have been ravaged by the VC. We are strong and well equipped, and with your cooperation we can and will provide protection against the VC. It is only good judgement to protect yourself and your family by supporting your true government and its Allied Forces. Resist the unjust taxation by the VC and help your GVN provide you and your family with a good life free from fear and VC infustice.

Incl 3

34 h

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VIỆT CONG KHÔNG ĐƯỢC ĐỌC TRUYỀN ĐƠN NÀY

**VIỆT CONG
KHÔNG ĐƯỢC ĐỌC
TRUYỀN ĐƠN NÀY**

Chính Phủ quốc gia đã in truyền đơn này.
Cán Bộ của các bạn lo sợ các bạn đọc truyền đơn
này của chính phủ phát hành.

Họ sợ các bạn sẽ biết:

1. Sự tiếp tế của các bạn thiếu hụt rất trầm trọng vì một phần lớn đã bị Chính Phủ và Lực Lượng Đồng Minh tịch thu trong những cuộc hành quân mới đây.
2. Hiện tại có 980.000 binh sĩ Quân Lực Việt Nam và Đồng Minh đang tìm kiếm các bạn.
3. Gia đình các bạn muốn các bạn sớm ngừng cuộc chiến đấu vô nghĩa và trở về với họ.

English Translation: **VIET CONG! DO NOT READ
THIS LEAFLET!!**

This leaflet is printed by the Government.
Your Cadre are scared to let you read what the
Government publishes. They are scared that you
might find out that:

1. Your food supply is dangerously low because so much has been captured by Government and Allied Forces in recent operations.
2. There are now 980,000 South Vietnamese and Allied Troops looking for you.
3. Your families want you to cease your useless fight and come home to them.
4. The Government's Chiêu Hồi Program welcomes and forgives all Viet Cong soldiers and civilian cadre and offers them a new start in life.
5. Because of artillery and air power, four (4) Viet Cong soldiers die for every one (1) Government or Allied soldier who dies.
6. The Allied Forces are not aggressors, but have been asked to come here to secure peace, independence and security for the Vietnamese people.
7. The allies are not here to exploit us, rather they are giving aid, so that Vietnam can build a free nation based on political and economic strength with social justice.
8. The Viet Cong are losing their unjust fight and your choice is to rally or to die.



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TIỀN THƯỞNG

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Quân Đội Hoa Kỳ có mặt tại Việt Nam để giúp đỡ Chính Phủ của đồng bào đem lại thanh bình và an ninh cho xứ sở. Để hoàn thành nhiệm vụ này, chúng tôi rất cần sự giúp đỡ của đồng bào. Để bảo vệ đồng bào và nhân dân vô tội chúng tôi sẽ thưởng tiền cho đồng bào nào cho chúng tôi biết tin tức về:

- Mìn, Hầm chôn vũ khí của Việt Cộng. Đường hầm của Việt Cộng.
- Cam bẫy, Nhử mìn phục kích của Việt Cộng.

Hãy liên lạc với binh sĩ Hoa Kỳ gần nhất của Trung Đoàn 11 Kỵ Binh Hoa Kỳ và đưa cho ông ta tờ truyền đơn này hay là số 969. Quân nhân này sẽ đọc mặt sau tờ truyền đơn viết bằng tiếng Anh và sẽ giúp đỡ đồng bào báo cáo tin tức tại cơ quan thẩm quyền liên hệ. Đồng bào sẽ được thưởng xứng đáng và những tin tức có ích lợi.

TRUNG ĐOÀN 11 KỶ-BÍNH HOA-KỶ-TIỀN THƯỞNG-TRUNG ĐOÀN 11 KỶ-BÍNH HOA-KỶ

TIỀN THƯỞNG

"The American Soldiers are here in Vietnam to help your GVN bring peace and security to your country. To accomplish this task, we need your help. To protect you and other innocent people, we will give a reward to anyone who gives us information on:

- VC Mines and Weapons caches
- VC Tunnels
- VC Booby Traps and Ambushes

Contact the nearest American Soldier of the 11th Armored Cavalry Regiment and give him this leaflet or number 969. This soldier will read the reverse side of this leaflet written in English and help you report your information to the concerned authority. You will be properly rewarded for valuable information.

11th Cavalry Regiment-----REWARD-----11th Cavalry Regiment.

ATTENTION AMERICAN PERSONNEL

AMERICAN PERSONNEL WHO RECEIVE THIS LEAFLET FROM A VIETNAMESE NATIONAL WILL COURTEOUSLY DETAIN HIM(HER) AND NOTIFY THEIR COMMANDER. THE PERSON WITH THIS LEAFLET WANTS TO REPORT INFORMATION REGARDING THE ITEMS ON THE OTHER SIDE OF THE LEAFLET. HE HAS BEEN OFFERED PAYMENT IF THE INFORMATION CAN BE VERIFIED.

IF THE VIETNAMESE REFUSES TO STAY OR COME WITH YOU, OBTAIN HIS(HER) NAME, ADDRESS, DATE AND PLACE OF BIRTH. THIS DATA CAN BE FOUND ON HIS(HER) IDENTITY CARD. COPY ALL THE INFORMATION ON THE CARD AND GIVE IT TO YOUR COMMANDER

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REPLACEMENT TRAINING PROGRAM OF INSTRUCTION

Subject

Hours

Scope

References

Unit Organization

1 C

Origin, lineage, honors of the Regiment, missions, alert procedures, uniform policy, procedure for registering complaints, weapons policy, pass policy, R&R program. Code of Conduct, Geneva Convention, UCMJ, "Nine Rules" card and security briefing.

Regt SOP, MACV Directive 20-1, USARV Reg 28-5, USARV Reg 210-5, AR 350-30, UCMJ Art 137, AR 350-216, DAPAM 27-1, FM 21-77, FM 21-10, AR 350-212, ASubjSec 21-50.

Mine and Booby Trap Warfare

8 C,
D, PE

Demonstration and practical exercise covering the use of mines, booby traps and grenades to include marking and recording. Emphasis on recognition and defense against VC lines and booby traps. Procedures for disarming mines and operations and techniques of employment of mine detector equipment in road clearing and search and destroy operations.

FM 20-32, FM 31-7, 919th Engr Co Lessons Learned, DA PAM 381-11, TC 7-3, MACV Handbook, FM 5-31, FM 23-30

Squad Tactics

2, D,
PE

Demonstrations and practical exercise covering combat discipline and formations as applied in Vietnam. Stress fire and movement, combat formations, and lessons learned.

FM 21-50, FM 21-75, MACV Handbook, FM 31-75, Lessons Learned.

Demolitions

4 C
PE

Proper handling of electric and non-electric detonated charges and special non-standard charges. Emphasis on destruction of tunnels, bunkers and other fortifications.

FM 5-25, MACV Handbook for US Forces in RVN, Lessons Learned

Communications and RTO procedures

2, C
PE

Familiarization with Ff radios utilized by the unit, RTO procedures, pro-words and station to station practical exercises.

Pertinent TM's, Tank Commanders Guide, SOP, and 11th A/C SOI-SSI.

Weapons Familiarization and Zeroing

8, D,
PE

Assembly, disassembly, characteristics, safety, familiarization firing and zeroing of M-16, M14, M60-MG, .50 cal MG and M-72 rocket launcher.

Pertinent TM's, AR 622-5, and FM 23-71.

Airmobile Operations	1,C	Capabilities of organic and CR 47 helicopters, methods of loading and unloading aircraft, preparation of hasty LZ's, Aero-Medevac requests and procedures and Tactical Air Support.	Pertinent TM's, Unit SOP Lessons Learned, 1st AVN Bde Handbook, FM 1-1, FM 37-33, 147th AVN Co SOP
Personal Hygiene and Field Sanitation.	2,C	Prevention of sickness and disease to include malaria and VD through proper personal hygiene. Proper methods of sterilization, preparation of mess areas and latrines, disposal of waste, garbage and trash and care of clothing and equipment.	FM 21-10, FM 21-15, MACV Handbook, AR 40-15, USARV Reg 40-22, USARV Reg 40-33, USARV Reg 40-29, ASubjScd 21-3.
Combat First Aid and Heat Casualties	2,C	First aid stressing combat inflicted casualties; recognition, treatment and prevention of heat casualties and organization of medical support available to the 11th Arm'd Cav.	FM 21-11, AR 40-58, DA PAM 350-9, DA PAM 39-3, FM 8-10, FM 8-35, FM 8-50, FM 21-10, FM 21-13, FM 21-40, FM 21-41 FM 21-48, FM 21-76, Med TB 81 Med TB 175, Med TB 234, DA AR 40-16, USARV Reg 40-28.
Survival, Escape and Evasion.	2,C	Techniques of escape and evasion and survival in the jungle. Emphasis on finding water, edible plants and animals and avoiding poisonous snakes and insects.	Lessons Learned, FM 21-75, FM 21-76, FM 21-77, AR 350-225.
Perimeter Defense and Interior Guard	1,C	Organization and need for perimeter security force. Emphasis on rules of engagement, vulnerability during poor visibility and noise and light discipline.	Lessons Learned, SOP, FM 21-6
VC/NVA Forces	1,C	Organization and structure of VC/NVA units, their aims, relationship of the COSVN government to the VC Forces, VC capabilities and equipment.	DA PAM 360-51 & S2 Documents, Lessons Learned.
Background-- Vietnam; RVNAF.	1,C	Brief history of Vietnam and its religions. Organization- Vietnamese military and paramilitary forces to include ARVN, VNAF, RF, PF, Nat'l Police and CIDG. Relationship and role of US and Free World Forces in Vietnam.	MACV Handbook, USARV Troop Topic No 4-66, DA PAM 20-198, DA PAM 550-40.

Map Reading	2 C, F2	Review of Basic map reading, comparison of maps used in US and VN, introduction to PHOTO Maps, and use of military symbols.	FM 21-26, Lessons Learned.
Patrolling	4,C, D	Review of types of patrols; patrol organization, formation and discipline, camouflage and immediate action when ambushed.	FM 21-50, FM 21-75, Lessons Learned, MACV Handbook, FM 31-73.
Night Vision Devices	2	Operation and employment of Ikon Lights, IR binoculars and periscopes, metascopes and light intensification devices.	ACTIV Project No ACO 25F, Final Report, Pertinent TM's Lessons Learned.
New Equipment Familiarization	2,C	Weapons system and other modifications on M113 ACAV, M132 Al Flame Thrower, Deck Launched Bulk Bridge, M118 grenade launcher. Characteristics of operations and use in Vietnamese environment.	Pertinent TM's Lessons Learned SOP.
Individual Actions	1,C	Basic mental alertness and combat skills required of the individual soldier in reacting to various combat situations.	MACV Handbook, Lessons Learned.
Cavalry Tactics	1,C	Brief coverage of tactical formations stressing small unit employment, commonly used in the Regiment during operations.	Vietnam Battle Tips, Lessons Learned, SOP.
Jungle Navigation	1,C	Proper method of land navigation on jungle terrain using map, compass, dead reckoning and pacing.	FM 21-26, Lessons Learned
Field Expedients	1,C	Field expedients useful in jungle terrain.	FM 31-30, Lessons Learned.


ACCELERATED REPLACEMENT TRAINING PROGRAM (Subjects)

- 1st Day - Unit orientation
Perimeter defense
Survival, escape and evasion
Combs' intelligence
VC/NVA Forces
Individual actions and armored cavalry tactics
Background Vietnam/RVN/AF
- 2nd Day - Mine and boobytrap warfare
Indirect fire adjustment
- 3rd Day - Personal hygiene, field sanitation
First Aid, heat casualties
Airmobile operations
Weapons familiarization
- 4th Day - Weapons firing, zeroing
Patrolling
Night vision devices

UNCLASSIFIED


SWITCHBOARD DIAGRAM

LOCAL TRUNK LINES



UNCLASSIFIED

LONG DISTANCE ROUTING DIAGRAM



Incl 5


4D

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11TH ARMORED CAVALRY REGIMENT

COMBAT OPERATIONS
AFTER ACTION REPORT



OPERATION ATLANTA
20 OCTOBER 1966 - 8 DECEMBER 1966

REGRADED UNCLASSIFIED
WHEN SEPARATED FROM
CLASSIFIED INCLOSURES

GROUP 1
AUTOMATICALLY DECLASSIFIED
AFTER 12 YEARS

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HEADQUARTERS
11TH ARMORED CAVALRY REGIMENT
APO San Francisco 96257

COMBAT OPERATIONS AFTER ACTION REPORT
OPERATION ATLANTA

1. (U) REFERENCES:

- a. LOI 6-66, Headquarters, II F Force V, 27 September 1966.
- b. OPRD 09-66 (Operation ATLANTA); Headquarters, 11th Armored Cavalry Regiment, 6 September 1966.
- c. Map Series RVN, 1:50,000-6343I, 6443I, 6443IV, 6443II, 6443III, 6444II, 6543III, 6543IV, 6442I, 6442II, 6442III, 6442IV, 6544III, 6544IV.

2. (U) NAME AND TYPE OF OPERATION: 11th Armored Cavalry Operation ATLANTA Search and Clear, Base Camp Security, and ROADRUNNER.

3. (U) DATES OF OPERATION: 200230H October - 082400H December 1966.

4. (C) GENERAL: On 27 September 1966, II Field Force Vietnam directed the 11th Armored Cavalry Regiment to secure a base camp area in the vicinity of YS 4296 to clear and secure highways and lines of communications in portions of Bien Hoa, Long Khanh and Phouc Tuy Provinces. Execution of the mission was initiated under the code name Operation ATLANTA. The operation commenced on 20 October 1966. Initially the operation was confined to the securing of National Highway 1 from BIEN HOA to XUAN LOC and a portion of Interprovincial Route 2 to the area of the new base camp. Concurrently, security would be provided for the engineer work parties involved in the clearing and preparation of the area for occupancy by the Regiment in the latter part of November. A few days after the operation started the 1st Squadron and engineer units were joined by the 2nd Squadron which organized and operated out of a combat base in the Ong Que rubber plantation (YS 3999) for almost a month. The Regiment's general area of operation is depicted in Annex E. Initially this area of operation was divided into 3 areas as shown on the inclosed map. Later the general area was expanded to include 5 areas.

While the 1st and 2nd Squadrons were operating out of their combat bases in the XUAN LOC area, the 3rd Squadron was securing the Regimental Staging Area in LONG BINH and providing security for the BIEN HOA - LONG BINH area (Operations UNIONTOWN and MARSHALLTOWN). In addition to providing security, the 3rd Squadron conducted aggressive patrolling activities and provided artillery fire support for the DONG HAI sensitive area. By the end of the first week in November the command elements of the Regiment were operating out of the base camp area to be followed in the next 4 weeks by the remaining headquarters elements and the 3rd Squadron.

The Regiment continually demonstrated its versatility and maneuverability throughout the operation. It was not uncommon to find the squadrons operating on three independent missions covering terrain from LAI KHE (Operation ATTLEBORO) to the northern most limits of the 1st Australian Task Force TAOR as shown in Annex E. The Blackhorse Regiment remained constantly on the alert ready to exploit its tremendous firepower and inherent crosscountry mobility.

a. The reporting officer of this report is Colonel William W. Cobb, Commanding Officer, 11th Armored Cavalry Regiment.

b. Task Organization. Control of the operation was exercised by Headquarters, 11th Armored Cavalry Regiment, operating initially out of a tactical command post at LONG BINH which later moved to the base camp area. The initial task organization is indicated below. Due to the duration of the operation and the additional requirements placed on the Regiment, frequent changes in task organization were necessary and are shown as they occurred in paragraph 8, Execution. Commanders are shown in Annex D.

DOWNGRADED AT 3 YEAR INTERVALS
DECLASSIFIED AFTER 12 YEARS

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1st Squadron

Regimental Control

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2nd Squadron

919th Engineer Company

3rd Squadron

37th Medical Company
551st Light Maintenance Company (DS)
409th Radio Research Detachment
541st Military Intelligence Detachment
33rd CBRC Detachment
17th Public Information Detachment
28th Military History Detachment

5. (C) INTELLIGENCE:

a. Prior to Operation:

(1) VC Main Force:

UNIT	STRENGTH	CURRENT & PROBABLE LOCATION	DATE	EVALUATION
5th Div HQ	100	YS 6058	10Oct	B/2
274th Regt	1850	YS 5585	10Oct	B/2
800 Bn 274th	450	YS 5585	28Sep	B/2
308 Bn 274th	450	YS 5363	28Sep	B/2
265 Bn 274th	600	YS 5585	28Sep	B/2
275th Regt	1600	YS 5770	10Oct	B/2
239 Arty Bn	500	YS 6781	10Oct	C/3
250 NVA Regt	1000	Southern War Zone D	10Oct	B/2

(2) VC Local Force:

UNIT	STRENGTH	CURRENT & PROBABLE LOCATION	DATE	EVALUATION
500 DOI NG NAI Bn	450	YT 0352177	10Oct	C/3
860 Bn	300	YS 5875	10Oct	C/3
C106 Co (unconfirmed)	Unk	LONG KHANH Province	10Oct	C/3
H.1 Plat	30	YT 6006	5Aug	C/3
H.2 Plat	50	YT 650250		(Base of Operations)
H.3 Plat	20	YS 810940		(Base of Operations)
H.4 Plat	50	YS 4596	24Aug	B/2
C33 THI XA Plat	30	YT 150140		(Base of Operations)
C270 VINH COU Plat	30	YT 120170		(Base of Operations)
CHAU THANH Plat	30	YT 070160		(Base of Operations)
C26 CHAU THANH Plat	30	YT 350730		(Base of Operations)
Ch7 CAH SU Plat	30	YS 5257353		(Base of Operations)

(3) Incidents: VC activities along National Highway 1 from BIEP HOA to XUAN LOC, south along National Highway 1 and Interprovincial Route 2 to BA RIA ranged from ambushes of GVN and ARVN forces to roadblocks and tax collection points. The nature of the incidents indicated an attempt by the forces operating along these lines of communication to restrict the movement of civilian traffic while denying their use by friendly forces. A complete list of incidents is outlined in Annex F to this report.

(4) Reported movements:

(a) An ARVN agent reported that a VC Battalion located vicinity YS 2382 on 4 October moved to the NHON TRACH Area vicinity YS 110845. US evaluation F/4 (Comment: No main force battalions are held to be operation in this area at this time).

(b) A MSS agent reported a VC Battalion vicinity YT 3007 to YT 3501 to YT 3200 on 29 September 1966. ARVN evaluation D/3, US evaluation F/3. (Comment: Reliable agent report has unit vicinity YT 3301 on 3 October. Possibly company size element of the 5th VC Division or the unconfirmed LONG KILINH Provincial Company, C106).

(c) An ARVN agent reported the UV 8 3/8 Artillery Battalion was being transported from YT 4703 on 1 October to CAM DUONG (location unknown)

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on 5 October by local laborers: ARVN evaluation C/3. (Comment: No unit is listed under that number; however, elements of the 84A Artillery Regiment are known to be infiltrating South Vietnam and reportedly headed for III CTZ. Leading elements could have reached XUAN LOC area by this time. The Regiment was reportedly equipped with the U/1 66mm rocket firing weapon. Characteristics: Maximum range 10km, effective range 500m, kill radius 250m. US evaluation F/6.

(5) Enemy situation. The VC can be expected to harass convoys with mines, sniping, minor attacks of up to platoon size anywhere along routes in the Regimental sector. Mortar and minor harassing attacks could also be expected on base camps and combat base areas. Although not presently indicated, the VC does possess the capability of mounting a regimental size ambush on convoys and attacks on the 11th Armored Cavalry Base Camp.

(6) Intelligence sources: The following sources were utilized to plan the operation:

- (a) II F Force V Intelligence Report.
- (b) Agent reports.
 - 1 18th Division (ARVN), (Formerly 10th Division).
 - 2 Central Intelligence Operations.
 - 3 National Police.
- (c) Intelligence Estimate - III Corps Tactical Zone (III CTZ).
- (d) MACV monthly order of battle updated.
- (e) II F Force V Intelligence Imagery.
- (f) Photograph maps.
- (g) Visual reconnaissance.

(7) The intelligence information compiled for Operation ATLANTA varied in currency from four days in the case of order of battle (OB) reports to a little over a week for the incident reports. The information incorporated in the initial operation order was only two to four days old.

b. During the month of November the VC continued to harass the 11th Armored Cavalry with units up to platoon size. His actions were characterized by mining incidents along the Saigon - Xuan Loc railroad, sabotage and harassment of ASP's, POL dumps, bridges, and acts of terrorism on the local populace. His activities were restricted primarily to the Long Binh - Bien Hoa area. Information (agent reports) received on 13 November noted the presence of VC platoons and companies operating in Area of Operations 3 (AO3) thus giving him the capability of massing main force units in AO3 for a direct attack on the base camp. However, available information indicated no such threat was imminent. Agent reports further disclosed the presence of the 27th VC Regt along National Highway 1 between North-South grid lines 50 and 60. Other reports disclosed the construction of ambush positions on the north and south of Highway 1 vicinity YT 6206. Documents also covered in the vicinity of Hill 309 (YT 4800) indicated the presence of the 4th Rear Service Unit which normally operates in PHOUIC TUY Province. Visual reconnaissance flights by Forward Air Controllers (FAC) revealed the possible evacuation by women and children from villages northeast of the base camp. No appreciable amount of information of immediate combat value was gleaned from the RED HAZE and SLAR missions flown in support of Operation ATLANTA.

c. Terrain was a consideration, but not a limiting factor on Operation ATLANTA. The primary area of operation was confined to LONG KHANH Province. The central portion of LONG KHANH Province generally has rolling terrain covered with plantations and cultivated fields. North of XUAN LOC the area breaks into a series of long ridges radiating from Hill 396 (YT 3912). Vegetation in this area consists mainly of plantations along Route 20 and to the east of Hill 396. The area is interspersed with cultivated fields and hamlets. To the east of XUAN LOC the terrain is dominated by CHUA CHAN (YT 6010) and is covered with dense forest. On the south, high ground follows generally along Interprovincial Route 2 with long

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ridges extending east and west. To the east of Interprovincial Route 2, the terrain is broken by hills, as is the area southwest of XUAN LOC. Vegetation in this area consists of isolated rubber plantations interspersed with cultivated fields, but the majority of the vegetation is dense first growth, with some secondary growth. Streams traverse the area draining generally to the east and west of XUAN LOC. The majority of these streams are non-potable.

d. CA/PSYOP:

(1) Psychological Operations:

(a) Psychological operations during ATLANTA began initially by using a "Good Guy" leaflet drop and utilizing loudspeaker transmissions to announce the 11th Armored Cavalry Regiment's arrival in the XUAN LOC area. Reports later received indicated this method was appreciated by the people of the District of Xuan Loc thus developing an immediate rapport with the local populace. Leaflet drops were also made on suspected and known Viet Cong positions and on Viet Cong controlled hamlets. In conjunction with the drops and during tactical operations loudspeaker transmissions both live and taped were directed at the Viet Cong from overhead. Information received from ralliers and prisoners indicated that the loudspeakers were heard and that the leaflets were being read.

(b) Activities. During Operation ATLANTA the following support missions were conducted:

- | | | |
|--------------------|---|---|
| drop missions. | 1 | 1,979,500 leaflets were dropped during 16 leaflet |
| loudspeaker hours. | 2 | 9 loudspeaker missions were flown for a total of 13.0 |
| | 3 | 5 "No Doze" missions were flown totaling 10.8 hours. |
| | 4 | 5,000 curfew posters were distributed. |
| | 5 | 39,400 news letters were distributed. |
| | 6 | 200, 1967 Vietnamese calendars were distributed. |

(2) Civic Action: On 5 December (in conjunction with a cordon and search operation conducted by the 3rd Squadron of the villages of CHU LY and BINH DAI) a MEDCAP plan was initiated. In addition to medical assistance basic foodstuffs (powered milk, bulgar wheat, rice, and cooking oil) were distributed to the villagers.

Once the villages had been cordoned off the people were airlifted to district headquarters at DUC THINH for screening and issuing of identification cards. Over 300 persons were transported in the operation. However, only 20 of them permitted the MEDCAP team to administer any medical aid. It was quite apparent from the outset that the people had been well indoctrinated by the Viet Cong on the dire consequences and effects if any of them should accept medical help from US troops. The food was received in much the same manner.

This was the first time the Blackhorse Regiment has encountered a locale where so many of the people were pro-Viet Cong. In order to counteract this situation an extensive psychological program has been initiated in this area stressing the importance of the people rallying to the cause of the Government of Vietnam.

6. (C) MISSION: The 11th Armored Cavalry Regiment secures a base camp vicinity YS 4296; clears and secures National Highway 1 and Interprovincial Route 333 from BIEN HOA (YT 0012) to GIA RAY (YT 6312); Interprovincial Route 2 from XUAN LOC to the boundary of the 1st Australian Task Force (1st ATF) TLOP at YS 4697; National Highway 20 from junction of National Highway 1 (YT 3410) to RJ vic YT 3616; Interprovincial Route 333 from GIA RAY (YT 6312) to VO DAI (YT 7332; opens and clears a route from vicinity YT 4401 to LONG THANH (YS 1392).

7. (C) CONCEPT OF OPERATION: The overall concept of the operation was developed with the idea of executing the plan in four phases.

a. Phase I would involve a clear and secure operation along National Highway 1 from BIEN HOA (YT 0012) to XUAN LOC (YT 4508) by the 1st Squadron with the 919th Engineer Company preparing to assist in base camp development. The 2nd and 3rd Squadrons would continue to provide security for the staging area with the 2nd Squadron ready to assume the mission of the 1st Squadron and provide a troop size reaction force.

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b. Phase II would commence with the 2nd Squadron assuming the mission of the 1st Squadron and occupying a combat base vicinity of the road junction of National Highways 1 and 20 while the 1st Squadron would move to occupy a combat base vicinity YT 4301 and secure the Regimental Base Camp site (YS 4296). In addition the 1st Squadron would be prepared on order, to clear and secure National Highway 1 and Interprovincial Route 333 south and east from XUAN LOC (YT 4508) to GIA RAY (YT 6312). 3rd Squadron to continue securing the staging area and be prepared on order to establish a combat base vicinity YS 3995 and secure and clear Interprovincial Route 2 from XUAN LOC (YT 4508) to the boundary of 1st ATF TAOR (YS 4679). The 919th Engineer Company (Armored) would be prepared on order to move to the base camp and assist in its development.

c. In Phase III the 1st Squadron would continue to secure the base camp and conduct route security on National Highway 1 from XUAN LOC (YT 4508) to GIA RAY (YT 6312) while being prepared to conduct a route security mission on Interprovincial Route 333 from GIA RAY (YT 6312) to VO DAT (YT 7332). 2nd Squadron would continue its route security mission on National Highway 1 while conducting search and clear operations south of the road junction of Routes 1 and 20 at the same time clearing routes to ONG QUE rubber plantation vicinity YS 3998; on order relieve 1st Squadron of base camp security mission. The 3rd Squadron would on order secure a combat base vicinity YS 3995; on order clear and secure Interprovincial Route 2 from XUAN LOC to the boundary of the 1st ATF TAOR; and be prepared to open and clear a route from the Regimental Base Camp to LONG THANH (YS 1392) and provide base camp security. 919th Engineer Company would continue to provide assistance for base camp development and combat engineer support for the squadrons.

d. During the final phase, Phase IV, the 1st Squadron would on relief of base camp security by the 2nd Squadron continue its route security mission on National Highway 1 from XUAN LOC to GIA RAY and initiate similar operations on Interprovincial Route 333 to VO DAT. 2nd and 3rd Squadrons and 919th Engineer Company would continue with their assigned missions stated in Phase III.

8. (C) EXECUTION: 20 October - Changes in Task Organization

1st Squadron

Troop L, 3rd Squadron

1st Squadron initiated Operation ATLANTA at 0230H moving out on National Highway 1 from the Regimental Staging Area in LONG BINH (YT 0612) organizing a combat base vicinity YT 4301. During the move small arms fire was received by Company D and Howitzer Battery. 2nd Squadron remained in the staging area preparing for movement on 23 October while the 3rd Squadron provided escorts for 2nd Battalion, 13th Artillery to XUAN LOC.

21 October

Troop B and Company D conducted search and clear operations vicinity YS 4496 with only light contact. Numerous tunnels were uncovered and destroyed. Troop L conducted operations to the east, burning 30 huts and destroying 10 tunnels at YS 354927. At 2140 hours Troop B received a burst of automatic weapons fire wounding one man, and observed 13 VC probing perimeter positions vicinity YS 440982. Fire was returned with unknown results.

22 October

Operation ATLANTA continued with only minor incidents during the day. One M113 (AGAV) from Troop B was damaged by a pressure mine at YS 455875 with no casualties. Four Viet Cong Suspects (VCS) were detained by Troop B vicinity YS 474857 and evacuated for interrogation.

23 October - Changes in Task Organization

1st Squadron

Troop L reverted to 3/11 effective 1500 hours.

Operation ATLANTA continued with negative contact. A tank from the 919th Engineer Company was damaged by a mine at YS 449983 resulting in one US

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VIA. 2nd Squadron moved from the staging at 0950 with Troop G and advance party elements to organize a combat base at CHU QUE vicinity YS 3999.

24 October

Operation ATLANTA continued with the 1st Squadron conducting search and clear operations vicinity YS 4497 resulting in negative contact. A 1/2 ton truck with three passengers from the 409th Radio Research Detachment received one command detonated claymore mine and 3 rounds of small arms fire vicinity YS 446995, resulting in one US KIA, one US WIA, and one 1/2 ton truck damaged. The main body of the 2nd Squadron departed the staging area 0738 hours, closing in its combat base at 0900 hours without contact.

25 October

Operation ATLANTA continued with search and destroy operations vicinity of the Regimental Base Camp and the 2nd Squadron's combat base resulting in negative contact. 3rd Squadron provided security for the STARCOI site (YS 030115) as part of UNIONTOWN (continuous operation - security for BINH HOA area).

26 October - Operation ATLANTA continued with negative contact. 1st Squadron conducted patrols vicinity of the Regimental Base Camp and ROA PRUNTER operations along Interprovincial Route 333 from XUAN LOC (YT 440050) to GIA RAY (YT 630120). Day and night patrols were conducted by the 3rd Squadron from the staging area.

27 October - Operation ATLANTA continued with the 1st Squadron making a zone reconnaissance south of the Regimental Base Camp. During the reconnaissance at least 10 tunnels containing clothing, rice, hand grenades, cooking utensils and documents were located and destroyed. Three ACAV's from Troop A were damaged by pressure type mines resulting in one US WIA. Negative contact was made by the 2nd and 3rd Squadrons.

28 October - Operation ATLANTA continued with search and destroy operations vicinity Regimental Base Camps and BUDDY operations with a local Popular Force (PF) platoon achieving negative results. Troop K provided a convoy escort for 188th Maintenance Battalion from LONG BINH YT 060120 to Blackhorse Base Camp without incident. In conjunction with the 1st Squadron's activities along Interprovincial Route 2, 165,000 leaflets were dropped from YS 4690 to YS 4683.

29 October - Operation ATLANTA continued without contact. Search and clear operations by Troop A disclosed a hut containing 12 expended 57mm RR rounds, a home made battery, and anti-American propaganda, at YS 455658. Troop F continued BUDDY operations with a local PF platoon vicinity YT 444015.

30 October - Operation ATLANTA continued with local security operations around Blackhorse Base Camp. Contact was made with 4-6 VC by an ambush patrol from Howitzer Battery, 1st Squadron vicinity YS 456980 engaging the VC with small arms and hand grenades. The enemy returned fire with 7-10 rounds of small arms and then broke contact. VC casualties unknown; no US casualties. Troop L continued to provide security for the LONG BINH ASP.

31 October - Operation ATLANTA continued with the advance elements of the Regimental Command Group closing in the base camp at 0900 hours. Search and destroy operations continued in the vicinity of the base camp while Troop C provided security for a bridge classification team from Company C, 27th Engineer Battalion (C) from XUAN LOC along National Highway 1 and Interprovincial Route 333 to CAU GIA HUY (YT 678198). Troop C received 10-15 rounds automatic weapons fire vicinity YT 464053 with negative results. Search and clear operations by Troop A located a hut (YS 353928) containing 250 pounds of rice. Progress continued on the development of the base camp by 27th Engineer Battalion. Troop E uncovered 200 pounds of rice, 100 BA-30 batteries and medical supplies vicinity YT 343051. Troop L continued to provide security for the LONG BINH ASP with no contact.

1 November - Troops A and B conducted a dismounted night march at 0230 hours encircling villages at YS 420940 and YS 463996 with no contact. The 27th Engineer Battalion continued to develop the base camp.

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2 November - Changes in Task Organization

1st Squadron

Troop F (OPCON 1/11 for base camp security)

Preparation for the displacement of the Regimental Headquarters elements continued while Troop C road marched to GIA RAY (YT 621110) along National Highway 1 and Interprovincial Route 333 without contact. Security measures were initiated by the 1st Squadron to assist Company C, 27th Engineer Battalion in securing the GIA RAY rock quarry. Security operations by the 3rd Squadron continued in the LONG BINH - SIEN HOA area.

3 November - Changes in Task Organization

Troop I OPCON 2/11 for base camp security

The Regimental Command Group closed in to the base camp area (YS 445955) at 0920 hours. Troop A with support from Howitzer Battery continued to operate along Interprovincial Route 333. Troops E and G received automatic weapons and small arms fire with Troop G observing at least six persons vicinity YS 444982. Troop F engaged two Viet Cong vicinity YS 425975 firing 3 rounds M79 cannister with unknown results.

4 November

1st Squadron

Battery C, 2nd Battalion, 35th Artillery attached to 1st Squadron.

Operation ATLANTA continued with the 1st Squadron pushing northward in conjunction with BUDDY cordon and search operations in the SUOI CAT area. Sporadic mining and small arms incidents were encountered with no US casualties. Battery C, 2nd Battalion, 35th Artillery provided fire support for the operation from GIA RAY. Base camp security continued to be maintained by the 2nd Squadron while the 3rd Squadron secured the staging area.

5 November - Troop A provided security for engineer work parties constructing culverts in the vicinity CAV GIA HUYNH (YT 677198). Route clearing operations proceeded northward along Interprovincial Route 333. Company B, 27th Engineer Battalion commenced work on a rock quarry site off National Highway 1. In support of the Regiment's activities loudspeaker operations were conducted at VO DAT from YT 8642 to YT 8945. Base camp and staging area security continued to be maintained by the 2nd and 3rd Squadrons with no significant contact.

6 November - Security and route clearing operations continued along Interprovincial Route 333 with the 1st Squadron making a show of force at VO DAT. 600 pounds of wheat were located (YT 647078) and evacuated by Troop C. Sniper fire vicinity of YT 654071 was received by Troop C resulting in one US WIA. Troop E and 2nd Squadron trains closed in the Regimental Base Camp from their combat base camp at ONG QUE. Units of the 3rd Squadron continued to conduct security operations with elements of the 3rd Brigade 4th Infantry Division; no significant contact made.

7 November

Troops A and B conducted dismounted patrols in AOI while Troop C conducted a route reconnaissance on Highway 1. In conjunction with the patrols, BUDDY operations were run with elements of the 52nd Ranger Battalion vicinity YT 640205 east to YT 694205 and YT 772280. Battery C, 2nd Battalion, 35th Artillery displaced to YT 690218 to provide support east of VO DAT (YT 7332). Construction of a culvert bypass (YT 678198) was completed by Company C, 27th Engineer Battalion and opened for traffic. Security of the base camp continued to be provided by the 2nd Squadron; staging area security was provided by elements of the 3rd Squadron with Troop L and one platoon of tanks from Company H working with elements of the 3rd Brigade, 4th Infantry Division providing a screen of the LONG BINH ASP, with no significant contact.

8 November - Changes in Task Organization.

1st Squadron OPCON to 1st Infantry Division effective 1400 hours.

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Troop I released to 3rd Squadron for Operations UNIONTOWN and MARSHALLTOWN

1st Squadron terminated its operations in the GIA RAY - VO DAT area at 1000 hours. Squadron elements cleared GIA RAY (YT 6311) at 1300 hours on their way to LAI KHE (XT 7738) stopping for - Class I and III resupply at the LONG BINH STAGING AREA. The first elements of the squadron arrived, 200 km's later, in LAI KHE at 1630 hours, and by 1830 the entire squadron had closed. The move involved approximately 200 vehicles and 1000 men completely combat ready. Elements of Troop G relieved the 1st Squadron contingent of security operations around the rock quarry at GIA RAY while Troop E ran search and clear operations from the Blackhorse Base Camp vicinity of YS 4590. Occasional small arms fire was received by Troops F and I with negative results. However, Troop E had an ACAV detonate a pressure type mine (YS 457900) resulting in one US WIA and damage to the ACAV. The remaining Regimental units conducted security operations in the staging area and LONG BINH - BIEN HOA area.

9 November

1st Squadron continued under the OPCON of the 1st Infantry Division as part of Operation ATTLEBORO. 2nd Squadron continued to protect the base camp and dispatch patrols outside the perimeter with no contact. No significant activities occurred in the staging area. 3rd Squadron continued Operation UNIONTOWN.

10 November

Local patrols and security of the base camp area continued to be maintained by the 2nd Squadron while the 3rd Squadron secured the staging area and operated in the 173rd Airborne Brigade's TAOR as part of Operation UNIONTOWN. 1st Squadron remained OPCON 1st Infantry Division. No significant results were achieved.

11 November

1st Squadron continued under the OPCON to the 1st Infantry Division.

2nd Squadron continued patrolling and securing the Regimental Base Camp with one platoon from Troop G providing security for the GIA RAY rock quarry in the vicinity of YT 6311. Troop G had an ACAV hit by a claymore mine (YT 627071) resulting in one US WIA and negative damage to the track.

3rd Squadron continued Operation UNIONTOWN and provided security for the staging area. An M Company M48A3 Tank attached to Troop K detonated a pressure type mine vicinity of YT 058149 slightly damaging the vehicle. On National Highway 1 a 3/4-ton truck from Troop K traveling in convoy was hit by a claymore mine resulting in no US casualties and only minor damage to the vehicle.

12 November

1st Squadron remained under the OPCON of the 1st Infantry Division.

Security of the base camp and rock quarry continued to be maintained by the 2nd Squadron.

3rd Squadron continued providing support for Operation UNIONTOWN and security for the staging area with no significant action.

13 November

1st Squadron continued to provide armor support for Operation ATTLEBORO under the operational control of the 1st Infantry Division.

2nd and 3rd Squadrons continued to maintain security of the base camp and staging area respectively.

14 November

Activities remained the same with the maneuver elements continuing with their missions. Company M conducted search and destroy operations vicinity of XUAN LOC (YT 3810) with negative results.

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15 November

1st Squadron continued to furnish support for Operation ATTLEBORO in the LAI KHE area.

Operation ATLANTA continued with the 2nd Squadron conducting local patrols in conjunction with the security of the base camp. Convoys continued to arrive and depart from the base camp daily, traveling National Highway 1 from LONG BINH to the Regimental Base Camp without incident. 3rd Squadron provided convoy escorts in addition to securing the staging area perimeter and providing one Troop for Operation UNIONTOWN.

16 November

At 2025 hours the Regimental Base Camp received an estimated 30 rounds of 82mm mortar fire and 75mm recoilless rifle fire vicinity of YS 428981, YS 462972 and YS 455975. Fire was immediately returned with 105 mm howitzers, 4.2" mortars, and 90mm tank fire which quickly and effectively silenced the VC guns. Results of the attack were 8 US WIA and minor equipment damages. A later check of the VC gun positions indicated the enemy had departed in a hurry leaving unexpended 82mm mortar and 75mm Recoilless Rifle rounds.

1st Squadron remained OPCON to the 1st Infantry Division on Operation ATTLEBORO.

2nd Squadron continued Operation ATLANTA conducting local patrols from the base camp and securing the GIA RAY rock quarry all with negative results.

3rd Squadron continued providing support for Operation UNIONTOWN and the security of the staging area. Troop L received 25 rounds of automatic weapons fire vicinity of YT 080085, fire returned with negative results. Troop I observed and challenged 2 civilians in black pajamas breaking a trail through the jungle (YT 057144). Upon being challenged they broke and ran at which time the troop fired 20 rounds of small arms, possibly wounding one of them.

17 November

Patrols from the 2nd Squadron searched the area around the base camp to locate the positions used by the VC to shell the camp the previous night. At 1135 hours Troop G found 32 expended 75mm Recoilless Rifle rounds and one live 75mm recoilless rifle misfire at YS 455979. A further search of the area found three mortar positions (YS 458974) with six 82mm rounds, assorted mortar fuzes and night firing equipment.

1st Squadron continued Operation ATLANTA under the operational control of the 1st Infantry Division at LAI KHE.

3rd Squadron continued to support Operation UNIONTOWN and provide security for the Regimental Staging Area. At 2115 hours an ambush patrol from Troop I heard noises at YT 080118 engaging the suspected area with one round of M79 cannister; two hand grenades were received on position. 8 - 10 rounds of M-16 were also fired in the direction of the noises along with six rounds of 4.2 inch HE causing a secondary explosion after the patrol withdrew. No US casualties, VC casualties unknown.

18 November

1st Squadron continued Operation ATTLEBORO under the operational control of the 1st Infantry Division.

2nd Squadron continued to conduct patrols and secure the base camp perimeter and the rock quarry. Probing actions were made along the perimeter in Troop E's sector at 0155 hours and 2325 hours. Suspected locations were engaged with M79 rounds, results unknown.

3rd Squadron continued to provide security for the staging area and support for Operation UNIONTOWN. The 2nd Platoon of Troop L at 1825 hours received 30 rounds of small arms fire vicinity YT 075066. Fire was returned with M-79 and small arms fire, results unknown. Contact was broken at 1845 hours.

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19 November

1st Squadron continued to participate in Operation ATTLEBORO now under the operational control of the 173d Airborne Brigade effective 0700 hours.

2nd Squadron conducted patrols in the vicinity of the base camp (YS 4497) and provided security for the rock quarry. At 0045 hours a patrol from Troop F received 5-7 60mm mortar rounds from IS 430951 resulting in no US casualties. Artillery fire was returned with unknown results.

3rd Squadron continued UNIONTOWN operations and security of the staging area. The area of operation remained quiet with only occasional small arms firing. A squad size base camp was located (YT 095086) consisting of a 20 meter long trench, 5 foxholes, and cooking utensils.

20 November

1st Squadron was released from operational control of 173d Airborne Brigade and closed on the staging area at 2035 hours.

2nd Squadron continued to conduct patrols and provide security for the base camp.

3rd Squadron continued to support operation UNIONTOWN and security of the staging area as well as the LONG BINH ASP.

21 November - Changes to Task Organization.

Troop K and L OPCON 173d Airborne Brigade in support of UNIONTOWN.

The Regiment continued Operation ATLANTA and was relieved of the UNIONTOWN mission by the 173d Airborne Brigade. At 1025 hours a regimental convoy traveling on National Highway 1 towards XUAN LOC was ambushed vicinity YT 275100 to YT 290099. Fire was immediately returned by the escort platoon from Troop C along with air strikes by helicopters and fighter aircraft in addition to artillery being fired in support of the beleaguered convoy. The 1st Squadron moved to the ambush site as a reaction force from the LONG BINH staging area. Major contact was broken at 1137 hours except for sporadic contact during the remainder of the day. US casualties were 7 KIA (5 from 11th Armored Cavalry), 8 WIA (7 from the 11th Armored Cavalry); VC losses included a final total of 30 KIA (BC), 1 VCS. Weapons captured listed in Annex A. US equipment losses included 2 M113 destroyed, 1 M113 damaged, 4 2½-ton trucks destroyed, 1 UH1B damaged; VC losses included 1 57mm RR, 1 AK 47 rifle, 2 RPG rounds and miscellaneous documents.

1st Squadron remained in the area of the ambush to conduct a sweep the following day.

2nd Squadron remained at the base camp conducting security patrols around the perimeter.

3rd Squadron was released from Operation UNIONTOWN at 1120 hours by the 173d Airborne Brigade. Continued to provide security for the staging area.

22 November

1st Squadron conducted search and destroy operations south of the ambush site. Four more VC bodies were found with another 75-100 VC KIA (Possible). Eight 57mm RR rounds, a tripod w/T&E mechanism for either a recoilless rifle or heavy machine gun was also located.

The 2nd and 3rd Squadrons continued to provide base camp and staging area security respectively.

23 November

1st Squadron performed base camp security for a portion of the perimeter with no significant events. Patrols from Troop C found a grave (YT 274072) containing a body with a pistol belt and one US grenade.

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2nd Squadron conducted search and destroy operations in the vicinity of YT 4003 and provided security for a portion of the GIA RAY rock quarry. At 1144 hours Troop F heard 8-10 rounds of small arms fire vicinity YT 4250015; a sweep of the area was made with negative results. A platoon from Troop G received an unknown number of rounds of automatic weapons fire and heard one large explosion believed to be a claymore vicinity YT 570053. Fire was returned with automatic weapons with negative results. A possible tax collection point was reported by the Air Observer at YT 575635.

3rd Squadron continued to secure the staging area and supported Operation UNIONTOWN.

24 November

Operation ATLANTA continued with the 1st Squadron performing convoy escort missions from LONG BINH to the Regimental Base Camp; conducted search and destroy operations in the vicinity of their assigned sector of the base camp perimeter. Troop C reported locating a fortification complex consisting of 80 bunkers and trenches forming a "T" from YT 278087 to YT 275075, and from YT 278080 east to YT 281079.

2nd Squadron conducted search and destroy operations (YS 3495) with Troop F and provided security for the GIA RAY rock quarry. On two different occasions persons were detected along the perimeter manned by Troop E. A trip flare was ignited at 0315 hours revealing two persons. Fire was received at this time resulting in one US KIA. Two rounds of mortar fire were received at 1820 hours in the 2nd Squadron area. Light fire teams were scrambled and the howitzer batteries from the 1st and 2nd Squadrons were used to engage the suspected mortar position. Reinforcing fires were also requested and provided by the 54th Artillery Group in XUAN LOC.

3rd Squadron remained in the staging area providing security and support for Operation UNIONTOWN.

25 November

1st Squadron conducted search and destroy operations vicinity of YT 495012. 35 VCS were apprehended in a hamlet containing VC propaganda material and empty 60mm mortar containers; seven were detained for further questioning. Troop B also conducted ROADRUNNER operations from YS 4497 to YT 2810 without incident.

2nd Squadron utilizing Troop F opened Route 320 for tracked vehicles, from the base camp (YS 439956) west to National Highway 15 at LONG THANH (YS 140920). The bridge located at YS 205935 was determined passable only for wheeled vehicles with a bypass available for tracked vehicles. ROADRUNNER and security operations were performed by Troops E and G.

3rd Squadron continued to provide security for the staging area and support for Operation UNIONTOWN with Troops I and L under the operational control of the 173d Airborne Brigade. Troop K conducted ROADRUNNER operations and convoy escort from LONG BINH to XUAN LOC without incident.

26 November

Operations remained quiet with the squadrons providing convoy escorts, limited search and clear operations and base camp security. Support for UNIONTOWN activities continued to be provided by the 3rd Squadron.

27 November

Search and destroy operations by the 1st Squadron east of the perimeter uncovered 90 1 1/2 volt batteries of local manufacture in a tree wrapped in plastic. Troop A also found 9 VC packs with personal equipment and new black nylon pajamas.

The 2nd Squadron conducted search and destroy operations northwest of the base camp and continued to maintain security of the GIA RAY rock quarry site.

Security of the staging area and continued support of UNIONTOWN operations were provided by the 3rd Squadron. Convoy escorts were also provided for regimental vehicles moving to and from the base camp.

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28 November - Changes in Task Organization

Troop E relieved Troop L of its UNIONTOWN mission effective 1200 hours.

1st Squadron continued Operation ATLANTA with search and destroy operations (YT 4900) northeast of the base camp with light contact. ROADRUNNER and convoy escort operations were run between Blackhorse Base Camp and LONG BINH.

2nd Squadron operated north of the base camp on search and destroy operations and continued to maintain security for the rock quarry.

3rd Squadron continued to participate in UNIONTOWN with Troops I and L under the operational control of the 173d Airborne Brigade.

29 November

Operation ATLANTA continued with the 1st Squadron making a reconnaissance in force along National Highway 1 and Interprovincial Route 333 from XUAN LOC to GIA RAY.

2nd Squadron assumed a portion of the UNIONTOWN mission under the operational control of the 173d Airborne Brigade. Troop F provided escort for Regimental convoys and conducted search and destroy operations vicinity of YT 4302.

3rd Squadron continued on Operation ATLANTA with one Troop still participating in Operation UNIONTOWN.

30 November

1st Squadron's reconnaissance in force operation continued with no contact. A report from a 10th ARVN Division FAC indicated approximately 300 VC were observed at YS 4485. 2nd Squadron units were dispatched to conduct a search and destroy operation which resulted in only minor contact.

3rd Squadron meanwhile maintained security of the staging area and continued to move its equipment and supplies to the base camp. Troop L completed its move to the base camp at 1315 hours.

1 December - Changes to Task Organization.

Troop G relieved Troop I of OFCON mission to 173d Airborne Brigade.

Troop I reverted to 3rd Squadron control.

1st Squadron secured the rock quarry and conducted ROADRUNNER operations between GIA RAY and the base camp.

2nd Squadron Operation ATLANTA with negative contact and participated in Operation UNIONTOWN with Troops E and G.

The 3rd Squadron (-) closed in the base camp at 1400 hours, with the remaining elements from the Provisional Squadron.

2 December

1st Squadron conducted an area reconnaissance (YS 4997) and a ROADRUNNER operation to GIA RAY at the same time providing security for the GIA RAY rock quarry. At 1640 hours a resupply convoy consisting of 2 M48A3 Tanks and 3 ACAV's (from Company D and Troop B) and 2 2½ ton trucks (one from the 27th Engineer Battalion) was ambushed by an estimated VC Main Force Battalion (Reinforced) at YT 627071 while returning from GIA RAY. A reaction force of the 1st Squadron (-) moved to the site shortly after contact was made. Reinforcing fire was received from 7 air strikes and artillery fire from the 54th Artillery Group at XUAN LOC. The main ambush force was positioned southwest of National Highway 1 with elements of the squadron positioned on the west, north and east sides of VC Positions. TAC air and artillery were utilized to seal off the escape routes to the south. Contact was broken at 1750 hours, with only sporadic firing continuing until 1950 hours.

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Illumination over the sealed area and suppressing fires were provided by an AC47 "Speck" ship after nightfall. As of 2400 hours US casualties were 13 WIA, 1 ACAV destroyed, and 1 M48A3 tank damaged. VC losses included 88 KIA (BC), 3 machineguns (2 with bipods) and 1 AK47 assault rifle. The attackers wore light blue uniforms with pistol belts and bandoleers of ammunition draped over their shoulders. One noticeable item of clothing lacking was that most of them were not wearing shoes. Expended rounds of 57mm and 75mm recoilless rifles were found near the ambush site.

2nd Squadron continued to secure the base camp and support Operation UNIONTOWN.

3rd Squadron secured the base camp and conducted area reconnaissance in the vicinity of coordinates YS 4189.

3 December

At 0700 hours the Regimental Command Group moved to the site of the ambush while the 1st Squadron continued search and destroy operations south and west of the ambush site. At 0720 hours Troop A uncovered an extensive tunnel system (YT 597063) and shortly thereafter captured 3 VC, 2 of whom were wounded. One of the VC stated that he was a member of the 1st Company, 1st Battalion, 275th Regiment, 5th VC Division. At 1405 hours Troop C captured another wounded VC and evacuated him for medical treatment. Prior to daylight the VC's routes of withdrawal had been sealed by artillery from 2/35th Artillery and an Air Force AC-47 orbiting overhead.

The 2nd Squadron remained at the base camp and conducted ROADRUNNER operations between the base camp and LONG BINH.

The 3rd Squadron moved from the base camp to establish blocking positions along National Highway 1 from YT 580065 to YT 630087 in support of 1st Squadron's search and destroy operations at the ambush site. Negative contact was made and the squadron closed in the base camp at 1815 hours.

4 December

1st Squadron continued to search the 2 December ambush site. At 1025 hours Troop C captured a 75mm recoilless rifle with T&E mechanism and tripod at YT 629073. Later on Troop C found 1 75mm recoilless round, 3 grenades, 8 entrenching tools, 25 foxholes and 1 VC KIA (BC) vicinity YT 634078. Total losses from the ambush were 1 US KIA (from 27th Engineer Battalion), 22 US WIA and 99 VC KIA (BC), 3 VCC (WIA). See Annex B for breakdown of weapons captured.

2nd Squadron continued to conduct ROADRUNNER operations between the Regimental Base Camp, and LONG BINH and provide support for Operation UNIONTOWN.

3rd Squadron continued to improve its perimeter defenses while providing base camp security.

5 December

ROADRUNNER operations were conducted between GIA RAY and LONG BINH with negative contact by the 1st and 2nd Squadrons.

3rd Squadron mounted a BUDDY search and destroy operation with the 1st Battalion 43rd Infantry Regiment (ARVN) in the vicinity of YS 445850. The ARVN troops made an airmobile assault after the 3rd Squadron had cordoned off the area. Battery B, 3rd Battalion, 35th Artillery was attached for the operation and organized a fire support base at YS 4496. A detailed analysis and report of the operation is outlined in Annex C to this report.

6 December

1st Squadron continued Operation ATLANTA with ROADRUNNER operations to GIA RAY and LONG BINH. Troop B continued to provide security for the GIA RAY rock quarry.

The 2nd and 3rd Squadrons continued to secure the base camp and conduct ROADRUNNER operations to and from LONG BINH.

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7 December

The disposition of the Regiment remained the same except for the 2nd Squadron. With the 1st Squadron securing the rock quarry and the 3rd Squadron providing base camp security the 2nd Squadron terminated Operation ATLANTA and at 1800 hours and came under the operational control of the 173d Airborne Brigade for Operation CANARY/DUCK.

8 December

The Regiment terminated Operation ATLANTA at 2400 hours.

9. (U) SUPPORTING FORCES:

a. Artillery:

(1) Size of Force:

Howitzer Battery, 1st Squadron, 11th Armored Cavalry
Howitzer Battery, 2nd Squadron, 11th Armored Cavalry
Howitzer Battery, 3rd Squadron, 11th Armored Cavalry
54th Artillery Group

(2) How and When Employed:

(a) Battery B, 2d Bn, 35th Artillery (155mm SP) - 2 - 4
December - supported.
1st Squadron on GIA RAY ambush (2 Dec).

4-5 December - supported 3rd Squadron on Operation ALEXANDRIA along Interprovincial Route 2.

(3) Concept of Operation: The howitzer batteries organic to the Regiment were used in direct support of their parent squadrons with the additional mission of providing general support for the entire Regiment. General support reinforcing fires and harassing and interdiction (H&I) fires were provided by the 54th Artillery Group.

(b) Battery A, 2nd Battalion, 32nd Artillery (OPCON to 54th Artillery Group less command from 23rd Artillery Group) (8"/175mm SP) - 21 November and 2 December provided general support reinforcing and H&I fires.

(c) Battery C, 7th Battalion, 79th Artillery (105mm towed) - 20 October - 8 December provided supplementary H&I fires.

b. Signal:

(1) Units Employed: A detachment from Company B, 53rd Signal Battalion consisting of a radio relay terminal (AN/MRC - 17), and HF radio van (AN/GRC-26D), a communications center (AN/MGC - 17) and 10 signal personnel under the command of Lieutenant Ing.

(2) Method of Employment: The detachment was utilized to terminate command and central telephone circuits to II F Force V, provide access to the Army Area Communications System, and to provide a communications center for the 11th Armored Cavalry.

(3) Execution: The Regimental Signal Officer determined what circuits were needed for the operation and forwarded his requirements to the II F Force V Signal Officer. II F Force V then submitted work requests for the installation of the necessary terminals which were established by the 53rd Signal Detachment. Lines from the terminals were extended by personnel from the Regimental Communications Platoon. Initially, circuits were established to the LONG BINH staging area. However, as the Regiment cleared the area these circuits were dropped and others established in the base camp area. The first circuits in the base camp were operational by 31 October 1966.

(4) Concept of Operations: The 53rd Signal Detachment deployed with the forward command post elements of the Regiment on 31 October and remained at the base camp providing communications between the Blackhorse CP and higher headquarters.

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(5) Results: The detachment provided continuous communications with high quality circuits throughout the operation. The operation of the Black-horse switchboard and installation of wire to all organic and supporting units in the base camp was accomplished by the Regimental Communications Platoon thus providing all units access to the army area communications system.

c. Army Aviation:

(1) Units Employed:

- (a) Aviation Platoon, HHT, 11th Armored Cavalry
- (b) Aviation Section, HHT, 1/11th Armored Cavalry
- (c) Aviation Section, HHT, 2/11th Armored Cavalry
- (d) Aviation Section, HHT, 3/11th Armored Cavalry

(2) Method of Employment:

- (a) Aviation Sections - General support of the Regiment.
- (b) Aviation Sections - Direct support of their respective squadrons; cross-attached between squadrons as situations required.

(3) Concept of Operations:

(a) The Regimental Aviation platoon provides a limited lift capability within the transport section utilizing six UH-1D's, and command and control support utilizing the two OH-23G's in the command and control section.

(b) The UH-1D's provided aviation support in a variety of ways such as command and control, logistical troop and cargo lifts, combat troop and cargo lifts, medical evacuation, reconnaissance, training, aircraft maintenance, administration, mail delivery, F/C, psychological warfare, and hauling of perishable rations.

(c) The OH-23G's were used primarily for command and control and administrative missions. They were also used quite extensively for convoy escort, artillery adjustment and reconnaissance operations.

(d) The UH-1G's were effectively used in such roles as ambush suppression, escort of airmobile operations, truck convoy escort, daily perimeter reconnaissance of the base camp, and as a standby immediate reaction security force.

(4) Significant engagements during which Army Aviation played a major role:

(a) Ambush suppression and search and destroy operations, vicinity coordinates YT 2810, 21-23 November 1966.

(b) Ambush suppression and search and destroy operations, vicinity coordinates YT 6307, 2-4 December 1966.

(c) Operation Alexandria in support of 3/11, search and destroy operations vicinity of coordinates YS 4484.

(5) Statistical data on Army Aviation support operations.

(a) Hours flown:

- 1 OH-23G - 627 hours.
- 2 UH-1D & AH-1G - 1387 hours.

(b) Sorties flown:

- 1 Command and control - 856 Sorties.
- 2 Combat Support - 3207 Sorties.
- 3 Combat Assault - 337 Sorties.

(c) Cargo transported - 62.5 tons.

(d) Passengers transported - 4,357.

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a (6) Elements supporting organic aviation units:

(a) 68th Assault Helicopter Company (airlifted 1/43 ARVN Regt on Operation Alexandria 5 Dec).

(b) 506th QM Co provided POL support at the Regimental Base Camp.

d. U.S. Air Force:

(1) Employment:

U.S. tactical air elements were employed in support of the 11th Armored Cavalry throughout Operation ATLANTA. O-1 Aircraft of the TACP; 11th Armored Cavalry were flown daily in the support of operations. Missions flown consisted of VR, from which valuable intelligence data was collected and submitted; FAC, in which tactical fighter and bomber aircraft were employed against both preplanned and immediate targets selected and requested by the Regimental S-2 and S-3 sections; convoy escorts during which both O-1, and when required, fighter aircraft escorted 11th Armored Cavalry convoys; and Artillery Adjustment, in which the FAC's in the O-1 aircraft adjusted both Regimental and other support artillery against targets within the area of operations. Administrative flights were flown by the O-1 aircraft but these were mainly in support of TACP requirements.

(2) Control:

All Air Force elements utilized during the operation were under the command and control of the 7th U.S. Air Force (PACAF).

(3) Effectiveness:

The majority of the tactical fighter and bomber strikes were, as determined by subsequent agents reports, considered very effective. These agents reports must be relied upon because ground follow up action was generally impossible due to the terrain and/or other tactical considerations. On two occasions when the Regiment had convoys ambushed by sizable Viet Cong forces tactical airpower was instrumental in keeping friendly losses to a minimum and was of great aid in dispatching the enemy force. Killed by air body count in these encounters was low due to the Viet Cong tactic of rapidly evacuating their killed and wounded. Again, subsequent agent reports supported the fact that the tactical air forces employed were very effective and the actual body count told only a small portion of the story.

(4) Statistical Data on Air Force Support Operations:

(a) Sorties Flown:

VR - 132

FAC - 39

Escort - 13

Artillery Adjustment - 10

Administrative - 9

Combat Strike - 135

(b) Type aircraft flown with breakdown of number of sorties
per type:

F-100 - 89

F-5 - 29

B-57 - 12

A-1 - 4

AC47 - 1

C-1 - 203

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(c) A total of 190 tons of ordnance was expended with the following breakdown by type:

MK-56	1000# Bomb	43
M-117	750# GP Bomb	44
MK-82	500# Bomb	172
MK-81	250# Bomb	28
	260# Frag Bomb	24
BLU-1B/27B	750# Napalm	228
Cannisters of CBU (All Types)		30
2.75mm FFAR		341
Illumination Flares		19
.30 Cal Ammo (Rounds)		15,000
20mm HEI (Rounds)		9600

e. Engineer:

(1) Units:

919th Engineer Company (Armored)

(2) Method of Employment:

During the operation engineer elements were attached to the squadrons based on their assigned missions. Attachments in some cases were made down to troop and company level with an engineer squad providing the support. Tasks assigned the 919th Engineer Company (Armored) ranged from base camp development and security to combat engineer support (clearing mines, destruction of fortifications and construction of temporary bridging).

(3) Execution:

On 20 October the 1st Platoon attached to the 1st Squadron moved to the area of the base camp and began clearing fields of fire, utilizing three tank dozers and one full tracked bulldozer. While the fields of fire were being cleared and the base camp perimeter secured each of the three platoons were providing combat engineer support to the various Armored Cavalry Troops when an independent mission was required. Specifically, a squad from the 1st Platoon supported Troop A by probing and clearing mines in suspected areas and destroying bunkers tunnels and booby traps. One of the other squads from the 1st Platoon while supporting Troop B on a reconnaissance mission encountered an ingeniously emplaced mine complex designed to disable an armored vehicle and once stopped, destroy it with a charge that was placed at a higher elevation than the first. They also destroyed enemy bunkers and tunnels as they were located. While the 3rd Squadron of the 1st Platoon supported Troop L on a search and destroy operation, it constructed a hasty bridge crossing in order for the troop to continue with its mission.

On 26 October the 1st Platoon moved back to the staging area to assist the Company Headquarters in their move to the base camp. The following day the 2nd Platoon completed its move to the base camp.

By 31 October the entire company had displaced to the base camp area and was busily engaged in constructing defensive positions and sandbagging living areas. Building materials were obtained and pre-cut for use in construction of permanent bunkers for the base camp. In conjunction with the installation of the perimeter defenses technical assistance was provided to the various troop units occupying the camp.

(4) Results:

By 8 December the perimeter wire and bunker system was 60% completed in the base camp area and work on the base camp roads and drainage ditches were 50% completed. Vertical construction was in its initial stages with priority of effort going to latrines, showers and messhalls. All base camp development projects were accomplished in conjunction with the 27th Engineer Battalion (C).

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Reconnaissance activities were confined mainly to hasty bridge and route surveys. This was caused primarily because of the nature of the duties placed upon the engineer platoons by the units to which they were attached. These missions included tunnel and fortification destruction and minor road and bridge repairs.

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10. (C) RESULTS:

a. Friendly Losses:

KIA - 8
WIA - 49

Equipment lost or destroyed:

ACAV - 3

Equipment damaged:

ACAV - 9
Tank M48A3 - 3
UHLB - 3
UHLB - 1
OH23G - 1

b. Enemy Losses:

a

(1) Personnel:

KIA (BC) - 136
KIA (Poss) - 104
VCC - 51
VCS - 276

(2) Weapons and ammunition:

Recoilless Rifle:
75mm w/mount - 1
57mm w/mount - 1
Machine gun - 5
Submachine gun - 6
Rocket Launcher - 1
Mortar (60mm) - 1
Small Arms - 8
Artillery Rounds - 2
Mortar Rounds - 25
Recoilless Rounds - 11
Rockets - 2
Mines - 28
Grenades - 28
Small Arms Ammunition - 2570

(3) Installations:

Base camps - 8
Fortifications
Tunnels - 61
Trenches - 59
Tunnel/Bunker Complex - 3
Foxholes - 284

(4) Foodstuffs:

Rice - 11 1/2 tons
Peanuts - 1 ton
Salt - 1 ton
Miscellaneous - 1100 lbs

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(5) Supplies:

Uniforms - 17 sets
Bicycles - 6
Cooking Utensils - 52
Batteries - 168
Packs and individual web gear - 48 sets

(6) Miscellaneous:

Documents - 41 lbs
Medical Supplies - 54 lbs (+)
Flag - 1 (metal)
Oil - 120 gallons
Money - 53,000\$VN
Electrical Wire - 2200 meters

11. (U) ADMINISTRATIVE MATTERS:

a. Logistics:

Resupply:

(1) Methods. 1st Logistical Command on request of the Regiment established a forward supply point (FSP) in the Regimental Base Camp area. During Operation ATLANTA, resupply of Class I, III and IIIA was handled by supply point distribution from the FSP. Class V resupply was and still is being accomplished by supply point distribution from the 3rd Ordnance Ammunition Supply Point (ASP) at LONG BINH. Class II and IV supply (except PLL repair parts) were received through the 266th Quartermaster Supply and Service Battalion at LONG BINH.

(2) Techniques. Logistical convoys were used to provide the primary mode of resupply for the units of the Regiment and the FSP. Aerial resupply was employed only on an emergency basis.

(3) Basic Loads:

(a) Class I. Each unit of the Regiment carried a 3 day supply of MCI's on their vehicles with a 2 day supply in their unit trains.

(b) Class III. Each Squadron Support Platoon is authorized seven 1200 gallons tank and pump units by TO&E. Additionally, each squadron has been authorized two 5,000 gallon tankers with tractor by MTO&E (USARV Form 47). Experience during the operation has shown that the Regiment used an average of 67,113 gallons of Class III and IIIA per week broken down as follows: JP-4, 8, 904 gallons; AVGAS, 1,506 gallons; MOGAS, 35,487 gallons; DIESEL, 21,216 gallons.

(c) Class V - Below is listed a consolidated list of the Regimental basic load:

DODAC #	DESCRIPTION	BASIC LOAD
1305-A011	Ctg, 12 Ga. Shotgun	40,000
1305-A066	Ctg, 5.56mm, Ball	1,739,880
1305-A068	Ctg, 5.56mm, Tracer	579,960
1305-A124	Ctg, 7.62mm, Tracer, Carton	100,000
1305-A130	Ctg, 7.62mm, Ball, 5 rd Clip	851,480
1305-A131	Ctg, 7.62mm, Linked, Ball and Tracer	612,140
1305-A127	Ctg, 7.62mm, Linked	2,265,560
1305-132	Ctg, Cal .30 Carbine, Ball, 10rd Clip	1,000
1305-A475	Ctg, Cal .45 Ball	27,855
1305-A557	Ctg, Cal .50 Ball and Tracer, Linked	1,207,500
1310-B568	Ctg, 40mm, HE, M386	6,084
1310-B574	Ctg, 40mm, Fixed HE, M386	4,056
1315-C258	Ctg, 90mm, Smk, WP	288
1315-C262	Ctg, 90mm, Cannister	2,306
1315-C266	Ctg, 90mm, HE	768
1315-C280	Ctg, 90mm, HE-T	1,442

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DODAC #	NOMENCLATURE	BASIC LOAD
1315-CH45	Ctg, 105mm, w/o Fuze	3,600
1315-CH49	Ctg, 105mm, Illum, w/fuze MTSQ	255
1315-CH51	Ctg, 105mm, Smk, Green, w/fuze MTSQ	15
1315-CH52	Ctg, 105mm, Smk, HC, w/fuze MTSQ	360
1315-CH53	Ctg, 105mm, Smk, Red, w/fuze MTSQ	15
1315-CH54	Ctg, 105mm, Smk, WP, w/fuze PD	270
1315-CH55	Ctg, 105mm, Smk, Yellow, w/fuze MTSQ	15
1315-C704	Ctg, 4.2" Mortar, HE, w/fuze PD	2,592
1315-C705	Ctg, 4.2" Mortar, HE, w/o fuze	1,037
1315-C706	Ctg, 4.2" Mortar, Illum	259
1315-C708	Ctg, 4.2" Mortar, Smk, WP	432
1330-G889	Gren, Hand, Frag	8,432
1330-G900	Gren, Hand, Incend	5,941
1330-G910	Gren, Hand, Offensive	1,000
1330-G930	Gren, Hand, Smk, White, HC	960
1330-G940	Gren, Hand, Smk, Green	399
1330-G950	Gren, Hand, Smk, Red	399
1330-G955	Gren, Hand, Smk, Violet	399
1330-H600	Rkt, HE, 3.5"	108
1345-K143	Mine, AP, M181A, Non-bounding, Non-metallic	792
1345-K935	Thicknes, Incend Oil, M1, 100 lb drum	45
1370-L231	Sig, Illum Acft, Red	64
1370-L232	Sig, Illum Acft, Yellow	64
1370-L233	Sig, Illum Acft, Green	64
1370-L307	Sig, Illum Gnd, White Star Cluster	500
1370-L311	Sig, Illum Gnd, White Star, Para	1,000
1370-L314	Sig, Illum Gnd, Green Star, Cluster	500
1370-L315	Sig, Illum Gnd, Red Star, Cluster	500
1370-L320	Sig, Smk, Gnd, Red	200
1370-L322	Sig, Smk, Gnd, Yellow	200
1370-L323	Sig, Smk, Gnd, Red, Para	200
1370-L324	Sig, Smk, Gnd, Green, Para	200
1370-L407	Flare, Acft, para	250
1370-L495	Flare, Surface, Trip, M49	5,676
1370-L621	Starter, Fire	225
1375-M023	Chg, Demo, Block, Comp, Ch	1,480
1375-M030	Chg, Demo, Block, TNT, 1/4 lb	300
1375-M031	Chg, Demo, Block, TNT, 1/2 lb	200
1375-M032	Chg, Demo, Block, TNT, 1 lb	1,850
1375-M130	Cap, Blasting, Spec-Elec, J2	1,850
1375-M131	Cap, Blasting, Spec-non-Elec	1,850
1375-M241	Det, Explosive, M10	180
1375-M456	Cord, Deto, Reinforced	9,000
1375-M670	Fuze, Blasting, Time, Explosive loaded	6,000
1375-M766	Ignite, Time Blasting Fuze, Pull Wire Type	1,850
1340-H496	Rkt, 2.75", w/motor	350
1340-H555	Rkt, 66mm, Heat, M72	400
1390-N200	Fuze, Point Deto, M78, CP	39
1390-N319	Fuze, Point Deto, M51A series	1,998
1390-N335	Fuze, Point Deto, M557 w/coaster M125A1	261
1390-N412	Fuze, Proximity, M513 series	2,403

(d) Weapons densities (Regiment and attached units) are indicated below:

NOMENCLATURE	AUTH	O/H
Rifle, M14	475	884
Rifle, M16	2,623	2,234
M3, 7.62mm, M60	847	847
M3, 7.62mm, M60C	48	48
M3, 7.62mm, M73	63	63
Carbine, M1	18	18
Pistol, M1911A1	1,007	1,006
Submachinegun, M3A1	145	145
M3, Cal .50, M2	583	583
Grenade Launcher, M79	347	347
M159 (14 tubes each)	12	12
Rocket Launcher, 3.5"	18	18
M5 (40mm aerial)	4	4

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NUMERATURE	AUTH	C/H
M16	7	7
M2	9	9
M23	6	6
M29	11	0

b. Transportation. The Regiment relied principally on organic transportation support located in the support platoons of the squadrons for its combat service support. Trench support was provided by the Saigon Area Transportation Officer to move 2,500 short tons of WABTCO, COMEX containers and tentage from the staging area to the base camp area. The Regiment was required to pickup Class II and IV supplies (less repair parts) and Class V from supply points in the LONG BINH area (an approximate 110km turn around). The same combat service support vehicles were also used to deliver from the base camp supply points to the squadrons which in some cases involved another 110km turn around. The use of tactical support vehicles to return to rear area supply points as well as deliver from forward supply points to the units of the Regiment has resulted in the accumulation of excessive mileage on the tactical support vehicles of the Regiment. This situation will be alleviated somewhat when a planned forward supply point for Class V is established in the base camp. However, the problem of Class II and IV will continue until such time as a FSP is established for these supplies.

c. Medical Evaluation and Hospitalization.

(1) Concept: The squadron medical platoons would provide immediate treatment and prepare casualties for evacuation to the 37th Medical Company and/or request "Dust Off" support. Aeromedical support would be provided by either the Regimental Aviation Platoon or Aeromedical units located at LONG BINH depending on the availability of aircraft.

(2) Execution: Each armored cavalry troop normally had medical personnel and evacuation vehicles attached to them from the squadron headquarters troop. Initial medical aid was provided by these aidmen while awaiting aeromedical evacuation. Whenever a landing zone could not be secured or the terrain was such that the helicopters could not land, the attached evacuation vehicles were utilized to move the casualties to the squadron aid station and subsequently to the 93rd Evacuation Hospital in LONG BINH or the 3rd Field Hospital in SAIGON. Over 90% of the Regiment's casualties were evacuated by air. Response to "Dust Off" requests was immediate and highly effective. On several occasions the "Dust Off" pilots exposed themselves and their aircraft to heavy enemy fire as well as friendly artillery fire in order to evacuate a critically wounded trooper.

12. (U) SPECIAL EQUIPMENT AND TECHNIQUES: No special techniques or equipment was employed or developed during Operation ATLANTA.

13. (U) COMMANDER ANALYSIS: Operation ATLANTA proved to be a most successful operation not only from the standpoint of casualties inflicted on the Viet Cong but the number of lines of communication that have been opened to friendly traffic. No longer can the Viet Cong freely utilize them for movement of their forces and supplies nor set up tax collection points to harass and extort money from the local populace. The persistent, aggressive and far reaching actions of the Regiment have continually kept him off balance thus preventing any massing of forces for any sizable attack. The two instances (ambushes) when he was able to mount an offensive action resulted in complete routs. Geographical locations heretofore considered privileged Viet Cong sanctuaries were breached by the armored columns of the Blackhorse Regiment destroying base camps, fortifications, and capturing precious stores of food. The operation only further demonstrated the flexibility, effectiveness, and prowess of an Armored Cavalry Regiment in an insurgency environment. The situations encountered by the Blackhorse ran the gamut from ROADBLOCK and convoy escort missions to cordon and search operations whereby the squadrons had to seal off and then move in and physically root the Viet Cong forces. On each occasion the enemy was decisively engaged and felt the full combat power of the Regiment with telling results. Throughout the operation the Regiment has been able to move at will in LONG BINH and BINH TUY Provinces and the northern most portion of PHUC TUY Province both on and off the highways experiencing little difficulty with terrain or geographical obstacles.

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Operation ATLANTA was the Regiment's initial operation in the XUAN LOC-VO DAT areas and initial efforts were being expended securing and organizing the base camp, however, on at least two occasions ARVN and Popular Force units participated in search and clear/destroy operations in the Blackhorse TACR. Much of the Regiment's preliminary efforts were devoted toward establishing lines of communication with the 18th ARVN Division, District and Province officials and the National Police. Currently the Regiment has exchanged liaison officers with the 18th Division and has established 24 hour contact with the local Vietnamese officials. Additionally, a limited program has been instituted whereby the National Police accompany the squadrons on their operations which so far have proved most beneficial to all concerned. Future plans call for an expansion of this program with the ultimate goal of speeding up the pacification effort in LONG KHANH and BINH TUY Provinces.

14. (C) LESSONS LEARNED:

a. Operations.

(1) Item: Obtaining clearance to engage sampans.

Discussion: When there is a possibility of helicopter fire teams encountering sampans, target clearances and identification problems may arise since clearance must be obtained from District. This requirement causes undue delay and often results in the target escaping the area before clearance can be obtained.

Observation: The problem can be greatly simplified and facilitated by carrying a Vietnamese Official on board one of the ships who is authorized to give permission to fire once the target has been identified.

(2) Item: Employment of combat engineer platoons.

Discussion: During operations adequate and efficient engineer support is not always provided because the platoons are often fragmented even though operational requirements and missions sometimes do not warrant the employment of an entire platoon.

Observation: Commanders should evaluate their engineer support available and in consonance with the mission at hand assign tasks to the engineer commander at the same time maintaining support flexibility.

(3) Item: Control of air space over the battle area.

Discussion: During an ambush there were four observation aircraft, four UH1B gunships, a medical evacuation helicopter, and one command helicopter all over the ambush site at one time or the other. With the possible exception two of the four observation aircraft were there by necessity. In addition, high performance aircraft were making strikes on each side of the road which resulted in a few near misses.

Observation: One airborne element should coordinate the airspace above the battle area when more than one type of aircraft is operating in the area. The old rule of thumb that the slower aircraft should temporarily leave the area until the faster ships have delivered their ordnance would be very appropriate in this case.

(4) Item: Convoy reaction force.

Discussion: The ambushes of 21 November and 2 December clearly indicated the need and the value of a highly mobile, and self sustaining force with the capability of rapidly closing with the enemy.

Observation: Convoy reaction forces should be composed of armor elements, if possible, supplemented with armed helicopters (AH-1G).

(5) Item: Reaction of convoy escorts in an ambush.

Discussion: Recent experiences have shown that the first minutes of contact and reaction thereafter by the escort are most critical.

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Without exception if the escort had not, once clear of the killing zone, returned to the ambush site firing every weapon available the convoys would have been overrun by the VC.

Observation: Maximum firepower and bold execution of counterambush techniques will effectively neutralize the ambushing force.

(6) Item: Location of Viet Cong ambush forces.

Discussion: During the 21 November 1966 ambush the Viet Cong positioned themselves in the grass and undergrowth flanking (2 to 3 meters) the road with the apparent idea that the gunners field of observation would be masked by their own vehicle (ACAV).

Observation: ACAV gunners should be trained to fire ahead, to the rear, and down as the vehicle passes through a killing zone.

(7) Item: Employment of hand grenades in an ambush.

Discussion: Experience has shown that the Viet Cong position their closest forces just off the road sometimes in the drainage ditches. Machineguns located on the ACAV's experienced difficulty in effectively covering the close-in, immediate area on either side of the vehicle.

Observation: The hand grenade is an excellent close in counterambush weapon.

(8) Item: Employment of snipers as part of the ambush force.

Discussion: The employment of snipers particularly in ambush sites having rubber or similar height trees can inflict heavy casualties on the ambushed element. Snipers are very effective because the ambushed force normally is concentrating its attention on the forces on the ground.

Observation: Plans for fire distribution should include the engagement of possible sniper locations once contact has been made.

(9) Item: Utilization and employment of armed helicopters.

Discussion: The armed helicopters (AH-1C) organic to the Armored Cavalry Regiment can best be utilized and employed when consolidated at Regimental level (air cavalry troop). This allows greater flexibility and continuous support for committed maneuver (squadron) forces.

Observation: Armed helicopters consolidated for combat and combat support missions will allow continuous and greater aerial support for the armored cavalry squadron.

(10) Item: Liaison requirements.

Discussion: During Operation ATLANTA a liaison officer was assigned to the 10th ARVN Division in XUAN LOC and the 10th ARVN in turn assigned an ARVN officer to HQ, 11th Arad Cav Regt. This made rapid coordination possible and has proven invaluable.

Observation: Timely liaison with other units in an area of operations is of great importance, and can provide information that would be otherwise unattainable.

(11) Item: Control of convoys.

Discussion: During Operation ATLANTA numerous convoys moved to and from the Regimental Base Camp. Control of these convoys during movement and limiting their size became a problem. During movement there is the ever present threat of ambush, especially against such lucrative targets as resupply convoys, and control becomes even more difficult and important.

Observation: Convoys must be effectively controlled and their size limited to reduce the possibility of VC exploitation of weak points.

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(12) Item: Signal support.

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Discussion: When a regimental forward or tactical command post is employed, a multi-channel radio link is necessary to extend necessary command and control circuits. This support must be requested from a higher headquarters. If there is sufficient time for planning, support can be programmed and obtained. However, if a situation develops rapidly, this support may not be available to deploy with the tactical CP.

Observation: A need exists for a permanently assigned multi-channel radio link within an armored cavalry regiment. Equipment has been requested expected in-country in July.

(13) Item: Command Post Vehicle M-577A1.

Discussion: When the command post vehicle M-577A1 is used as a "fixed station" CP, the heat build-up inside the vehicle causes deterioration of parts in the communication equipment. There are measures that can be taken to alleviate the heat build-up.

1. Insure adequate ventilation.
2. Utilize a fan to cool equipment.
3. Keep radio transmissions to a minimum.
4. Provide overhead shelter for the M-577A1.
5. When not transmitting, place the T-195 in the standby position.

Observation: Radio operators and supervisors should be made aware of the measures to be taken to prevent damage to communications equipment in the M-577A1 when operating in a static position.

(14) Item: Frequencies.

Discussion: The frequency spectrum has proven to be extremely crowded in III CTZ. Constant command emphasis and supervision is needed to minimize interference and expedite traffic passage.

Observation: Frequency interference exists, but units can communicate and make effective use of assigned frequencies by observing correct procedures.

b. Training.

Item: Rules of engagement training.

Discussion: Rules of engagement as imposed in parts of Vietnam require the individual soldier to initiate combat under varying conditions and with a variety of weapons. Without specific training oriented towards this type of engagement the results could be detrimental to our efforts in Vietnam.

Observation: CONUS training for Vietnam bound troops should include some of the general rules of engagement i.e. action against snipers in towns, progression of weapons to be used and destruction of homes and huts and why these rules are necessary. Once assigned to a unit in-country the individual should receive further instruction on any rules common only to that unit.

c. Intelligence.

Item: Patrols.

Discussion: Daylight recon patrols and night ambush patrols in the vicinity of both the staging area and base camp have been found to be extremely effective in deterring VC attacks on these areas.

Observation: An aggressive plan for patrolling the areas around base camps will deny the VC opportunities to plan, practice and execute attacks.

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d. CA/PSYOPS.

(1) Item: Loudspeaker operations.

Discussion: Information received from Viet Cong prisoners and ralliers indicate that loudspeaker missions are not effective when flown above, 2,000 feet or on windy days.

Observation: The altitude and wind activities will have a direct effect on the overall results of loudspeaker missions.

(2) Item: Chieu Hoi Program.

Discussion: Reports continue to come in from the field stating that the Viet Cong do not trust the allied forces in particular the Americans. It is quite apparent that Viet Cong 'propaganda is still able to influence their thoughts. All the ralliers in LONG KHANH Province during Operation ATLANTA turned themselves in to GVN and ARVN forces.

Observation: Leaders at all echelons of command must be aware of and stress the importance of the Chieu Hoi Program and especially how to identify and handle a rallier.

* Additional lessons listed in Annex C Operation Alexandria

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NARRATIVE OF THE AMBUSH OF 21 NOVEMBER 1966

INTRODUCTION (C)

On 21 November 1966 a large convoy escorted by nine Armored Cavalry Assault Vehicles (ACAV's - Modified M113 Armored Personnel Carriers mounting a 50 caliber machine gun with hatch armor and two side mounted M60 machineguns, each with an armored gun shield) was ambushed on National Highway One between BIEN HOA and XUAN LOC (YT 27509980 YT 299097) by elements of two battalions of the Viet Cong 274th Regiment. The escort successfully defended the convoy despite the fact that the VC were well entrenched and employed 57 and 75mm recoilless rifles, mortars, automatic weapons, and small arms and grenades.

BACKGROUND (C)

Operation ATLANTA, which began on 20 October 1966, was the operation in which the 11th Armored Cavalry Regiment cleared, secured, and occupied a base camp in the vicinity of LONG GIAO, YT 4496, 12km south of XUAN LOC, RVN. The convoy of 21 November was one of many convoys moving supplies, equipment and men from the staging area to the base camp as Operation ATLANTA progressed.

Units represented in the convoy included Headquarters and Headquarters Troop 11th Armored Cavalry, 28th Military History Detachment, 33rd Chemical Detachment, 11th Armored Cavalry Tactical Air Control Party, 541st Military Intelligence Detachment, 48th Transportation Group, as well as elements of the S1, S2, S3, and S4 staff sections of Headquarters, 11th Armored Cavalry.

The terrain and vegetation in the area provided good fields of fire and concealment for the ambush force. On the south side of Highway One, where the heaviest concentration of enemy troops was located, the brush, jungle and secondary growth begins at YT 275099 and continues to YT 282100, where an area of grass and banana trees begins (see sketch map). This area continues to YT 292098 where brush and high grass dominate the area. The north side of the road is generally level or with only gentle slopes and consists of high grass vegetation interspersed with low scrub brush, throughout the ambush area.

Less than ten minutes prior to the ambush, an intelligence report was received by S2, 11th Armored Cavalry, indicating that VC forces were in position at what soon proved to be the ambush site. This information was passed immediately to the 1st Squadron, parent unit of the convoy escort platoon.

THE AMBUSH OF 21 NOVEMBER 1966 (C)

The escort commander received warning of the impending ambush when his own vehicle was less than 1,000 yards from the ambush site. All vehicles except the lead ACAV were notified of the impending ambush before the VC commenced firing. As the convoy and escorts passed by the ambush site they employed reconnaissance by fire which was returned by a heavy volume of small arms, automatic weapons, mortar, recoilless rifle, and hand grenade fire.

Approximately one-half of the convoy passed through the killing zone safely before a truck was hit by recoilless rifle fire which stopped and burned in such a position that no other vehicles could pass. Within two minutes the three trucks behind the first one to be hit were destroyed on the road. The two ACAV's closest to the firing moved immediately to protect the trucks under fire engaging the enemy with all their available weapons. This action, combined with the small arms fire returned by the personnel who had dismounted from the trucks when the rear portion of the convoy was forced to halt, kept the enemy elements from overrunning the convoy. After a brief but furious exchange of fire, both of the ACAV's that had come up to protect the trucks took disabling recoilless rifle rounds, and had to be evacuated by their crews, most of whom had become casualties.

As the fire fight was raging in the killing zone, the escort platoon leader organized a hasty escort from three ACAV's in the lead and moved that section of the convoy on towards XUAN LOC. He then immediately turned around, and with one other ACAV, moved at top speed back toward the sound of the guns. Halfway to the burning trucks, the platoon leader was forced to leave the ACAV accompanying his vehicle to act as security for the DUST-OFF helicopter coming in to evacuate

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wounded. As he continued alone his vehicle was struck by a recoilless rifle round which disabled only the radio, on the vehicle, but wounded two crewmen. Before reaching the scene of the action the platoon leader's vehicle engaged the ambush force on both sides of the road until the enemy fire stopped. During this time he adjusted the ordnance delivered by an air-strike, and supervised the evacuation of wounded by DUST-OFF.

FIRE SUPPORT (U)

There was no artillery fire in support of the ambush fight, however, later in the day artillery was emplaced to support search and clear operations in the area. There was a total of four firing runs made by armed helicopters and two airstrikes flown in support of the convoy. Later in the day an additional air strike was flown in support of search and clear operations.

The Light Fire Team from the Aviation Platoon, 11th Armored Cavalry Regiment placed the following ammunition on the ambush:

1st Firing Run 2 UH1B	12 Rockets (2.75 FFAR) 12,500 rounds 7.62 MG (+)
2nd Firing Run 3 UH1B	18 Rockets 12,500 rounds 7.62 MG
3rd Firing Run 3 UH1B	10 Rockets 12,500 rounds 7.62 MG
4th Firing Run 3 UH1B	2 Rockets 12,500 rounds 7.62 MG 12 Rockets
TOTAL	50,000 rounds 7.62 (+)

The Air Force delivered the following ordnance on the site of the ambush:

1st Air Strike Flight of 3 F100's	6-500 pound bombs 6-750 pound napalm bombs 7200 rounds 20mm
2nd Air Strike Flight of 2 F51's	2-500 pound bombs 2-750 pound bombs 2-Type 2A CBU clusters

RESULTS

(U) Enemy losses included:

Personnel:

KIA (BC)	30
KIA (POSS)	75 - 100

Equipment:

57mm Recoilless Rifle	1
AKA 47 Assault Rifle and Tripod	1
RPG-2 AT Rockets	2
RPG AT hand grenade	1
Stick grenades	35
Tail fin assemblies from expended RPG-2	2
AT rockets	3
75mm RR Casings	3

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83 a Unfired 57mm RR HEAT 9
 Rounds
 Expended 57mm RR casings 6
 Expended booster charge 2
 casings for RPG
 Sets of web equipment and 10
 camouflage
 Aidman's medical kit with 1
 splints
 Documents identifying 1st Bn, 274, and 2nd Bn,
 274th VC Regiment were taken from bodies

(C) Friendly losses included:

Personnel:

KIA 7
MIA 8

Equipment:

ACAV's destroyed 2
2½ ton trucks destroyed 4

CONCLUSIONS (C)

Information obtained from documents found on the VC bodies indicated elements of the 1st and 2nd Battalions of the 274th VC Regiment comprised the ambush force.

Though the VC destroyed 2 combat and 4 administrative vehicles the convoy was not overrun, despite the fact that the major portion of the enemy force only had to contend with the small arms of the escorted personnel and two ACAV's. This was determined by three factors:


First was the counter fire from the ambushed column, which began as soon as the trucks stopped.

Second was the fact that the escort unit was warned of the ambush and entered the killing zone firing their automatic weapons. This undoubtedly inflicted casualties on the enemy and may well have caused the VC to initiate the ambush prematurely.


Third it must be accepted that the tremendous volume of fire put out by the ACAV's was instrumental in causing the VC to break contact and flee.

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Sketch Map



← 2.5 KM →



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NARRATIVE OF THE AMBUSH OF 2 DECEMBER 1966

INTRODUCTION (C)

On 2 December 1966, elements (resupply convoy) of the 1st Squadron were ambushed by the 275th Viet Cong Main Force Regiment on National Highway 1 northeast of SUOI CAT. The ensuing action dramatically displayed the epitome of proper counterambush techniques and actions. So violent was the execution of the counterambush that within 70 minutes the squadron had rendered the 275th VC Regiment ineffective as a fighting force without the loss of a single trooper. This one action assisted immeasurably in paving the way for more extensive operations by the Blackhorse Regiment to the north and east of VO DAT.

BACKGROUND (C)

Operation ATLANTA began on 20 October 1966 with the 1st Squadron conducting a clear and secure operation along National Highway 1 from BIEN HOA to XUAN LOC and securing the site of the Regiment's permanent base camp south of XUAN LOC. Operation ATLANTA was not only conceived on the idea of carving out a piece of real estate and building a base camp, but in opening up and securing roads and permitting the flow of civilian commerce throughout the provinces around XUAN LOC. Once the base camp area had been secured, search and destroy and ROADRUNNER operations were conducted toward VO DAT along National Highway 1, and Interprovincial 333, and south from the base camp on Interprovincial Route 2 to the 1st ATF TAOR.

Convoys with supplies, equipment and troops continued to arrive from the LONG BINH staging area in ever increasing amounts throughout the remainder of October and the entire month of November. On 2 November the Regiment began providing security for a company from the 27th Engineer Battalion (C) in the vicinity of GIA RAY adjacent to National Highway 1 at the base of CHUA CHAN Mountain.

Viet Cong activities in the 11th Armored Cavalry's area of operation were relatively minor in nature during the month of November except for the ambush of 21 November. On 27 and 28 November the Regiment received RED HAZE reports of approximately 80 emissions south of National Highway 1 (vic YT 2010 - 2410 - 2407 - 2007) and agent reports of movements north and south of National Highway 1 in the vicinity of SUOI CAT and CHUA CHAN Mountain. On the 29th the 1st Squadron moved into the area of the reported activity and conducted a zone reconnaissance north and south of Highway 1 as far as GIA RAY remaining overnight, returning the next day without contact. On the same day the 1st Squadron returned to the base camp, a FAC from the 18th ARVN Division (Formerly the 10th Division) reported receiving automatic weapons fire and observed an estimated Viet Cong battalion off Interprovincial Route 2 vicinity of XA BANG (YS 4285). Shortly thereafter a second report was received, this one from XUAN LOC subsector indicating another Viet Cong battalion was located (YT 3405 to YT 3498) west of XUAN LOC approximately 8 kilometers. The 2nd Squadron was immediately dispatched to check the reported activity to the south on Interprovincial Route 2 while the 1st Squadron moved to the west on Highway 1 to search the other suspected area. Both operations produced negative contact.

The 1st and 2nd Squadrons returned to the base camp resuming their mission of base camp security. The next day Troop B relieved elements of the 2nd Squadron providing security for the GIA RAY rock quarry. Agent reports still indicated enemy activity around GIA RAY. Consequently, reaction forces were continually on the alert and each convoy's movement was closely scrutinized.

The terrain in the area of the ambush is gentle, sloping to the southeast from the commanding terrain in the area, Chua Chan Mountain (elevation 837m). Drainage flows from the mountain to the northeast to the southeast. The highway is flanked by elephant grass on both sides turning into heavy secondary growth approximately 60 meters off the road. The initial area of contact was flanked to the west by a portion of a rubber plantation. Trafficability was limited once the vehicles entered the undergrowth. However, it did not impede the advance of the Blackhorse Troopers. The weather was hot and clear continuing throughout the night and the next day.

Annex B

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THE AMBUSH OF 2 DECEMBER 1966 (C)

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On the second of December Troop B plus a platoon of tanks from Company D were securing the site of the rock quarry while Troop A manned the squadron's sector of the base camp perimeter. A resupply convoy had arrived earlier in the day at the base camp and was on its way back to the rock quarry when it was ambushed at 1640 hours by an estimated 2 battalion Viet Cong force. The area selected by the enemy for the ambush is located on a stretch of Highway 1 that has come to be known as "Ambush Alley" (YT 602064 to YT 629084 along Highway 1) (see sketch 1). The convoy, consisting of 2 tasks, 3 ACAV's and 2 2½-ton trucks, reacted violently to the attack with the armored vehicles escorting the two trucks out of killing zone then returning immediately to rake the entire killing zone with 90mm cannister, 50 Cal and 7.62 machinegun fire, grenades and M-16 fire (see sketch 2).

Word of the ambush was received by the 1st Squadron units in the base camp and Troop B located 5 kilometers north of the ambush at the rock quarry. Within seven minutes after the squadron received the information, Company D (-) was on the move towards the ambush to be followed 10 minutes later by Troop C. Meanwhile Troop B had arrived at the ambush site, moving right into the killing zone smothering the Viet Cong positions, many of which were only off the shoulder of road, with withering fire. A Viet Cong recoilless rifle round hit one of the tanks knocking off the commander's cupola, but it did not deter the crew as they continued to fight and in the ensuing battle fired every round of 90mm on the tank.

By this time the tanks of Company D began to arrive on scene having traveled 22 kilometers in 25 minutes, commenced moving through the ambush zone raking one side of the highway while Troop B worked over the other side. Howitzer Battery which followed Troop C and was in turn followed by Troop A 45 minutes later, moved into a fire support position near SOU CAT. Once Troop C reached the ambush site it moved through the killing zone firing everything it had, and taking up positions on Highway 1 beyond the RJ of 333 and 1 in an effort to seal off the Viet Cong's routes of withdrawal.

The Viet Cong apparently thinking that Troop C was the last of the reinforcements began to fire again on the road only to be caught in a crossfire between the on-charging Troop A and the tanks of Company D. This fire fight lasted about ten minutes then Charlie began to lose his taste for combat with the Troopers of the Blackhorse. Troop A moved into positions astride Highway 1 west of Troop B while Troop C shifted further south in an attempt to block the Viet Cong's escape routes (see sketch 3).

Reinforcing fire was provided both from the ground by the 54th Artillery Group and fighter aircraft based at BIEN HOA directed by the Regiment's FAC personnel observing the ambush site from overhead. Further support was provided by the Squadron's light fire team and aircraft from the Regimental Aviation Platoon.

The Viet Cong had dug-in and covered positions on both sides of the road (see sketch 2) covering the killing zone with heavy and light machineguns, 60mm mortars, at least one 75mm recoilless rifle and small arms. Viet Cong forces were also positioned close to the shoulder of the road with grenades, with the apparent hope of damaging the suspension systems of the ACAV's and tanks which proved to be fruitless. They did however, provide lucrative targets for the grenadiers on the passing ACAV's as they dropped their hand grenades and fired their M79 launchers with deadly accuracy.

At 1750 hours contact was broken by the Viet Cong with only sporadic firing continuing until 1950 hours. In order to seal off the escape routes to the south (see sketch 3) a combination of artillery and air support was utilized to fire throughout the night on suspected avenues of withdrawal (trails, stream beds, ridge lines). Illumination and suppressing fires were delivered by rotating ACH7 "Spook" ships over the area until morning light. An initial check of the area indicated the VC had 88 KIA (BC) in the 70 minute encounter with the "First of the Blackhorse".

After remaining in position all night along the road the 1st Squadron started to clear the ambush site, sending dismounted patrols approximately 200 meters off the road. Mounted patrols conducted search and clear operations on the trails traveling 10 kilometers into the jungle. To further tighten the knot around the area the 3rd Squadron moved from the base camp assuming the 1st Squadron's blocking positions while the 1st made a sweep of the area. A forward CP from the

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Regiment was also moved into the area to facilitate command and control of the operations. As the clearing operation progressed the Viet Cong body count climbed, reaching 99 with at least another 100 KIA (POSS). At approximately 1630 hours the 3rd Squadron and Regimental CP moved back to the base camp leaving the 1st Squadron to continue their clearing of the area.

FIRE SUPPORT (U)

At the time of the ambush there were no preplanned fires or air strikes, however, within ten minutes after the ambush started, supporting fires from fighter aircraft and the 54th Artillery Group were on the way. Thus providing Howitzer Battery, 1st Squadron enough time to position itself at SOUT CAT where it was able to provide direct support for the entire ambush area. Prior to darkness a Battery from the 2nd Battalion, 35th Artillery was dispatched from XUAN LOC to provide further support. Highway 1 was established as the fire coordination line (see sketch 4) with the air strikes directed to the east and south of the highway and the artillery to the west and north. FAC personnel from the Regiment directed, in coordination with the ground commander, seven air strikes from their light observation aircraft observing the ambush site. CBU's 250 pound bombs, napalm and 20mm cannons were directed into the area uprooting trees and cutting huge gouges out of the jungle below. During the hours of darkness a AC47 "Spook" ship was continually overhead providing illumination and suppressing fires on request and as targets of opportunity appeared. Supplementing the above mentioned fire support were light fire teams from the 1st Squadron and Regiment. The light fire team from the 1st Squadron personally bagged at least 5 Viet Cong when it caught a group of them in the open.

A total of 22 sorties were flown as follows:

A01 - 3
F5 - 5
F100 - 10
AC47 - 4

Ordnance expended included:

CBU	8 cannisters
Bomb, 500 lbs	16
Bomb, 750 lbs	6
Napalm, 750 lbs.	22
FFAR, 2.75"	76
20mm (HEI)	10,000 rds
30 Caliber	15,000 rds

There was a minimum of one FAC overhead at all times and at some times as many as 3 in the air at once. Continuous communications were maintained with the ground commander for the duration of the ambush.

Artillery direct support was provided by Howitzer Battery 1st Squadron. Reinforcing fires were provided by Battery B (155SP), 2nd Battalion, 35th Artillery. A total of 1700 rounds were fired in support of the operation.

RESULTS

(U) Enemy losses included:

Personnel:

KIA (BC)	99
KIA (POSS)	100-150
VCC	3

Equipment:

75mm RR	1
7.62 Hvy HB	1
7.62 Lt HB (Type 58)	1

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7.62 Lt. MG (Type 56)	4
AK 47 Assault Rifle	3
Chicom Carbine w/Bayonet	1
B40 RPG2 Rocket Launcher	1
60mm Mortar	1
M50 Sub MG	1
Carbine M2 (US)	1
Small Arms Ammunition	1500 rounds
Grenade (Fragmentation & Concussion)	45
RKG AT grenade	2
Mortar Ammunition (60mm)	15

(C) Friendly losses included:

Personnel:

KIA - 1 (27th Engr Bn)

WIA - 22

Equipment:

ACAV (destroyed) - 1

Tand M48A3 (damaged) - 1

CONCLUSIONS (C)

A search of the ambush area and information obtained from captured documents and prisoners indicated that the 275th VC Regt (Main Force) reinforced with heavy weapons sprung the ambush which 70 minutes later turned into a disastrous defeat. The decisive defeat of the Viet Cong can be attributed to several things:

First and foremost is that at no time in the ambush was the Viet Cong able to gain control of the situation even though he had the advantages of surprise and fortified positions. The violent reaction by the escort force completely stripped him of any advantages he might have had. Once out of the killing zone the escort force minus the trucks charged head long down the road belching fire on both sides of the road. This spontaneous action held at bay the attacking force until the reaction forces arrived.

Secondly, the rapid reaction of the remainder of the squadron in reaching the ambush site within 25 minutes after traveling a distance of approximately 22 km.

Third, the immediate establishment of a fire coordination line (Highway 1) thus permitting maximum utilization of both air and ground supporting fires.

Fourth, the ability of the convoy to withstand the initial shock and then be able to retaliate so effectively.

The final results might have been even better if it had stayed light another two hours. However, weather conditions did not limit the ability of control personnel to place effective fire on the enemy positions.

Inclosures:


Sketch map 1, Sketch map 2, Sketch map 3, Sketch map 4, and Topographic Map.

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
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
Sketch 1




Sketch 2




Sketch 3



Sketch 4





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COMBAT OPERATIONS AFTER ACTION REPORT
OPERATION ALEXANDRIA

References:

OPORD 09-66 (OPERATION ALEXANDRIA), Headquarters, 11th Armored Cavalry Regiment, 2 Dec 66.

1. NAMES OR IDENTITY AND/OR TYPE OF OPERATION.

a. OPERATION ALEXANDRIA

b. Search and Destroy.

2. DATES OF OPERATION: 041030 - 051957 Dec 66.3. LOCATION. DUC THANH and YUAN LOC PROVINCES.4. CONTROL HEADQUARTERS. 11th Armored Cavalry Regiment.5. REPORTING OFFICER. LTC Palmer A. Peterson.6. TASK ORGANIZATION. See Annex A.7. SUPPORTING FORCES:

a. Air Support

(1) Preplanned air strikes: There were two preplanned air strikes at 050700 Dec on suspected VC routes of withdrawal. Its effectiveness could not be judged because of the dense vegetation in the strike area.

(2) Immediate air strikes: There was one immediate air strike at 051100 Dec called in by Tm I to reduce enemy machine gun and small arms fire. The strike which followed artillery and an assault by two light fire teams reduced the volume of fire to the extent where ground elements could effect a search.

b. Squadron and Regimental Aviation.

(1) A total of 25 hours and 40 minutes of air time was recorded by helicopter pilots flying in support of the ground action. 13 hours 50 minutes were recorded in UH-1B aircraft and 11 hours 50 minutes were recorded in OH-23G aircraft that flew FO's and other observers.

(2) A total of four strikes were recorded. Three by the Third Squadron light fire team and one by the Second Squadron light fire team. Targets were enemy routes of withdrawal from the objective area, tunnels and bunkers. The assaults were observed to be more effective in suppressing enemy fires from those positions.

(3) The following Ordnance was expended:

(a) 2.75" air to ground rockets - 37

(b) 7.62mm linked - 6,000 rounds

c. Other Aviation.

(1) Two Dust Offs were completed for this operation.

(2) 68 hours were flown by 10 UH-1B aircraft of the 68th Aviation Support Company. The company air-lifted the 43rd Infantry into objective Alpha and out at the end of the day. Also, these elements were used to evacuate 600 VCS to an interrogation point six kilometers from Objective A.

Annex C

GROUP 4
AUTOMATICALLY DECLASSIFIED
AFTER 12 YEARS

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SUBJECT: Combat Operations After Action Report (RVC: MLCV J3-32 (Cont))

d. Artillery

(1) General: Artillery support for the operation was supplied by three sources.

(a) Howitzer Battery 3d Squadron fired the following missions:

1. 050200 to 050300 Dec. H&I was fired in various areas. 40 rds HE were fired. It was unobserved; effectiveness unknown.

2. 050515 to 050715. 297 rds HE and 42 rds WP were fired for preparatory fires and to seal off the objective areas. It was unobserved and results unknown; however, based on the number of VCS detained it can be assumed that it was effective in helping to establish the seal.

3. 050600 Dec. 2 rds of WP were fired as a navigational aid to Tm I.

4. 050900 Dec. 366 rds HE and 48 rds WP were fired for a blocking barrage which was requested by S-3. An FO observed and reported the fire effectively blocked avenues of escape.

5. 051045 to 051400. 396 rds of HE and 32 rds WP were fired for combined assault on line by Tm I, Tm K and Tm L. At one point on this mission a dead space was encountered in a deep draw. The assault elements could not effectively clear the area without halting the assault. Howitzer Battery effectively closed their sheaf and was able to completely fill the draw with fire and reduce enemy harassment from that position.

6. 051630 to 051645 Dec. 137 rds HE and 13 rds WP were fired by the 105 Battery and 155 Battery massed as a final protective fire for Tm I and Tm L as they withdrew from the area. This was a TOT mission. Artillery batteries are not usually located together in Vietnam to allow them to mass their forces in this way. However, the mission was effectively accomplished.

b. B Battery 2/35 Artillery 155 MM SP fired 454 rds HE and 10 rds WP in missions ranging from H&I to a TOT. As this battery has a range of 3 to 4 miles and its effect on a target in three times that of a 105, the battery provided a valuable asset to the operation.

c. Provisional Mortar Battery, composed of the mortars in the Armored Cavalry Troop massed in one battery, fired four H&I missions in the vicinity of Objective Alpha. As a supplement to our Howitzer Battery and a second source of indirect fire the Provisional Mortar Battery is very valuable.

8. INTELLIGENCE

a. Prior to Operation: Numerous sources, 1st Australian Task Force, Phuoc Tuy Province and Sector Headquarters, Duc Thanh Advisor and aerial observation all indicated that an unknown local force was operating in the area. Countless incidents of sniper fire, mines, road cuts and tax collection points had been reported by these sources. It was suspected that the local force units provided cuts to allow the 274 and 275 VC Regiments to cross Interprovincial Highway #2. They also served as guides to the Regiments when in the area.

The S-2 American Advisor in Phuoc Tuy Province further indicated that the area could harbor a transient VC Base Camp as there were tunnels and trenches sighted on several occasions, and the fortifications were on a VC east-west route of movement.

b. Value of prior intelligence: Prior intelligence was a valuable indication of what might be expected in the area. Expected terrain limitations came as no surprise and full advantage was taken of those areas where we knew armored vehicles could operate best. The 43 ARVN Inf Bn was requested to cope with expected unfavorable terrain where it existed and to provide a search element for widely dispersed and isolated huts in Objective A. Prior intelligence from aerial observation allowed for preplanned artillery to be placed on expected routes of enemy withdrawal. Actual enemy resistance did exceed that which was expected and planned for.

c. Intelligence during the operation: Intelligence gained from OPERATION ALEXANDRIA definitely identified the local force to be local force Company C-20. Of the 42 confirmed VC captured, interrogators found one who was a member of the 274th VC Regiment. Documents collected have not been fully evaluated but one revealed the location of a VC mine field.

Tunnels and bunkers indicated a defensive position and verified suspicions that the area was utilized as a transient Base Camp.

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SUBJECT: Combat Operations After Action Report (RVC: MACV J3-32 (cont))

9. MISSION. To conduct search and destroy operation 050609 December 1966, vic YS445852, Cam My 2 (YS465858), Ap Hein (YS462825) to seize VC and VCS in area.

10. CONCEPT OF OPERATION:

a. Maneuver: To conduct opn in 3 phases:

- (1) Phase I: Atk on 2 directions of atks to seal obj's A and B. Secure landing zones for 43 Inf (ARVN) (-).
- (2) Phase II: Cont to seal Obj's A and B. 43 Inf (ARVN) clears Obj's A and B. VC and VCS airlifted to sector interrogation center vic YS464782.
- (3) Phase III: On order, Tm M cont atk to search Obj C; Tm L cont atk to search Obj D.

b. Fires:

- (1) Arty: Pri of fire Tm I init; Tm K on order. Prep H-30 to H-hour to seal Obj A and B.
- (2) TAC Air: On call.

11. EXECUTION

General: Headquarters 3d Squadron 11th Armored Cavalry Regiment issued OPOD 09-66 (OPERATION ALEXANDRIA) on 2 Dec 1966 assigning the mission as stated in paragraph 9 above. On 211800 Dec all unit commanders were briefed on the mission. At 021500 Dec coordination was made with the participating ARVN unit. The Squadron Commander, S-3, a liaison officer and the Regimental 2 traveled to Bia Ria on 2 Dec to effect coordination with Phouc Tuy officials and American Advisors, the Battalion Commander of the 43 ARVN Infantry, and Liaison officer of the 68th Airmobile Company. On 4 Dec liaison was made with B 2/35 Arty.

4 December 1966

At 041400 Dec, How Battery displaced to the Courtenay Rubber Plantation at YS458920 in preparation to fire H&I fires and direct support missions on 5 Dec 66.

Tm L mounted, moved south on route Black at 041745 Dec and from YS438956 to YS443915 the team dismounted and took position on either side of Route 2 to secure that portion of the route for the road march on 5 Dec. Tm L occupied these positions by 041846 Dec. The Tm L vehicles returned to Base Camp after the dismounted personnel took position.

5 December 1966

Phase I of the operation commenced at 0515 hrs with Howitzer Battery and B battery 2/35 Artillery conducting preparatory fires in objectives A & B to seal the area until the teams could take position.

At 0515 Tm K crossed SP and proceeded south on route BLACK traveling south to effect a seal on objective Alpha. Tm L brought its vehicles to the positions it occupied on route BLACK. The team mounted and proceeded south to complete the seal on objective Alpha. Team L brought its vehicles to the positions it occupied on route BLACK. The team mounted and proceeded south to complete the seal on objective Alpha.

Provisional Mortar Battery followed in march order and displaced to the south of route BLACK to YS457840 where the Battery was laid.

3/919 Engineers was last in march order, and took up position with Provisional Mortar Battery.

At 0545 How Battery stopped preparatory fires and started interdiction fires on suspected route of withdrawal from Objectives A & B.

At 0630 Tm K had completed the seal on Objective Bravo. Tm I reported its portion of the seal for Objective Alpha was complete at 0647. At 0656 the first lift, one company of the 43rd Infantry (ARVN) was on the landing zone. At 0709 Tm M reported they were in position and were sealing their position and completed the seal at 0735.

Phase II. At 0640 Tm K commenced a search of area Bravo. The search in objective Bravo revealed several posters and leaflets which were anti-American. At coordinates YS465850 in the vicinity of a concrete plantation house Tm K found a 30 meter long tunnel. By 0729 Tm K had taken about 150 VCS and requested air evacuation for the suspects so that they could be taken to the interrogation point at Binh Gia. At 0745 Tm K reported having located 2000 pounds of peanuts which they destroyed.

The third lift of the 43 Infantry was completed at 0800. At this time the ARVN Force moved east from the landing zone at YS417862 and moved into objective Alpha to initiate a search of the area.

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Tm I and Tm started searching in the vicinity of their blocking positions and at 0820 Tm I discovered a large number of inter-connecting tunnels running under houses. Snake was placed in the tunnel and "tunnel rats", recently trained in the Squadron entered the tunnels for a detailed search.

At 0825 sniper fire wounded a tank commander and loader in the head at coordinates YS438346. Dustoff was called for at that location by Tm I.

Tm I called in a light fire team to make a run on the location that the sniper fire came from. The air observer and S3 called in artillery to fire a blocking barrage to seal the area while Tm I searched the position. At 0905 Tm I made further contact with heavy volumes of machine gun and small arms fire at YS438346. The light fire team made an assault on the position but artillery was not used due to aircraft in the area.

High performance aircraft was also kept on stand-by pending the completion of Dustoff. One attempt at Dustoff failed at 0904 when the aircraft suffered tail damage from hostile fire and was forced to land at Base Camp. At 0920 the wounded tank commander died, and Tm I requested the body be evacuated.

To the south of Objective Alpha where Tm M was in blocking position. A limited search was conducted. By 0958 Tm M had discovered 5000 lbs of rice and had 35 VCS to be evacuated.

Dustoff was not accomplished for Tm I until 1022 almost two hours after it had been requested. Upon completion of Dustoff Tm I called in artillery as small arms and automatic weapons persisted. The artillery was lifted at 1058, and the light fire team followed by TAC air assaulted the area.

At 1102 Tm I requested a second dustoff. The second dustoff was completed at 1140. Tm I still had a KIA at its location as neither dustoff nor our light fire team could pick up the body. One of the aircraft from the 68th Airmobile support company finally evacuated the body. Tm M searching in the vicinity of its blocking position had uncovered a total of 8000 lbs of rice which was destroyed and 45 VCS. By 1147 Tm I had 50 VCS in the vicinity of its blocking position.

43 Infantry had completed a rather haphazard search of Objective Alpha by 1020 hours. The Battalion Commander set his companies in position along Highway 2 and remained there for the rest of the operation. The search performed by the ARVN Force resulted in several burned huts. Mine VCS, some handgrenades of various manufacture, one anti-tank mine, and several pigs, chickens, bicycles and one sewing machine were taken by the 43 Infantry.

Feeling a more detailed search of objective Alpha was necessary at 1200 hours Tm I, Tm K and Tm L swiftly formed on line to the north of the objective and performed a mounted sweep of the area with one company of the 43 Infantry searching behind the vehicles. Artillery was employed during this search to fire into draws and thick jungle ahead of the search elements to drive out anybody hidden in such places.

This search revealed numerous tunnels, bunkers, booby traps, punji pits and firing positions. Four VC KIA were discovered and 140 more VCS were found. In addition rice, handgrenades and many uniforms were taken. The positions where KIA were found were entranced and the enemy was killed at close range. There was one instance of an enemy assaulting two ACAP's with a handgrenade at 15 meters.

At 1342 Tm K moved to objective Charlie and conducted a search that yielded 43 VCS.

A MEDCAP operation was conducted at the interrogation point. The operation met with only limited success as the people who had been evacuated to the interrogation point all demonstrated a reluctance to participate because of VC propaganda that discredited MEDCAP as dangerous and brutal. Attempts by S-5 to give away various foodstuffs was also only partly successful because of VC propaganda labeled the food as poison.

Because of approaching darkness and the time required to airlift the 43 Infantry to Ba Ria, Phase III, the search of objective Delta was never accomplished.

At 1612 hours Tm K returned 1-43 Infantry to the parent unit and moved north to secure route BLACK from the SP to the RP. Tm L moved north next on route BLACK and secured from the RP to YS458901. At 1658 hours two tanks of Tm L ran over pressure detonated mines at YS456344. No injuries were inflicted.

Tm I secured route BLACK from the southern sector of Tm L to the landing zone at YS456841. Tm M secured the landing zone until the 43 Infantry (ARVN) had been completely airlifted out of objective Alpha. At 1540 Howitzer Battery moved north and returned to the base camp at 1837. The 43 Infantry (ARVN) was clear of the LZ at 1840. Tm M then moved north on route BLACK

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SUBJECT: Combat Operations After Action Report (RVC: MACV J3-32 (Cont))

10/ followed by Tm I, Tm L and Tm K. By 1957 all elements had closed on Base Camp.

12. Results:

a. Friendly

(1) Personnel

US - 2 KIA, 10 WIA

(2) Equipment (Damaged or lost)

2 tanks suffered track and suspension damage.

1 M-79 lost.

b. Enemy

(1) Personnel

(a) 4 VC KIA (BC)

(b) 2 VC WIA (Confirmed)

(c) 0 VC KBA

(d) 600 VCS captured.

(e) 42 VCC detained.

(2) Tunnels and Fortifications

(a) 24 major tunnels were found.

(b) 2 fortified positions were explored. Punjii

stakes, bobby traps, spider holes and anti-aircraft were among the defenses employed.

(c) None of the tunnels or fortifications could be completely destroyed as it would have required major engineer effort equipment and time not available to the Squadron.

(d) Captured and/or destroyed.

4100 lbs of peanuts destroyed.

13½ tons of rice destroyed.

2½ tons of rice evacuated.

70 Chicom stick grenades destroyed.

2 claymores destroyed.

2 Pressure type anti-tank mines captured.

13. ADMINISTRATIVE MATTERS: As OPERATION ALEXANDRIA involved only a single day, problems in administrative procedures were at a minimum. Some of the following areas are worthy of comment.

a. Treatment of Casualties: Tm I suffered a KIA early in the action; However, evacuation could not be effected for several hours. Dustoff would not evacuate a KIA even though the body could easily have been placed on a dustoff ship when it was in the area to evacuate a wounded soldier. The UH-1B's organic to the Squadron could not evacuate the body due to the extreme weight of the Ordnance carried by the aircraft.

A swifter method will have to be devised for KIA evacuation. Not only is the presence of a dead comrade a definite morale factor, but the body creates a handicap when the unit must move rapidly and frequently. Units must be ready to evacuate casualties or KIA by armored ambulance to a safe landing zone for pick-up.

b. Communications: In future operations the Squadron would like to switch all airmobile communications to the admin/log net as traffic becomes extreme on the command net. At one time a request for dustoff and a request for a fire mission were in competition with each other, indicating a need for established priorities on radio traffic.

14. SPECIAL EQUIPMENT AND TECHNIQUES.

The only item of equipment that met full combat utilization for the first time was the M132 Flame Thrower. The ability of this weapon to burn thick brush and route a hidden enemy is unequalled. It is such a valuable weapon when readily available to the troop that it is felt that two M132's should be organic to each troop.

15. COMMANDER ANALYSIS: OPERATION ALEXANDRIA was most successful in terms of physical damage inflicted upon the enemy, numbers of confirmed VC captured, and the psychological advantage gained by easily entering an enemy stronghold and establishing our control in the area. Further, indispensable intelligence was gained about activities and operations in the Regiments TAOR. The stores and fortifications found definitely established the area as a staging area used by the 5th VC Division for east-west movement. The single most important success was on terrorist rings and infrastructure of the area. The operation also provided the opportunity to assault entrenched positions, utilize the Squadron's tunnel rats, and exercise the processing and evacuation of prisoners and documents. The troops also encountered punjii stakes and other booby traps.

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SUBJECT: Combat Operations After Action Report (RVC: MACV J3-32) (Cont)

One disappointment in the operation was with the performance of the 43 Infantry (ARVN). It was hoped that they would provide the task force with a capable means of conducting a detailed ground search of the objective areas. However, the ARVN Infantry troops lacked disciplined leadership and the conduct of the search was rapid and sloppy. Those areas that were searched were burned after the troops confiscated all pigs, chickens, bicycles, and other assorted items of value to them.

It is hoped that another mission will be undertaken with the 43 Infantry and that through a more definite command relationship more skillful teamwork can be formed.

16. RECOMMENDATIONS. See Annex B.

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ANNEX A. to Combat Operations After Action Report to OP ALEXANDRIA

TASK ORGANIZATION (Initially).

Tm I

I/3-11 Armd Cav (-1 plat)
1/I/3-11 Armd Cav
1/FO/How/3-11 Armd Cav
1-M132

Tm L

L/3-11 Armd Cav
Lt Sec 3/M/3-11 Armd Cav
1 FO/How/3-11 Armd Cav
1 - M132

Tm K

K/3-11 Armd Cav
HV-Sec 3/M/3-11 Armd Cav
1 Co/1-43 Inf (ARVN) (OPCON)
1 FO/How/3-11 Armd Cav
2 GVN National Police (OPCON)

Tm M

M/3-11 Armd Cav (-2 plat)
2/I/3-11 Armd Cav
1 FO/How/3-11 Armd Cav

TF CON

How Btry
Prov Mort Btry
3/919 Engr
1 Engr Recon Tm/27 Engr
Lt fire Tm/2-11 Armd Cav (OPCON)
MI Tm/11 Armd Cav
2 FO/How/3-11 Armd Cav

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ANNEX B to Combat Operations After Action Report to OP ALEXANDRIA

LESSONS LEARNED OPERATION ALEXANDRIA

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1. ITEM: RECON BY FIRE

a. Discussion: Rather than random reconnaissance into heavily vegetated areas such as woodlines, jungles or banana groves reconnaissance by fire should start short of the suspected area and be walked into the target.

b. Observation: Fire discipline and coordination exhibited by the enemy indicated that well conducted reconnaissance by fire can cause an enemy unit to reveal itself by return fire, or it will suppress his fire.

2. ITEM: FIRE DISCIPLINE

a. Discussion: When a team or a vehicle crew has more than one automatic weapon they should closely control their fire during enemy contact so that there is always at least one automatic weapon firing while the others reload.

b. Observation: Wounded personnel in OPERATION ALEXANDRIA indicated they were wounded because all automatic weapons ran out of ammo at the same time and the crew had no suppressive fire while they reloaded. This clearly dictates the need for control on firing automatic weapons.

3. ITEM: LAND NAVIGATION AT NIGHT

a. Discussion: Night movement under black out conditions can either achieve great surprise and success or create chaos. Surprise and success will be achieved if the following procedures are adopted:

(1) Know the distance between SP and objective and have the lead element measure the distance on his odometer to insure that the objective or turn off to the objective is found.

(2) Linsatic compasses are valuable as an added reference for movement and to quickly determine general direction

(3) Preplanned artillery concentration utilizing WP are an important aid to determining exact location and achieving proper positioning on the objective area.

b. Observation: On OPERATION ALEXANDRIA the Third Squadron enjoyed a successful night movement by employing the procedures listed. It is recommended these considerations be SOP for movement during hours of darkness.

4. ITEM: CLOSING ON A KNOWN OR SUSPECTED ENEMY POSITION.

a. Discussion: When moving against a known or suspected enemy position armored vehicles should lead the dismounted elements so that any anti-personnel mines, booby traps or automatic weapons fire will be absorbed by the armor. Dismounted personnel can be utilized best by following behind to conduct a detailed search of the area, utilizing the protection of the armor and automatic weapons.

b. Observation: The combination of a mounted-dismounted team advancing on an enemy position proved effective in OPERATION ALEXANDRIA however greater speed and skill could be achieved if training were conducted in this procedure by ARVN units.

5. ITEM: DETECTING UNDERGROUND BUNKERS AND FIRING POSITIONS.

a. Discussion: On OPERATION ALEXANDRIA some underground bunkers and firing positions were detected by long mounds of earth. This was prevalent in banana groves, and in most cases trenches, bunkers and firing positions were found under the mounds.

b. Observation: Search elements should be instructed concerning mounds and what they could indicate.

6. ITEM: ENEMY EMPLOYMENT OF PUNJII STICKS.

a. Discussion: Punjii stakes were found around and enemy defensive position. They were easily recognizable in the grass and the points were aining away from the position.

b. Observation: Troops should be trained to look for punjii sticks and read into them what their employment could mean i.e. the direction they are pointing is expected route of friendly force advance. The opposite direction might hide an enemy position.

7. ITEM: EMPLOYMENT OF M-132

a. Discussion: For maximum utilization of the M-132 the following techniques were found to be most effective.

(1) Fire mixture short of target and allow the flame to roll into objective.

(2) Fire low when possible as the mixture will disipate if fired higher than necessary.

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ANNEX B to Combat Operations After Action Report to OP ALEXANDRIA (Cont)

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f. Observation: Crews on M-132 should be trained in the techniques mentioned.

8. ITEM: ASSAULT ON LINE

a. Discussion: At one point Tn I, Tn K and Tn L came on line to assault a wide area that contained enemy positions. With the help of an aerial observer 79 armored vehicles easily formed on line and advanced, all weapons trained on the enemy positions.

b. Observation: Armor can be employed successfully in mass formations in certain areas of Vietnam.

9. ITEM: CONTROL OF COMMAND NET.

a. Discussion: During the operation there were times when valuable transmissions had to compete for the opportunity to use the command net. Request for dustoffs were being cut out by spot reports which competed with commanders controlling air strikes. It was resolved to shift all air-mobile transmission to the admin/log net.


b. Observation: Airmobile communications may remain on the admin/log net to lessen transmissions on command net. Other suggestions include training people to listen before transmitting and fairly establishing their own priorities should important traffic be on the net.

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ANNEX C (Entrenchments Encountered on OPERATION ALEXANDRIA) to Combat Operations After Action Report to OPERATION ALEXANDRIA.

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
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

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ANNEX C (Intrenchments Encountered on G.F. MICH ALAMDA) to Combat Operations After Action Report to OPERATION ALEXANDRIA.

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HOUSE




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ANNEX D (OPERATION ALEXANDRIA Overlay) to Combat Operations After Action Report.

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109 ANNEX D - Combat Operations After Action Report, Operation ATLANTA, Roster of Cmdrs.

11th Armored Cavalry Regiment - COL William W. Cobb

Headquarters and Headquarters Troop, 11th Armored Cavalry Regt - CPT Marvin L. Doerr

1st Squadron, 11th Armored Cavalry Regiment - LTC Martin D. Howell

Headquarters and Headquarters Troop, 1st Squadron - CPT Richard H. Fanning (20 Oct - 23 Nov) 1LT Franklin F. Wing (24 Nov - 8 Dec)

Troop A, 1st Squadron - CPT John E. Bailey

Troop B, 1st Squadron - CPT John L. Landry

Troop C, 1st Squadron - CPT Robert W. Garrett Jr.

Company D, 1st Squadron - CPT Bill Peasley

Howitzer Battery, 1st Squadron - CPT William K. Fraase

2nd Squadron, 11th Armored Cavalry Regiment - LTC Kibbey M. Horne

Headquarters and Headquarters Troop, 2nd Squadron - CPT Bob E. Shamberger

Troop E, 2nd Squadron - CPT Richard M. Miller

Troop F, 2nd Squadron - CPT Howard C. Batt

Troop G, 2nd Squadron - CPT Glen J. Thorson

Company H, 2nd Squadron - CPT John G. Russell

Howitzer Battery, 2nd Squadron - CPT William R. Perry

3rd Squadron, 11th Armored Cavalry Regiment - LTC Palmer A. Peterson

Headquarters and Headquarters Troop, 3rd Squadron - CPT Calvin J. Reese (20 Oct - 6 Dec)
CPT Todd A. Welsh (6 Dec - 8 Dec)

Troop I, 3rd Squadron - CPT Peter P. Horoschak (20 Oct - 9 Nov)
CPT Joel R. Parker (10 Nov - 8 Dec)

Troop K, 3rd Squadron - CPT Wayne P. Halstead

Troop L, 3rd Squadron - CPT Larry L. Mengel

Company M, 3rd Squadron - CPT Herbert C. Hertel Jr.

Howitzer Battery, 3rd Squadron - CPT Leonard Dege

37th Medical Company - CPT Dennis J. Blais

919th Engineers Company (Armored) - CPT Donald J. Crocker

409th Radio Research Detachment - CPT Lee Gentry

541st Military Intelligence Detachment - CPT Alfred J. Dirksa (20 Oct - 18 Nov)
MAJ Cornelius L. Gray (19 Nov - 8 Dec)

33rd Chemical Detachment - 1LT James T. Price

17th Public Information Detachment - MAJ Paul Blackwell (20 Oct - 7 Dec)
CPT Owen Ditchfield (8 Dec)

28th Military History Detachment - MAJ Bruce R. Nilsson

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
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
ANNEX E Combat Operations After Action Report, Operation ATLANTA, Map Overprint


MAP SHEETS Vietnam 1 250,000, JOG(G) 1501 NC 48-8, JOG(G) 1501 NC 48-4, JOG(G)

1501 NC 48-5

Cambodia 1.250,000 JOG(G) 1501 NC 48-3.









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Annex F to Combat Operations After Action Report to Operation ATLANTA

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1. (C) INCIDENTS: BIEN HOA to XUAN LOC on/near National Highway One.

DATE	COORDINATES	INCIDENT
26 May 64	YT 177126	Ambush of RVNAF personnel.
6 Jul 64	YT 464112	Ambush of Civil Officials.
30 Mar 66	YT 452128	Ambush of RF personnel.
2 Jun 66	YT 241108	Roadblocks and mines, small arms.
13 Jun 66	YT 295058	Mine.
3 Jul 66	YT 3310	Roadblock.
7 Jul 66	YT 389101	Small arms.
Jul 66	YT 450101	Small arms.
12 Aug 66	YT 343101	Small arms.
14 Aug 66	YT 495056	Roadblock, Small arms.
19 Aug 66	YT 345102	Small arms.
6 Sep 66	YT 270100	Possible extortion point.
6 Sep 66	YT 344102	Booby-trapped roadblock.
13 Sep 66	YT 272092	Train mined.

2. (C) INCIDENTS: XUAN LOC to PHUOC LE (BARIA) on Routes 1 and 2.

9 Jun 64	YS 407638	FF Mil pers ambush - 6 KIA, 5 WIA.
9 Jun 64	YS 427644	RF Mil pers ambush - 3 KIA
No ambushes 9 Jun 64 thru April 66		
No Info. April 66 thru 3 June 66		
4 Jun 66	YS 460830	Small arms.
4 Jun 66	YS 462817	AT mine found - destroyed in place over 1/2 mi long - not clear.
4 Jun 66	YS 463820	Roadblock, dirt mounds, cuts.
30 Jun 66	YS 438914	Road cut - passable.
1 Jul 66	YS 460839	Small arms.
5 Jul 66	YS 454853	3 mines-1 APC-1 1/2 ton damaged.
10 Aug 66	YS 458840	Road reported mined.
	YS 454863	
13 Aug 66	YS 458889	Road cut.
13 Aug 66	YS 464795	Road cut.
13 Aug 66	YS 464796	Roadblock with poss wps plt.
13 Aug 66	YS 445970	Road cut.
13 Aug 66	YS 439914	Road cut.
13 Aug 66	YS 448978	Tree over road-held up traffic.
20 Aug 66	YS 431940	Dirt mound across road, and just off road.
20 Aug 66	YS 430937	One dirt mound each side.
20 Aug 66	YS 435916	Crater in road.
20 Aug 66	YS 430939	Dirt road block.
20 Aug 66	YS 445980	Deep trench across road.
23 Aug 66	YS 443914	Two trees across road.
23 Aug 66	YS 455850	Crater in road.
23 Aug 66	YS 455840	2 brushwood roadblocks-100m apart.
23 Aug 66	YS 457844	Barbed wire barrier.
26 Aug 66	YS 458833	Mine, hit by truck.
26 Aug 66	YS 454854	Mine, hit by truck.
26 Aug 66	YS 454854	APC, hits mine.
26 Aug 66	YS 465876	Jeep, hits mine.
27 Aug 66	YS 453862	Numerous but passable cuts.
	YS 455871	
28 Aug 66	YS 455907	APC destroyed by mine.
28 Aug 66	YS 458898	Truck hit mine.
29 Aug 66	YS 459900	ARVN APC damaged by mine.
2 Sep 66	YS 448978	Command detonated mine.
2 Sep 66	YS 425647	U/I explosion, small arms.
4 Sep 66	YS 432940	Mine.
5 Sep 66	YS 437919	Small arms.
3 Oct 66	YS 454865	Two road cuts.

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COMBAT OPERATIONS AFTER ACTION REPORT
OPERATION DAN-TAM 81

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1. (U) NAME OR IDENTITY AND/OR TYPE OF OPERATION:

- a. Operation DAN TAM 81.
- b. Security of rice harvest.

2. (U) DATES OF OPERATION:

- a. 160001 Nov 66 - 122400 Jan 67.
- b. US participation: 080830 - 301520 Dec 66.

3. (U) LOCATION: LONG KHANH and BINH TUY Provinces.

4. (U) CONTROL HEADQUARTERS: 11th Armored Cavalry Regiment.

5. (U) REPORTING OFFICER: LTC Martin D. Howell

6. (C) TASK ORGANIZATION: See Annex A.

7. (C) SUPPORTING FORCES:

- a. Air Support.

(1) Preplanned air strikes.

(a) On 15 Dec one strike north of the LA NGA River was aborted due to radio failure in the Forward Air Controller's aircraft.

(b) On 16 Dec one strike was called on a suspected enemy position located at coordinates YT 828480. Negative results were observed.

(c) On 17 Dec two strikes were called. The first was placed in a suspected enemy base camp north of the LA NGA River. Small secondary explosions indicated the possibility that an ammo cache had been hit. The second was called on a suspected base camp at YT 970446. Negative results were observed.

(d) At 231430 Dec another strike was called on a suspected VC base camp north of the LA NGA River with negative results.

(e) On 26 Dec a strike against a suspected enemy position at YT 840485 was aborted. Again, this was due to radio failure in the FAC aircraft.

(f) At 271230 Dec a strike was placed on a suspected VC supply dump north of the LANGA River. White and gray smoke was observed in two secondary explosions. On the basis of this, another mission was diverted, and a second strike was placed on the target, however no further results were observed.

(2) Immediate air strikes. On 22 Dec an immediate strike was put in at YT 874247 when elements of Troop B received automatic weapons fire from that area. The enemy had broken contact by the time the aircraft arrived, and the results of the strike were undetermined.

b. Army Air. The light fire team attached to the Squadron flew a total of 27 missions during the operation. A total of approximately 150,000 rounds of 7.62mm and 100 - 2.75" rockets were expended.

c. Artillery.

(1) General: Artillery support for the operation was provided by three batteries:

(a) How-Btry, 1st Squadron, 11th Armored Cavalry, 105 SP.

(b) B/7/9 Arty, 54th Arty Gp, 105 (towed).

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Incl 7

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GROUP 1
AUTOMATICALLY DECLASSIFIED
AFTER 12 YEARS

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(c) B/2/35 Arty, 54th Arty Gp, 155 SP. 116

The separate batteries were formed into a provisional battalion with the mission of direct support to the 1st Squadron. The command and control group was provided by the 2/35th Artillery.

(2) The following types of missions were fired:

(a) Each evening when the line troops assumed their positions, artillery fired defensive concentrations in their areas. These fires were continued intermittently throughout the night as part of the H and I program.

(b) Twenty-two will adjust missions were fired at small enemy elements. These fires in conjunction with friendly small arms fire caused the enemy to break contact in all cases. Fires were then shifted to suspected routes of withdrawal.

(c) Several fire for effect missions were fired on suspected enemy positions with unknown results.

(d) Small preparations on troop-sized objectives were fired as well as preplanned concentrations along routes for convoy protection.

(e) On several occasions H and I fires were effective in securing caches of enemy rice which had been discovered too late in the day for immediate evacuation.

(3) Ammunition during the operation was expended in the following manner:

	105HE	105WP	155HE	155WP
Registrations	180	14	103	
H and I Fires	2625		1352	
Defensive Concentrations	206		88	2
Will Adjust Missions	992	46	333	
Fire-for-effect and Preparations	344		38	
	4347	60	1914	2

8. (c) INTELLIGENCE:

a. Prior to Operation: Indications from all sources, including ARVN intelligence, advisors at HAM TAN and VO DAT, and RED HAZE missions, showed that the VO DAT rice bowl area was not heavily defended by main force units, but that the D500 Separate Battalion (DONG NAI) and at least two NVA regiments were available for employment in the area of operations. Extensive rice caches and base areas defended by guerilla units were reported in the mountain area north of the LA NGA River. The 421st VC district concentrated company also was reported operating in the MEPU - M'BRIM area.

b. Value of Prior Intelligence: Intelligence history indicated that in the past year the VC were active in the M'BRIM area, this decided the Squadron Commander, in his search for base areas, to initially concentrate on this area. Prior intelligence and aerial observation permitted timely fire planning for the area of operations. Actual enemy resistance was light, as expected.

c. Intelligence during the Operation: Intelligence received from the 10th ARVN Division Forward CP indicated a 200 man VC force (possibly from the 186th LF Bn) vicinity coordinates YT 8348. This information was checked and found to be unsubstantiated. Base camps and rice caches were found vicinity coordinates YT 8443, YT 8744, and YT 9143. Another ARVN report of a VC battalion, said to be located at YT 8333, was also checked with negative results. On 27 Dec, a battalion-sized base camp was discovered at YT 835448. It contained five huts and a large amount of rice. Documents found throughout the area referred to the 422nd LF Company, and listed numerous members of that organization. On 29 Dec, another base camp was discovered, containing several huts, animal pens, and rice. It was located at YT 925446. Paragraph 12 lists in detail the number of enemy killed, wounded, and captured, as well as enemy equipment and supplies captured or destroyed.

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117 9. (C) MISSION: Effective 080830H Dec 66 move from Base Camp to via VO DAT (YT 7333) and establish combat base. Thereafter commence operations to secure route from SUOI CAT to TANH LINH in coordination with CO TF 52, 10th Inf Div (ARVN). Be prepared to secure US engineer work parties. Be prepared ONO to conduct search and destroy operations north of the LA NGA River. Continue security of GIA RAY Rock Quarry.

10. (C) CONCEPT OF OPERATION:

a. Maneuver: To conduct operation in 3 phases:

(1) Phase I: Conduct tactical road march and establish combat base at VO DAT.

(2) Phase II: Commence operations to secure route from SUOI CAT to TANH LINH and to secure engineer work parties on order.

(3) Phase III: On order, conduct search and destroy operations north of the LA NGA River.

b. Fires:

(1) Arty: Priority of fire to convoy security initially, to the north and west of Routes 1 and 333.

(2) TAG Air: On call, to the south and east of Routes 1 and 333.

11. (C) EXECUTION:

General: Headquarters, 1st Sqdn, 11th Armored Cavalry Regiment issued OPORD 15-66 (Opn DAN TAN 81) on 7 Dec 1966 assigning the mission stated in paragraph 9 above. At 071600 Dec all unit commanders were briefed on the mission. On 6 Dec, coordination was made at XUAN LOC with officials of the participating ARVN units and the 54th Arty Gp.

8 December 1966

Phase I: 1st Sqdn departed the Regimental Base Camp at 0830 on 8 Dec. Due to the number of vehicles involved, and the fact that some units were to integrate into the convoy at intermediate points along the route, the various elements were split into three march units. This division of elements into units of manageable size facilitated control.

In view of a history of ambushes along the route, a detailed fire plan was devised to support the convoy in any eventuality. Constant coverage by Forward Air Controllers and artillery concentrations at likely ambush sites were provided. Events proceeded according to plan until the bridge at YT 679199 became damaged with passage of the lead elements. Engineer work was initiated; and the crossing was repaired after a delay of several hours. All elements closed into VO DAT just prior to nightfall and a combat base was established at YT 7232. Team Blast (see Annex A) remained at the GIA RAY Rock Quarry (YT 6312) to provide for its security.

9 - 15 December 1966

Phase II: During this period, the Sqdn was primarily concerned with the repair and security of Route 333, the primary line of communication leading to the rice bowl area. Work parties from B Company, 27th Engineers commenced immediate operations to repair and improve the various bridge sites between SUOI CAT and VO DAT. Security forces guarding these work parties served a dual function in that elements of the Squadron were thereby dispersed along the route and aided in its security. The route security mission was further supported by ROADRUNNER operations and THUNDER RUNS. A THUNDER RUN consisted of movement along the route by armored vehicles firing to either side of the road with short-range weapons such as the M-79 and 90mm cannister. This exercise proved extremely effective in insuring against route interdiction during the hours of curfew. Route improvement proceeded in an orderly fashion, and there was no enemy activity except for a light probe of the combat base perimeter on the night of 8 December.

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16 - 18 December 1966

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During this period, Phase II was continued with the primary engineer effort shifted to the route between VO DAT and TAN LINH. Work was begun on the bridge site at YT 837346 and the air strip at TAN LINH.

Also during this period, Phase III was initiated with a search and destroy operation north of the LA HUA River. On the night of 15 December, one platoon from B/27 Engineers displaced to the bridge site at YT 846389 and prepared it for crossing by elements of the 1st Sqdn and 3/43 ARVN. Early on the morning of 16 December, the crossing was accomplished without incident. At 0830, Troop C discovered a series of punji stakes and a recently used bunker at YT 866433. Both were destroyed. At 1130, Troop B found a hut with expended 20mm rounds, material for making shoes, and food at YT 860435. At 1510, elements of Troop A killed one VC at YT 920425. He was found to be armed with a Mauser rifle and one grenade. At 1500, Troop C discovered and destroyed a VC village which contained 14 huts, large amounts of rice, bunker systems, and a small amount of Caliber .50 and shotgun ammo. On 17 December, A Troop made contact with an estimated VC squad at YT 982366. The VC escaped into the jungle to the north. Troop C found a deserted village which contained approximately 3 tons of rice. Troop A discovered from 30 to 40 tons of rice a short distance away. HAI fires were planned in the vicinity of these caches while plans were made to evacuate the rice the next day. On 18 December, at 1030, a platoon from Troop A encountered a VC squad at YT 917428, resulting in 2 US KIA from grenade fragments. An air strike was placed on the suspected route of withdrawal with unknown results. At 1615, Troop A again made contact, engaging 4 VC at YT 915349. One VC was killed and two were wounded. The latter escaped into the jungle. During this day approximately 60 tons of rice were evacuated and turned over to BINH TUY Province officials. Late in the evening, the Squadron recrossed the river and closed into the combat base at VO DAT at 2300.

19 - 25 December 1966

During this period, the Squadron continued to conduct Phase II operations and observed the cease fire from 0700 24 Dec to 0700 26 Dec. Engineer work was continued between VO DAT and TAN LINH. ROADRUNNER operations were conducted between VO DAT and SUOI CAT at an increased tempo. Brush burning operations were undertaken by the Sqdn on either side of Route 333 in selected areas to render ambush sites less tenable. On 19 December, the Sqdn partially stood down in order to perform maintenance.

26 - 30 December 1966

During this period the Sqdn continued with Phase II and again initiated Phase III operations. On the morning of 26 December, the Sqdn again crossed the LA HUA River with Troops A and B. Troop C and Company D continued the security of the combat base at VO DAT and the rock quarry at GIA RAY. The Sqdn CP and the provisional artillery battalion displaced to the bridge site at YT 846389. At 0940, Troop B found 500 lbs of rice at YT 835432. The rice was evacuated. At 1210, Troop B discovered what was judged to be a Viet Cong rest area at YT 815422. It contained a thatched hut, bunker system, and foxhole perimeter, and appeared to be four or five days old. Trails leading from the area were also lined with foxholes. This complex was destroyed. A short distance away, another 500 pound rice cache was discovered, and the rice was evacuated. At 1358, Troop A found a small base camp with tools, bunkers, and approximately 200 pounds of rice.

During the morning hours of 27 December, several sniper rounds were fired at both Troops A and B. There were no US casualties, and the fire was returned with unknown results. At 1215, Troop B engaged a VC squad at YT 836446, resulting in two VC KIA (BC). An airstrike was placed on the suspected route of withdrawal, and two secondary explosions were observed. At 1300, Troop B found a battalion sized base camp at YT 835448, containing five huts in good condition, and documents identifying the 422 Company, as well as the 420 and 421 Platoons. The base camp was destroyed.

On 28 Dec, Troops A and B conducted search and destroy operations in Objective SLED, vicinity coordinates YT 9244. Troop B engaged two VC at YT 925435 at 1400 with unknown results. A search of the area revealed 1 grenade, documents, and 2 bags of rice. The search was continued in the surrounding area with negative results.

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119 On 29 December, at 0835, Troop B engaged 3 to 4 VC at YT 925436. An attached ARVN infantryman was wounded during the encounter. The enemy fled with unknown results. At 0945, an ACAV received slight damage from a command detonated mine at YT 433036. Later in the morning, B Troop discovered an enemy base camp at YT 925446. 100 pounds of rice were evacuated from the area, and the camp was destroyed. In the late afternoon, the Squadron returned to the combat base at VO DAT to prepare for the return march to the Regimental Base Camp.

On 30 Dec, the Squadron moved from VO DAT to the Regimental Base Camp without incident, closing the latter at 1520 hours, and terminating the mission.

12. (C) RESULTS:

a. US Losses: 8 WIA, 1 3/4 ton, 1 ACAV damaged.

b. Enemy Losses:

(1) Personnel: 7 VC KIA (BC).

(2) Equipment captured: 141.37 tons rice, 2 Mauser rifles, 1 Thompson SMG, 3 bags of assorted clothing, 2 grenades, 2 bicycles.

(3) Equipment Destroyed: 6 bunkies, 17 structures, rest area, small base camp, 1 battalion sized base camp.

13. (C) ADMINISTRATIVE MATTERS:

The operation vicinity VO DAT had particular impact on logistical operations due to the length of the main supply route and its insecure condition. It was immediately apparent in planning that aerial resupply would have to be employed. VO DAT was particularly suitable in that there was an operational air strip adjacent to the planned combat base. This allowed for either fixed or rotary wing aircraft to be utilized and gave a greater available air craft factor. Within three days of establishing the combat base at VO DAT daily Caribou resupply missions were being flown from XUAN LOC. These daily sorties enabled the Squadron to subsist on Class A rations. The Caribou was also used to bring in the mail, which was large in quantity due to the Christmas period. POL and route of communication, but by virtue of the aerial resupply available for emergency requirements, routine convoys had to be run every two or three days. On one occasion routine ammunition resupply was by air. The utilization of aircraft for resupply required reliable personnel in the base camp area as procedures for obtaining aircraft required constant coordination.

A DUSTOFF helicopter was requested for medical evacuation and was provided for standby at the combat base. This allowed for immediate response to casualty evacuation requirements.

14. (C) SPECIAL EQUIPMENT AND TECHNIQUES:

On two separate occasions, once on 18 December and again on 29 December, the Squadron employed CH-47 Chinook helicopters to evacuate large stores of captured enemy rice from a relatively remote area of poor trafficability. The efficacy of this method was proved by the amount of rice removed in such a short period of time, a chore which otherwise would have required the efforts of friendly troops for a much longer period.

15. (C) COMMAND ANALYSIS: Operation DAN TAN 81 was successful in its immediate goal of securing the rice harvest operation in the VO DAT - TAN LINH area. The fact that the harvest was accomplished with complete freedom from Viet Cong harassment was no doubt a result of the dual threat imposed by ARVN security forces, and the presence of the Squadron as a mobile force capable of striking anywhere in the area on short notice.

The side effects of the operation were several. It was noted that the flow of commerce into the area increased sharply during the period, a direct result of the increased presence of the friendly troops and the route security effort. The operations north of the LA NHA River impressed the populace with the fact that friendly forces could operate in the area with impunity, and extract large stores of enemy rice for distribution by local government officials.

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The reinforcement of the Squadron by ARVN infantry units aided in the accomplishment of search and destroy operations north of the river. In general, ARVN company-sized units attached to Reconnaissance Troops performed with enthusiasm and demonstrated capable leadership.

16. (C) RECOMMENDATIONS: See Annex D.

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Annex A to COAAR (Operation DAN TAY 81)

12/ Task Organization (Initially):

<u>Troop A</u>	<u>Team Blast</u>	<u>Troop C</u>	<u>Team Danger</u>
A/11	B/11 (-) 1/D/11	C/11	D/11 3/B/11

Sqdn Control

1st How
B/2/35 Arty
B/7/9 Arty
B/27 Engr
1/919 Engr
1 Sec/409th RRD

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Annex B to COAAR (Opn DAN TAM 81)

1. JOINT ARVN/US OPERATIONS:

- a. Small unit combined operations are most effective when US forces control. ARVN units are not normally trained to respond quickly to Sqdn frag orders. In addition, the basic differences in doctrine make it difficult to fully utilize US capabilities when an ARVN commander controls the operations.
- b. The most effective method of employing ARVN troops during perimeter defense is to reinforce US recon platoons with ARVN platoons, and have ARVN dig in between the tracks.
- c. During daylight dismounted operations, ARVN forces are most effective when employed as an integral unit. Lines of communication, command and control, and the use of ARVN leadership are the key factors to consider. However, if ARVN leaders are weak, the best method is to attach individual ARVN platoons to the recon platoons, and accept the communications problems.
- d. If ARVN ambush or recon patrols are emplaced forward of US positions, a US fire team or, at the very least, a radio liaison team should accompany each ARVN element. This will permit more rapid acquisition of intelligence information, provide better fire support and reaction, and provide exact verification of position and situation reports.
- e. The more effective ARVN units can be trained in practices which, while foreign to them, will increase their combat effectiveness such practices are:

Digging in while occupying defensive positions.

Observing noise and light discipline after EENT.

Field Sanitation procedures.

Adequate local and flank security practices.

2. USE OF CHIEU HOI:

- a. The use of the "Open Arms" program to obtain intelligence of specific areas and for guides to areas can be very effective. During DAN TAM 81 - rice caches and VC base camps were pointed out exactly by a CHIEU HOI.
- b. If CHIEU HOI are used as guides, they should accompany the point elements, a practice which discourages the CHIEU HOI from leading US units into VC ambushes.

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
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11TH ARMORED CAVALRY REGIMENT

COMBAT OPERATIONS
AFTER ACTION REPORT

OPERATION CEDAR FALLS
3 - 24 JANUARY 1967



REGRADED UNCLASSIFIED
WHEN SEPARATED FROM
CLASSIFIED INCLOSURES

GROUP 4
AUTOMATICALLY DECLASSIFIED
AFTER 12 YEARS

Incl 8

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HEADQUARTERS
11TH ARMORED CAVALRY REGIMENT
APO San Francisco 96257

1. (U) Name or Identity of Operation:

Operation CEDAR FALLS: search and destroy operation.

2. (U) Dates of Operation:

8 January to 24 January 1967.

3. (U) Location:

The IRON TRIANGLE vicinity of BEN CAT, Republic of Vietnam.

4. (C) Command or Control Headquarters:

The 173rd Airborne Brigade was the controlling headquarters for the 11th Armored Cavalry Regiment.

5. (C) Reporting Officer:

Reporting Officer for this report is Colonel William W. Cobb, Commanding Officer, 11th Armored Cavalry Regiment.

Subordinate commanders during the operation were as follows:

2nd Squadron, 11th Armored Cavalry - LTC Kibbey M. Horne
3rd Squadron, 11th Armored Cavalry - LTC Arthur F. Cochran
37th Medical Company - CPT Dennis J. Blais
919th Armored Engineer Company - CPT Donald J. Crocker
409th Radio Research Detachment - CPT Lee W. Gentry
541st Military Intelligence Detachment - MAJ Cornelius L. Gray
17th Public Information Detachment - CPT Owen W. Ditchfield

6. (C) Task Organization:

With the exception of attachments and detachments of units on a day to day basis, the Task Organization was as follows:

Regimental Control:

Air Cavalry Troop (-)
919th Engineer Company (-2nd and 3rd Platoons)
409th Radio Research Detachment (-)
541st Military Intelligence Detachment (-)
37th Medical Company (-)
188th Maintenance Battalion (-) DS
1 MP Squad

TF 2-11:

2nd Squadron (- Howitzer Battery)
2nd Platoon 919th Engineer Company
Contact Team 188th Maintenance Battalion DS

TF 3-11:

3rd Squadron (- Howitzer Battery)
3rd Platoon, 919th Engineer Company
Contact Team 188th Maintenance Battalion

GROUP 4
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AFTER 12 YEARS

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7. (C) Supporting Forces:

a. Artillery: All artillery fires were controlled by the 173rd Airborne Brigade and will not be covered in this report:

b. USAF Support: The fact that the Regiment was OPCON to the 173rd Airborne Brigade for the operation required close coordination between the Air Liaison Officers of the two units. During planning sessions between the ALO's from the two units the relatively small size of the areas of operation of subordinate units together with the close proximity of the ground troops was taken into consideration. It was decided by the two ALO's that due to these factors a joint Forward Air Controller schedule, coordinated by the Tactical Air Control Party attached to the 173rd Airborne Brigade would be the responsive system in filling the FAC requirements of both units. The soundness of this plan was demonstrated as the operation progressed.

The FAC's were airborne over the AO's during all daylight hours of the operation and were standing by on ground alert status during all night hours. Had either unit TACP attempted individually to cover only their individual units, this constant coverage would not have been possible, because of the limited amount of aircraft and pilots available to each TACP.

Both the FAC and Tactical Air coverage provided during the operation were of the highest quality and contributed to the overall success of the mission.

FAC and fighter/bomber sorties flown and/or directed by the 11th Armored Cavalry Forward Air Controller.

(1) Total O-1 Sorties - 63

- (a) Forward Air Control - 18
- (b) Visual Reconnaissance - 36
- (c) Escort (Convoy) - 9

(2) Fighter Support:

- (a) Total strike aircraft missions - 22
- (b) Total strike aircraft sorties - 62
- (c) Immediate Missions - 7 (18 sorties)
- (d) Preplanned missions - 15 (44 sorties)

(3) Size and Composition of forces:

(a) Immediate missions - by flight

- 1 2 F-5 (CBU, napalm, bombs, 20mm)
- 2 3 F-5 (20mm)
- 3 2 B57 (Napalm, bombs)
- 4 3 F-100 (Napalm, bombs)
- 5 3 F-5 (Napalm, bombs, 20mm)
- 6 2 F-100 (Rockets, bombs)
- 7 3 F-100 (Napalm, bombs, 20mm)

(b) Preplanned Missions:

- 1 3 F-5 (bombs)
- 2 3 F-100 (Napalm, bombs)
- 3 3 F-4C (Napalm, bombs)
- 4 3 F-100 (Napalm)
- 5 3 F-100 (Napalm, bombs)
- 6 2 F-100 (bombs)
- 7 3 F-100 (Napalm, bombs)
- 8 3 F-100 (Napalm, bombs)
- 9 3 F-5 (Napalm, bombs)
- 10 3 F-100 (Napalm, bombs, 20mm)
- 11 3 F-100 (Napalm, bombs)
- 12 3 F-100 (Napalm, bombs)
- 13 3 F-100 (Napalm, bombs)

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(4) Employment and results: Of the total of twenty-two Tactical Air Support missions listed above, six were employed in a close support role against enemy troops and the remaining against ground targets such as fortifications and tunnels, or at positions where hard targets were suspected.

One close air support mission controlled by a FAC from the 11th Armored Cavalry Tactical Air Control Party and flown for elements of the 173rd Airborne Brigade resulted in four VC KIA (BC). Additional results were thirteen bunkers uncovered or destroyed, 239 meters of trench uncovered or destroyed, forty-two fox-holes uncovered or destroyed, and three small structures destroyed.

c. Engineer Support: The 919th Engineer Company (Armored) provided direct engineer support to the Regiment as follows:

(1) Bridging: After the failure of a Class 60 Bailey Bridge in the area of operations elements of the company cleared the rubble of the old span and prepared the site to enable the 1st Engineer Battalion to employ a temporary AVLB span.

(2) Road Clearing: Extensive mine clearing operations were conducted by utilizing mine detecting equipment in suspected mine locations in the Regimental AO.

(3) Demolition: Extensive demolition operations were required to neutralize enemy bunkers, tunnels, booby traps and mines. Over four kilometers of enemy tunnel complexes were reconnoitered and/or destroyed.

d. Army Aviation Support.

(1) Armed Helicopter Support: Preplanned and Immediate missions were run on a daily basis. Preplanned missions included convoy escort and reconnaissance of suspected enemy locations. Immediate missions included escort of UH-1D DUST-OFF aircraft and on-call supporting fires provided to units in contact. The basic fighting and maneuvering element was the Light Fire Team consisting of (2) two UH-1C armed helicopters. Other missions flown in support of the operation included ambush reaction force, convoy escort, reconnaissance by fire, and river patrol flights. Timely support was achieved by stationing the armed helicopters at the Regimental Forward and/or Squadron Command Posts as appropriate.

(2) Administrative Helicopter Support: Combat and road reconnaissance, logistic troop and cargo lift, command and control, and PSYWAR missions were flown during the operation. A total of 708 missions entailing 513 flying hours were flown. Fifty-one tons of cargo and 1,320 passengers were carried.

(3) DUST-OFF Helicopter Support: DUST-OFF's were flown on an "on-call" basis and the reaction time was good. In many cases inflight aircraft were called to perform the evacuation, thus cutting reaction time to a minimum. Twelve individuals were evacuated by the 11th Armored Cavalry elements, fifteen by other DUST-OFF aircraft. Evacuation was to the 93rd Evacuation Hospital, and the 12th Evacuation Hospital. All wounded or injured personnel evacuated from the field were taken by DUST-OFF.

(4) Special Techniques: The "Fire-fly" or "Lightning Bug" missions proved to be unsuccessful. The XENON searchlight mounted on the helicopter proved to be ineffective when the aircraft was at 1,000 feet or higher. Accordingly, the attempt to conduct night surveillance of river banks and rivers was not considered successful.

8. (C) Intelligence:

a. Anticipated enemy situation:

No VC Main Force units were known to be located in the IRON TRIANGLE. However, Main Force units had previously been located in and had operated throughout the area, and it was considered possible that contact with VC Main Force units would be made.

The IRON TRIANGLE area had long been under VC domination and had the local population under firm control. It was expected, therefore, that contact with local

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force units from squad to company size would be made. Enemy emplacement of mines and booby traps was expected throughout the area, and enemy sniper, harassing, and mortar attacks were anticipated. It was believed that the VC would defend valuable stores cached throughout the IRON TRIANGLE until the materiel could be evacuated or concealed. It was anticipated that the VC would then withdraw to prevent destruction of their units by US Forces.

b. Actual Enemy Situation.

The intelligence estimate proved to be quite accurate. No Main Force VC units were contacted during the operation. Small unit actions predominated during the operation. In only one instance was even a platoon engaged. The expected mines, booby traps, snipers, and harassing mortar attacks materialized as anticipated.

"A total of 177 separate facilities were found which ranged from foxholes and trenches to bunkers and tunnel complexes, and to rice caches of all sizes. A comparison of each of these locations with all previously available intelligence information, principally the VC installations list, shows that 156 or 88.1% fell within 500 meters of a reported installation. The average error for these 156 installations was 135M (E-W) by 147M (N-S) or an average radial error of slightly over 200 meters. Thus the values of utilizing the VC Installation list, normally published as a TAB to the Intelligence Annex, (of an OPORD) is readily apparent. Such lists should be considered as a starting point for a search of any area." (11th Armored Cavalry Regiment Intelligence Bulletin #8, dated 29 January 1967) The list of enemy installations is included as TAB A.

c. Sources of information:

The VC installation List in the Operation CEDAR FALLS OPORD reflected such diverse intelligence sources as ARVN and US divisions, III Corps, DASC III Corps, LRRP's, POW's, and FAC's.

d. Terrain Analysis:

(1) General: The area of interest for Operation CEDAR FALLS, known as the IRON TRIANGLE, lies east of the SAIGON river, south of east-west gridline XT 37, west of National Highway 13, and north of east-west gridline XT 20.

(2) Observation in the IRON TRIANGLE is dependent on the type of vegetation in the immediate area. Wetlands and rice areas offer good observation both on the ground and in the air. Observation in rubber plantation areas is fair, though dependent on the thickness of the undergrowth in the immediate area. All streams and rivers are lined with trees which limit ground observation. The jungle area in the central portion of the IRON TRIANGLE severely limited observation.

(3) Fields of Fire:

Fields of fire are good in rubber tree areas, wetlands, and rice paddies. Fields of fire are limited in the dense jungle areas.

(4) Cover:

The major cover available to the enemy is in the form of bunkers and tunnels.

(5) Concealment:

All forested areas offer good concealment. Small, dismounted elements receive excellent concealment in villages and hamlets in the area. The rice paddies offer no concealment.

(6) Obstacles:

The SAIGON River flows from northwest to southeast on the western boundary of the area and varies in width from 100 to 150 meters. The THI TINH River flows generally from the north to the south through the area varying in width from twenty to fifty meters. Both rivers have low and gently sloping banks.

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The dense forest which dominates the center of the IRON TRIANGLE constitutes a major obstacle to cross country movement. The marsh area adjacent to the CHU KY Stream (XT 722325-XT 712286-XT 711278) also severely restricts vehicular movement in the area.

(7) Movement and Avenues of Approach:

Movement is generally channelized to roads and trails in areas of dense growth. Cross country mobility is limited in rice paddies and marshlands. Existing trails and roads offer the best avenues of approach.

(8) Key Terrain Features:

The area is generally a level plain with no prominent or commanding terrain features.

9(C) Mission: The mission of the 11th Armored Cavalry Regiment was to attack west from BEN CAT to cut the IRON TRIANGLE destroying a VC Base Camp (Objective 1), seizing and securing an artillery base (Objective 1A) and to destroy a VC HQs (Objective 2). The Regiment then was to link-up with heliborne forces and to screen along the eastern edge of the Area of Operations to prevent enemy withdrawal to the east. The Regiment was under the operational control (OPCON) of the 1st Infantry Division who in turn passed OPCON to the 173rd Airborne Brigade for the operation.

10. (C) Concept of Operations:

The concept of the operation was to break the operation into two Phases. Phase I was initiated and completed on 8 January. During this phase the Regiment (-1st Sqdn) conducted a night road march from the Regimental Base Camp (Regimental Headquarters, 3rd and Provisional Squadrons) and from BEAR CAT Base Camp (2nd Squadron) to forward assembly areas, XT 8515. Phase II began on 9 January. The Regiment attacked west from BEN CAT and seized Objective 1 and Objective 1A. From Objective 1A, elements of the Regiment attacked northeast to establish a link-up of heliborne forces in LANDING ZONE 5. Other Regimental elements attacked west from Objective 1 to destroy a VC HQs (Objective 2). The Regiment then established a screen along LINE RED and secured engineer bases and work parties. The Regimental maneuver elements then prepared to conduct search and destroy operations in their assigned sectors.

11. (C) Execution:

8 January:

At 1200H the Regiment came under the operational control of the 1st Infantry Division who in turn placed the Blackhorse under the 173rd Airborne Brigade. The Regimental Command Post, escorted by ACAV's and the 3rd Squadron Howitzer Battery, initiated (1200H) a road march from the base camp to forward assembly areas north of PHU LOI (XT 857162) arriving at 1617H. The Regimental Trains (Headquarters and Headquarters Troop, 919th Engineer Company (-) and field trains) with escorts provided by Troop K departed the base camp at 1951H closing at PHU LOI (XT 7921) at 2322H.

2nd Squadron:

The 2nd Squadron was located at BEAR CAT, the location of a recently completed operation (Operation CANARY/DUCK). The first element to move was its Howitzer Battery escorted by an armored cavalry platoon. Crossing the starting point (SP) at 1330H it cleared its release point (RP) at 1627H. The remainder of the squadron departed at 1900H closing in a forward assembly area at 2222H.

3rd Squadron:

The 3rd Squadron (-) made a night move from the Regimental Base Camp at LONG GIAO to a forward assembly area vicinity XT 7820 closing at 2315H. During the move a 1/2 ton truck from Company M was hit by a claymore mine resulting in one US KIA and one US WIA. Shortly after the mining incident traffic control elements from the 720th Military Police Battalion received small arms fire and grenades vicinity XT 937069 with negative results. At 2159H, Company M also received one recoilless rifle round (XY 937069) with negative results.

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9 January:

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The Regiment remained OPCON to the 173rd Airborne Brigade. (See Annex A - OPERATIONS OVERLAY)

2nd Squadron: At 0815H Troop F, secured Position GREEN (XT 7232), Troop E moved through Position GREEN to seize Objective 1A, at 0900H, and Troop F then established a screen from XT 652317 to XT 688330. Company H relieved Troop F of the security of Position GREEN at 1400H. Troop G secured a company from the 1st Engineer Battalion, located at XT 7031, at 1537H. An ACV from Troop G hit a small mine at XT 695315 resulting in a broken track and damaged road wheel. Troop F received an unknown number of small arms rounds at XT 733318 with negative casualties resulting. Company H discovered and evacuated 2200 pounds of rice from XT 703340, and Troop F found 1500 pounds of rice at XT 662307, which later was turned over to the National Police.

3rd Squadron:

At 0912H, Troop K seized Objective 1 at XT 6730. At 1000H, Troop I seized Objective 2 at XT 6630. Troop L initiated search and destroy operations at XT 6828. Beginning at 1600H, Troop L and Company M screened Engineer Base 2 at XT 7031, while Troops I and K moved to secure Engineer Base 3 at XT 6630 and were in position at 1715. During operations on 9 January, Troop K detonated a booby trap with an ACV at XT 721317, and located twenty foxholes two feet deep and five feet wide at XT 686288. Troop L received ten rounds of sniper fire at XT 658304, and captured 2.2 tons of rice at XT 665302. Troop L observed and fired on two armed VC at XT 684272 with negative results. At 1610H, one trooper from Troop I was wounded by sniper fire, at XT 662306.

10 January: The Regiment remained OPCON to the 173rd Airborne Brigade. The 1st Squadron, 4th Cavalry was placed OPCON to the Regiment. At 2000H, a 4-ton truck from the Regimental Scout Platoon was hit by a claymore mine resulting in extensive vehicle damage and one US KIA.

2nd Squadron: On 10 January, Troop Z secured Engineer TF BMMVO operating along Highway 14. Troop F screened from XT 634321 to XT 733324. Company H secured an Engineer Base at XT 725318. Troop G escorted Engineer TF ALPHA to 173rd Airborne Brigade boundary at XT 662375. At 1115H Troop G found a hut containing ten tons of rice and three grenades, both of which were booby trapped. The hut and grenades were destroyed, the rice was secured for evacuation.

3rd Squadron: Engineer Bases at XT 671302 and XT 701310 were secured by squadron elements, as was Engineer TF DELTA operating between XT 677306, and XT 671325. Troops I, K, and L conducted search and destroy operations in the assigned AO. During these operations Troop I found a squad-sized base camp at XT 660310, in which was found one M26 US grenade, M-16 ammunition, and an unidentified part of a large caliber weapon. Troop I captured one VCS who came out of a tunnel and surrendered at XT 662305. Troop I received four rounds of small arms fire at XT 675305, with negative casualties resulting. Troop L found and destroyed numerous punji stakes in the vicinity of XT 707315, and a Company H dozer tank hit an AT mine with negative casualties. A wheeled vehicle from Troop L was hit by a claymore mine at 2007H in the vicinity of XT 782236 resulting in one US KIA and light vehicle damage. At 1015H Company M discovered and destroyed an extensive tunnel system under buildings at XT 700313, and at 1153H uncovered a base camp. The camp, located at XT 699314 had an extensive tunnel and bunker system which was reinforced by logs. 1 VC was captured during a search of the camp, as were radio equipment, documents, Rice, C Nations and medical supplies. Some of the tunnels were booby trapped.

1st Squadron, 4th Cavalry: Squadron elements established a screen from XT 682343 to XT 662373. At 1900H, a tank from Troop B hit a mine in the vicinity of XT 669359 blowing off a track and four road wheels and wounding one individual. At 2215H Troop H received ten rounds of small arms fire with negative casualties.

11 January:

The Regiment remained under the operational control of the 173rd Airborne Brigade. A and C Batteries, 5th Battalion, 2nd Artillery became OPCON to the Regiment at 0700H. (See Annex B - FRMO ORDER 2 OPERATIONS OVERLAY)

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2nd Squadron:

Troop E secured Engineer and Artillery Base J at XT 725318 while Troop G secured an Engineer Base at XT 701311. Company H secured the bridgehead at Position GREEN. Troop F continued its screening mission from XT 634321 to XT 682343. Troop G found a platoon sized base camp at XT 654325. Troop E received two CHIEU HOI at XT 671302. An AGAV from Troop F ran over a 105mm shell rigged as a mine, but detonated only the fuze.

3rd Squadron:

Company C, 4th Battalion, 503rd Infantry, was attached effective 0700H. The squadron attacked south along Axis CAT at 0900H, from XT 6730 along Route 14 to seize objectives at XT 715238, XT 725243, XT 744238, and XT 744237, and to clear Area X-RAY (XT 6925) while enroute. Troop K conducted search and destroy operations in Area X-RAY. Troop I secured Objective 1 at 1055H; Company M secured Objective 2 at 1306H, and Objective 3 at 1545H; Troop L secured Objective 4 at 1640H. Troop I found 2 VC KIA (BC) at XT 708244 and detained nineteen persons at XT 671302. Interrogation revealed that they had been hiding for two days; two individuals also had large sums of money on them. Troop K discovered an undetermined amount of rice in a village at XT 658300 which was evacuated by the 1st Infantry Division. The Troop engaged 1 VC at XT 704242 resulting in 1 VC KIA (BC). At 1132H, the troop received small arms fire in the vicinity of XT 725324, and at 1251H, an AGAV hit a mine at XT 708254. Neither incident resulted in casualties or vehicular damage. At 1500H, the troop evacuated 700 pounds of rice from XT 746218. Troop L detained one person at XT 695302 at 0430H. At 1430H, thirty to fifty small arms rounds were fired at the troop. A search of the area (XT 699260) from which the fire came disclosed 2 CHICOM AT mines, 5 CHICOM grenades, 2 rounds RPG-2 ammunition, a siren, 150 rounds of Caliber .30 ammunition and 1 1/2 tons of rice, all of which were evacuated. At 1545H, the troop uncovered another twenty-five tons of rice, twenty rolls of corrugated roofing, and ten bicycles in the vicinity of XT 695247. All material and foodstuffs were evacuated. Company M received light small arms fire twice during the day without casualties. At 1030H the company found and destroyed one mine in the road at XT 695257. At 1145H, one of its tanks hit a mine at XT 698250 with negative casualties or damage. At 1147H, the company received three mortar rounds which fell short at XT 697256. Another tank hit an AT mine at XT 693257, disabling the tank without causing any casualties. A 105mm artillery shell rigged as a command detonated mine was discovered exploded at XT 747226. Five minutes later a WP round also rigged as a mine was found at XT 748227. Both rounds were blown in place. As the mines were being blown, elements of the company observed men dressed in black pajamas who appeared to be mining the road at XY 767213. The men scattered as a tank went to investigate. At 1930H, seven VC were spotted and taken under fire resulting in one VC KIA (BC) and one US M1 carbine captured.

1st Squadron, 4th Cavalry:

Elements of the squadron blocked from XT 663373 to XT 682343. At 1808H, an M113 from Troop A hit a pressure mine at XT 685244 with no casualties or damage resulting from the incident. The Troop located and burned 5000 pounds of rice at XT 662370.

12 January:

The Regiment continued to remain OPCON to the 173rd Airborne Brigade. 2nd Squadron became OPCON to 3rd Brigade, 1st Infantry Division at 0700H, as did the 1st Squadron, 4th Cavalry, and A and C Batteries, 5th Battalion, 2nd Artillery (AW). At 1720H, two Regimental Light Fire Teams located one VC resulting in 1 VC KIA (BC).

3rd Squadron:

Conducted search and destroy operations in areas O, P, and Q. Company D, 4th Battalion, 503rd Infantry remained attached. At 0620H, Troop K spotted movement in front of their perimeter, and fired into the area resulting in the capture of one wounded VC at XT 722236. Troop I discovered and destroyed two 100 pound WP bombs at XT 729230. Forty-five minutes later, at 1000H, the troop found a bunker and tunnel (XT 728228) with a booby-trapped grenade and parts of an unknown type of fixed wing aircraft. The troop also uncovered and evacuated a cache of 5.5 tons of rice in the vicinity of XT 722222. An hour earlier, at 1100H, six tons of

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rice and a sampan was found at XT 724220. The sampan was destroyed and the rice evacuated. The troop discovered 1200 pounds of rice at XT 732237. The rice, found at 1525H, was evacuated. At 1535H, the troop found an abandoned hut with four booby-trapped grenades and a dugout with a tunnel that appeared to be a small workshop for making mines, as tools were found in the tunnel. The complex and materiel were destroyed at XT 733227. Troop K found three tons of rice at XT 735219 which was evacuated. At 1010H, the troop located a five-by-six foot cave at XT 722233, containing ten pounds of clothing. Ten minutes later a large tunnel was found at XT 734228. The tunnel was searched with negative results. At 1039H, a hut containing 300 pounds of rice was discovered and destroyed. Just nine minutes later two huts were found at XT 748234 which contained twenty tons of rice, all of which was evacuated. At noon the troop had two ACAV's hit by command detonated mines in the vicinity of XT 736218 damaging road wheels on both vehicles, resulting in negative casualties. Two hours later the troop received fire from a command detonated mine which resulted in one individual WIA, and slight damage to the ACAV. At 1635H, the troop engaged in a fire fight with a VC unit of unknown size. A heavy volume of automatic and small arms fire was received as well as three rounds of recoilless rifle fire. One ACAV was damaged in the fight, but there were no friendly casualties. Troop L spotted five VC in the vicinity of XT 746234 at 1120H. A patrol chasing the VC was hit by two claymore mines resulting in four US KIA and three US WIA. Company M found a 105mm round wired for command detonation at XT 748234 and destroyed it in place. At 1130H, the company found a bunker at XT 745230 containing one 155mm round rigged as a command detonated mine. The bunker and mine were blown in place. Five minutes later an AT mine surrounded by five AP mines was found and destroyed at XT 748233. At 1130H, the company had received four rounds of 82mm mortar fire at XT 747232, resulting in one US WIA. Fifteen minutes later the company found an AT mine at XT 747232 and blew it in place. At 1310H, the company found three CHECCO grenades at XT 745233 and destroyed them in place. A well constructed tunnel in the vicinity of XT 747232 was found at 1430H, and was penetrated to a depth of 250 meters. Documents and a diagram were found in the tunnel. The underground complex was marked for future operations. At 1625H, the company found a tunnel, freshly occupied, containing five pounds of documents, overlays, technical manuals, 2 CHECCO grenades and 120 rounds of 7.62mm rounds. The tunnel (at XT 744244) was destroyed. At 2040H, the company observed 2 VC attempting to turn a claymore mine toward friendly positions. The claymore was detonated, resulting in one VC KIA (BC).

13 January:

2nd Squadron reverted to Regimental control at 1657H. The Regiment remained OPCON to the 173rd Airborne Brigade.

2nd Squadron:

Troop G discovered and exploded in place a 155mm round equipped for command detonation at XT 688336. At 1405H, a small base camp with two huts was found in the vicinity of XT 691314. A 60mm mortar round found in the camp was blown in place. A second base camp was discovered at XT 6933.

3rd Squadron:

Conducted search and destroy operations. Company D, 4th Battalion, 503rd Infantry, remained attached. Troop I found fifteen 100 pound bags of rice in the vicinity of XT 722227. At 1230H, a tunnel containing two booby-trapped grenades which were destroyed, was located at XT 717243. A hidden complex of huts was located at 1244H, at XT 718242, which contained one pound of documents. The huts were destroyed and the documents evacuated. At 1400H, fifteen CBU bomblets rigged as booby traps were found in and around trails at XT 733225. One US was WIA, and the booby traps were destroyed. At 1355H, thirty to forty rounds of small arms fire was received by the troop with no casualties resulting. The fire was returned at XT 733224, with unknown results. At 1356H, a 100 pound bomb rigged as a pressure mine was found surrounded by punji stakes at XT 719245. The bomb was destroyed and the punji stakes were buried. A trench three to four feet deep was found running northeast for an undetermined distance beginning at XT 713247. Troop K found a tunnel complex at XT 743219 at 1000H. The tunnel had three branches and was destroyed. More tunnels were found in the vicinity of XT 746224 containing documents and clothing. The tunnels, discovered at 1140H, were destroyed, and the documents evacuated. A tunnel and cave complex with compartments was discovered at XT 734232, and destroyed at 1215H. Forty booby-trapped grenades were found at

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XT 720240, and destroyed at 1231H. A small base camp at XT 734226, was found containing three small tunnels and one AP mine. The camp was destroyed at 1350H. Twenty minutes later a sampan was spotted and destroyed at XT 745223. Five pressure fuses found at XT 733223, were destroyed at 1430H. At 1440H, an ACAV hit two AT mines at XT 703252, causing slight damage. At 1500H, another ACAV was slightly damaged by an AT mine. Neither incident produced any casualties. At 1520H, a 250 pound bomb was found at XT 742216, and destroyed in place. Thirty-two bags of rice, each weighing 100 pounds, were found at XT 746218. A booby trap under a bed was found in a hut at XT 746218, and destroyed. Troop L tripped a booby-trapped grenade hanging in a tree resulting in three US WIA. At 1209H, an ACAV track was blown off by a mine at XT 720240, however, there were no casualties. A 250 pound bomb wired for detonation was found at XT 720240 and destroyed at 1220H. A Company H tank struck a mine at XT 716245 resulting in the track being blown off. The incident occurred at 0715H. At 1020H, a tunnel complex with six entrances was found at XT 745234. Only the northern portion of the tunnel had been sealed by the VC. The search continued to the next day. Howitzer Battery killed one armed VC PQI attempting to escape at 1625H in the vicinity of XT 752328 with the 541st Military Intelligence Detachment assisting. Company D, 4th Battalion, 503rd Infantry found a booby trap igniter at XT 747218 and destroyed it at 1220H. At 1540H, it destroyed a sampan at XT 730214 and two tons of rice found in the vicinity of XT 738211.

14 January:

The Regiment remained OPCON to the 173rd Airborne Brigade. (See Annex C - FRAGORD 4 OPERATIONS OVERLEY)

2nd Squadron:

Elements of the squadron continued to provide security for engineer work parties at XT 725318, XT 701311, and XT 671302. Troops E and F, and Company E conducted search and destroy operations northeast of Route 14 from XT 7325 to XT 7523. An ACAV from Troop E received moderate damage from an AT mine at XT 711248 detonated at 0830H, resulting in 2 US WIA in the incident. Mine sweeping in the area resulted in the discovery of a forty pound CHICQI mine. At 1030H, the troop located two homemade mines at XT 713247, and destroyed them in place. The troop received ten rounds of automatic weapons fire at 1415H with no casualties resulting. A CBU bomblet located by the troop was destroyed in place at 1650H. An ACAV of Troop F detonated an AP mine in the vicinity of XT 693259 at 1045H with no casualties or damage experienced. A tank from Company H, received moderate damage at 0830H in the area of XT 711248, from a pressure type AT mine.

3rd Squadron:

Company D, 4th Battalion, 503rd Infantry remained attached to the squadron as elements of the squadron conducted search and destroy operations in the area from XT 7241 to XT 7124. Troop I engaged a VC squad at XT 728219 at 1310H with no casualties on either side. Troop K found one CHICQI carbine in a tunnel at XT 739216. Search operations for 14 January resulted in the capture of eleven pounds of documents, one pound of medical supplies, and thirty-three tons of rice. Destroyed were eleven tunnels, one base camp, six structures, twenty-six pounds of small arms ammunition, four 60mm mortar rounds, two 105mm artillery rounds, one 155mm artillery round, twenty-three CBU bomblets, two 100 pound bombs, one 250 pound bomb, three mines, three grenades and 1.85 tons of rice.

15 January:

The Regiment remained OPCON to the 173rd Airborne Brigade.

2nd Squadron:

Squadron elements continued search and destroy operations in their assigned sector. Troop G continued security operations for engineer work parties at XT 725318, XT 701311, and XT 671302. At 0806H, Troop E sustained one US WIA from a command detonated claymore mine and small arms fire in the vicinity of XT 731254. The fire was returned with unknown results. Thirty minutes later a tank attached to the troop from Company H, detonated two claymore mines at the same location. There were no casualties and no damage sustained from the action. At 1115H, the troop sustained one US WIA, after receiving ten rounds of small arms fire from

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XT 736249. At 1310H, a booby trap detonated at XT 736248 causing six US WIA from the troop. Search operations resulted in the squadron capturing and evacuating thirty-two tons of rice and two half pound sets of documents. Thirteen grenades, two huts, two claymore mines, one 155mm round, one CBU bomblet, and fifteen 81mm mortar rounds were also destroyed.

3rd Squadron:

Company D, 4th Battalion, 503rd Infantry remained OPCON to the squadron. Elements of the squadron continued search and destroy operations in their assigned sector. Troop L sustained 2 US WIA from the explosion of a booby-trapped grenade at XT 716245 at 1020H. Five minutes later one grenade and automatic weapons fire were received; fire was returned with unknown results, and there were no casualties to the troop. An ACAV hit a mine at 1040H, in the same location sustaining light damage to the vehicle. At 1104H, Company D engaged a VC force of unknown size and killed one VC (BC). During a DUST-OFF, in support of Company D, two US were WIA and one KIA from sniper fire. Two ACAV's from Company H were destroyed by two large command detonated mines at XT 733219. Seven US were WIA, and one KIA. Squadron operations for 15 January netted the capture of 5.5 pounds of documents, one-half pound of medical supplies, two CHICOM carbines, two US carbines, one US submachinegun, and 27.8 tons of rice. In addition two tunnels, one base camp, seven structures, five CBU bomblets, six mines, and seven tons of rice were destroyed.

16 January:

The Regiment remained OPCON to the 173rd Airborne Brigade.

2nd Squadron:

Squadron elements conducted search and destroy operations in sector. Troop G continued to secure engineer work parties at XT 725318, XT 701311, and XT 671302. Troop F encountered light small arms fire at XT 726246. Fire was returned with unknown results. At 1325H, a Company H tank detonated an unknown type of booby trap killing one individual from the company. At 0800H, two CHIEU HOI surrendered to a patrol from the company at XT 716245. At 1659H, Troop E found one CHICOM type 56 carbine and one US caliber .30 rifle. Operations for 16 January resulted in the capture of 21.4 tons of rice, one CHICOM carbine, and one US rifle evacuated, and the destruction of three 105mm artillery rounds, one 81mm mortar round, one 60mm mortar round and 1.5 tons of polished rice.

3rd Squadron:

The squadron conducted search and destroy operations in sector. Company D, 4th Battalion, 503rd Infantry was detached at 0732H. Troop K found one Russian Mosin rifle in a tunnel at XT 739216. At 1430H, elements of the troop observed one VC entering a tunnel at XT 734222; the VC was pursued resulting in one VC killed and the capture of one M1 Carbine. An hour and a half later the troop killed two VC (BC) and captured one caliber .45 pistol and one type 43 CHICOM submachinegun at XT 712238. Elements of Company M searching a tunnel received automatic weapons fire resulting in one US KIA and one US WIA, at XT 741221. Operations for the day terminated with the squadron capturing (in addition to the items noted above) 16.5 pounds of documents, ten pounds of clothing, one rifle, one carbine, one grenade, and 100 rounds of CHICOM small arms ammunition. Three mines, and three grenades were also destroyed.

17 January:

The Regiment remained OPCON to the 173rd Airborne Brigade.

2nd Squadron:

Elements of the squadron conducted search and destroy operations in an area immediately to the northeast of Highway 14. Troop G provided security for two engineer work parties (XT 725318 and XT 701311). A tank/ACAV team from Troop E, while searching an area from which a Blackhorse UH-1D received fire, uncovered several bunkers. During search and destroy operations both Troop E and F discovered large caches of rice and numerous bunkers and tunnel complexes; one of which was a

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hospital complex at XT 734247, containing a mess area, trenches, and foxholes. A tunnel with a stone plug was found at XT 734255. At XT 734255. At XT 736250 a tunnel was discovered and searched for approximately 400 meters. A total of 46 tons of rice was also evacuated and five huts, five CHIGOM grenades, and twenty-seven tons of rice were destroyed.

3rd Squadron:

The squadron conducted search and destroy operations in its assigned sector. Troop I discovered one US type M1 carbine and found a tunnel complex at XT 733223. The troop also found and destroyed a 500 pound bomb in the same area. A company M tank hit a pressure type mine at XT 739216 resulting in only light vehicle damage. At 0900H, and again at 1115H, Company M killed a VC (BC) by a booby trap. In addition to the two VC KIA (BC), one US type M1 carbine was captured. Besides the above mentioned items, twenty-one pounds of documents, one camera, and one bundle of clothing were captured and evacuated.

18 January:

The Regiment remained under operational control of the 173rd Airborne Brigade.

2nd Squadron

The squadron conducted search and destroy operations in its assigned sector adjacent to Highway 14. Troop E discovered a tunnel at XT 726254, and found and recovered eight tons of rice from a bunker at XT 732245. Troop F discovered and evacuated six rolls of barbed wire from XT 730244. The troop also found a battalion size complex of bunkers and tunnels at XT 741239 containing a Soviet flag and ten pounds of documents. A company sized base camp at XT 746241 was located containing ten tons of rice which was evacuated.

3rd Squadron:

The squadron conducted search and destroy operations in its assigned sector. Troop I found a machinegun mount for an anti-aircraft machine gun which was constructed of US, non-US and VC fabricated parts. A tunnel containing six VC was found and the tunnel was destroyed by acetylene gas, resulting in six VC KIA (POSS), at XT 733224. A large tunnel complex consisting of numerous long branches was found at XT 732222. Troop K found two tunnels and five bunkers at XT 738218. Nine tons of rice was evacuated from the bunkers. 100 feet of tunnel was demolished at XT 742215. A patrol from the troop killed one VC (BC) at XT 723232 at 1900H. An ACV in Company H detonated a small mine at XT 735224 with no casualties or damage resulting. A base camp containing fourteen tons of rice was found at XT 743222. A tunnel entrance at XT 743224 was booby-trapped. Operations for the day resulted in four US grenades, and one AT mine captured in addition, three tunnels and three grenades were destroyed.

19 January:

The Regiment continued operations under control of the 173d Airborne Brigade.

2nd Squadron:

Squadron elements continued to search and clear operations northeast of Highway 14. Company H was relieved of the security of engineer work parties at two locations by elements of the 1st Squadron, 4th Cavalry. Troop E discovered fifteen tons of booby-trapped rice at XT 735236. After disarming the booby trap, the rice was evacuated. In the same area the troop discovered and destroyed one ton of spoiled rice. An additional twenty-five tons of rice was evacuated at XT 745233. A twenty pound claymore was located and destroyed at XT 735234. Troop F destroyed forty pounds of rice found in a bunker that had been searched the day before. A booby trap emplaced the day before had been tripped, but there was no sign of blood in the area. The troop discovered and evacuated 20 tons of rice from XT 742237.

3rd Squadron:

The squadron conducted search and destroy operations in its assigned

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sector. Company H became OPCON to the 4th Battalion, 503rd Infantry at 0700H, with one platoon returning to squadron control at 1800H. Though the squadron experienced only slight VC contact during the day, five tons of rice were captured and five bunkers, two tunnels, fifty pounds of ammonium nitrate, one 57mm recoilless rifle round, and one CRU bomblet were destroyed.

3rd Squadron:

The squadron conducted search and destroy operations in its assigned sector and in addition dispatched sniper patrols into selected areas. Troop E remained OPCON to the 173rd Airborne Brigade. Troop I discovered one CHICOM type 53 carbine, a British Enfield rifle, and four pounds of documents at XT 728227. The tunnel was destroyed, and when the destruction charge was triggered two secondary explosions occurred with gray and white smoke appearing. Troop L destroyed a tunnel in which a CHICOM type 53 carbine had been found at XT 717233. Four tons of rice were destroyed at XT 745224 by the troop. Company M found a bunker with seventeen pounds of composition C-4 utilizing part of the explosive to destroy the bunker. The company destroyed two concrete and steel reinforced bunkers at XT 737221.

21 January:

The Regiment remained OPCON to the 173rd Airborne Brigade.

2nd Squadron:

The squadron conducted search and destroy operations in its assigned sector while Company H (-) remained OPCON to the 4th Battalion, 503rd Infantry. Though there was no significant contact with the enemy, Troop E found two fresh graves containing two VC at XT 748238, and destroyed one small base camp and one tunnel.

3rd Squadron:

The squadron continued search and destroy operations in its assigned sector. Troop K remained OPCON to the 173rd Airborne Brigade. One eighteen foot was destroyed by Troop I, as were two US 2.75" aerial rockets, two hits, and one tunnel. Troop L netted four CHIEU HOI's during the day. A patrol killed one VC (BC) at XT 740215. Company M destroyed a squad size base camp and discovered and evacuated fourteen tons of rice from XT 738223.

22 January:

The Regiment remained OPCON to the 173rd Airborne Brigade. (See Annex D FRAGORD 12 OPERATIONS OVERLAY). At 0709H, the 2nd Battalion, 503rd Infantry, was attached to the Regiment.

2nd Squadron:

The squadron, less detached units, conducted search and destroy operations in its assigned sector. Company H (-), remained OPCON to the 173rd Airborne Brigade, and Troop E became OPCON to the 2nd Battalion, 503rd Infantry. There was no significant contact with the enemy during the day's operations. However, one French 8mm M1916 rifle, one type 98 7.92mm rifle and one US M1 were captured as was a VC constructed caliber .30 rifle. 2 huts, 2 grenades, 4 tunnels and one half ton of rice were destroyed.

3rd Squadron:

The squadron conducted search and destroy operations in its assigned sector of operations. Troop K remained OPCON to the 173rd Airborne Brigade. Company A, 2nd Battalion, 503rd Infantry was attached effective 0800H, for operations. Although enemy contact was negligible, operations netted 3000 SVN Piasters, ten tons of rice, fifty rounds of 7.62mm ammunition and one type 53 CHICOM carbine.

2nd Battalion, 503rd Infantry:

Battalion elements conducted search and destroy operations in rice paddies within their assigned sector. No significant enemy contact was reported. However, Company B, did find one VC KIA (BC) in the THI TINH River at XT 764215, and received one CHIEU HOI at XT 735256.

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Operations for the day resulted in the capture of 1.5 tons of rice, one pound of documents, one bicycle, and forty-six rounds of small arms ammunition. 500 pounds of rice, one grenade, four sampans, ten huts, and one small base camp were destroyed.

23 January:

The Regiment remained OPCON to the 173rd Airborne Brigade. The 2nd Battalion, 503rd Infantry remained OPCON to the Regiment.

2nd Squadron:

The squadron conducted search and destroy operations in its assigned sector. Company A, 2nd Battalion, 503rd Infantry remained OPCON to the squadron while Troop K remained OPCON to the 173rd Airborne Brigade. Troop I found 2 dead VC (BG) who appeared to have been dead two to four days. A sniper patrol from Troop L accounted for one VC KIA (BG) at XT 722232. The operations during the day resulted in the destruction of one 200 pound bomb, three tunnels, three huts and one ton of rice.

2nd Battalion, 503rd Infantry:

Battalion elements conducted search and destroy operations in rice paddies in its sector. Operations for the day accounted for 900 pounds of rice, five huts, three sampans, five bunkers, and one hand grenade destroyed.

24 January:

Operation CRDAR FALLS was terminated and the Regiment was released from the operational control of the 173rd Airborne Brigade at 1710H. The 2nd Battalion, 503rd Infantry remained OPCON to the Regiment and was integrated into the tactical road march of the 2nd Squadron. The battalion was released to its parent unit upon arrival at BIEN HOA.

2nd Squadron:

The squadron conducted a tactical road march from BEN CAT (XT 7533) to the Regimental Base Camp closing with the main body at 1710H. Trail elements closed at 2310H without incident.

3rd Squadron:

The squadron conducted a tactical road march from BEN CAT (XT 7533) to the Regimental Base Camp. The main body closed at 1455H, and the trail party closed at 2240H. There were no incidents during the march.

12. (C) Results:

a. Personnel:

26 VC KIA (BG) and 13 VC KIA (POSS). Seventy-four individuals were detained, and eight VC were captured. Twelve VC turned themselves in as CH IEU HOI's.

b. Fortifications and Buildings:

Sixty tunnels or tunnel complexes were found and all were partially or completely destroyed. Six base camps, fifteen bunkers and forty-seven huts were also destroyed.

c. Material:

Twenty-nine small arms were captured, along with 1100 rounds of ammunition. 174 mines were captured or destroyed as were 108 artillery or mortar shells. Thirteen pounds of medicine, six rolls of barbed wire, 150 burlap bags, one machine-gun tripod and seventeen pounds of C-4 explosive were captured.

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d. Miscellaneous Items and Foodstuffs:

479.5 tons of rice was captured of which only 79.5 tons had to be destroyed. The remaining 400 tons were returned to the GVN. One camera, fourteen bicycles, one 300 gallon fuel tank, NVN \$3000, twenty rolls of corrugated roofing and one siren as well as one gross of eight inch bolts were captured. Twenty sampans were destroyed.

e. Friendly Losses:

Friendly losses included eight US KIA, fifty-one US lightly WIA, six seriously WIA. Materiel losses were eight ACAV's, four tanks and four wheeled vehicles damaged. Two ACAV's and one tank were destroyed.

13. (U) Administrative Matters:

Administrative plans for the operation proved to be adequate, and logistical support kept pace with combat requirements throughout the operation. Classes I, III, and IIIA were supplied from a 1st Logistical Command Forward Support Area (FSA) at PHU LOI. Class V and VA and some Class IIIA were supplied from a 1st Logistical Command FSA located at LAI KHE. Maintenance Support was provided by the 188th Maintenance Battalion. Regimental and Squadron Trains operated from a central location at the PHU LOI Base Camp under the direction of the Regimental S4 and the Regimental Logistical Control Center.

a. Resupply:

Land lines of communications and daily resupply convoys were the primary methods of resupply for the operation. Organic transportation was the only transportation used except for Chinook helicopter air lift of water, rations, POL, and ammunition to the 3rd Squadron.

b. Maintenance:

The maintenance support furnished by the 188th Maintenance Battalion was outstanding, and at times approached "Instant Maintenance". Items deadlined as the result of combat action one day were, in the majority of cases, ready for action the next day.

c. POL Statistics:

Issue of the following types of POL products was accomplished during the operation: JPL-18,400 gallons, AVGAS-3805 gallons, MOGAS-55200 gallons, Diesel-34,000 gallons.

d. Treatment and Evacuation of Casualties:

Although there were many lightly wounded casualties not requiring treatment, there were forty-six injuries as a result of hostile action treated during the operation. In addition, twenty-two individuals received treatment from non-hostile injuries. Of this total, nineteen IRMA's and twenty-two individuals injured by other than hostile action were evacuated. All individuals evacuated were air-lifted by DUST-OFF to the 93rd Evacuation Hospital, the 12th Evacuation Hospital, or the 3rd Surgical Hospital.

e. Communications:

Communications to the Regimental Base Camp and to higher headquarters was maintained by a multitude of communications methods as listed below.

(1) FM Nets:

11th Armored Cavalry entered the 173rd Airborne Brigade Command Net and the 173rd Admin/Intel Net with no difficulties encountered.

(2) Telephone Circuits:

(a) A Sole User (Point to Point) circuit was established between the 11th Armored Cavalry TOC and the 173rd Airborne Brigade TOC with excellent results.

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(b) Common User circuits were established between the 173rd Forward Switchboard and the Blackhorse Forward Switchboard providing access to the Army Telephone System.

(3) Teletypewriter:

A common user circuit from Blackhorse Forward through the 173rd Airborne Brigade Forward and into the Army System was utilized.

(4) Regimental Trains Telephones:

Four common user circuits were established to the 1st Infantry Division Switchboard and into the Army System.

(5) Radio Teletype to Base Camp:

An AM RATT Net was established to the Regimental Base Camp from the Regimental Field location by using an AN/GRC-26D at the Base Camp.

(6) Telephone to Base Camp:

Point to point circuits were established from Blackhorse Forward to Blackhorse Rear.

(7) Teletypewriter to Base Camp:

The circuit to base camp was operated from Blackhorse Forward through 173rd Airborne Brigade and II Force V circuits.

(8) FM to Base Camp:

An FM Administrative Net was operated by use of tactical radios on an intermittent basis as needed.

f. Administration:

Routine administration continued to operate smoothly in spite of the great distance between the field location and the administrative center at the Regimental Base Camp. This was accomplished by a daily run to the field location by the S-1. Replacements were sent to the field by a Caribou aircraft flown by the Air Force on a daily basis. The same aircraft was used to transport R&R personnel to and from TAN SON NHUT Air Force Base. During the month the R&R program was greatly enlarged, and proved to be extremely beneficial to the morale of the troops on the operation.

14. (U) Special Equipment and Techniques:

The major innovation in military techniques employed during the operation is covered in paragraph 7,b, and paragraph 7,d,h.

15 (U) Commander's Analysis:

The operation, combining an initial rapid maneuver phase, a search and destroy phase, and screening, blocking and security missions demonstrated the great flexibility of the Blackhorse Regiment. The initial night move to assembly areas was rapid and smooth. The attack on successive objectives, the link-up with heliborne forces and establishment of screen and blocking positions demonstrated that the Regiment is capable of moving fast and arriving at its destination in excellent fighting trim.

The unique quality of the operation that the 11th Armored Cavalry demonstrated its ability to conduct comprehensive, thorough and effective search and destroy operations. The discovery and destruction of sixty tunnel complexes and discovery and evacuation of well over 470 tons of rice are effective testimony to that fact.

The search and destroy portion of Operation CEDAR FALLS was the final combat test of the modified TO&E designed to tailor the Regiment's organization to the requirements of counter-insurgency operations in Vietnam.

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The search and destroy operations, plus the allied saturation and sniper patrols, and tunnel search operations proved the validity of the MTOE. There proved to be sufficient personnel in the basic maneuver element - the Armored Cavalry Platoon - to allow for required dismounted tunnel and patrolling operations while maintaining sufficient crew members on the ACV's to maintain the platoon's mounted combat capabilities. 40

16. (C) Recommendations: (Lessons Learned)

a. Operations:

(1) Item: Saturation Patrols

Discussion:

Saturation patrolling is the technique of placing many small patrols in areas of expected enemy activity.

The technique is best employed along definite and linear terrain features such as stream beds, trails, canals, and any probable enemy avenues of approach.

Three to four man patrols are situated all along the terrain feature, and lay in wait for the enemy.

Should an enemy force approach, one, two, or all of the patrols in the area can engage the force.

Saturation patrolling proved effective on Operation CEDAR FALLS.

Observation: Saturation patrolling can be effectively employed in armored cavalry search and destroy operations.

(2) Item: Sniper Patrols

Discussion:

The sniper patrol is a smaller version of the night ambush patrol.

Each patrol is equipped with an M-79 grenade launcher, 3 M-16 rifles, and a radio.

The patrols are positioned near known or suspected rice caches and tunnel entrances.

It was discovered that the patrols proved to be a valuable source of information on VC daylight activities.

Observation: Like saturation patrolling, sniper patrolling was proven to be a valuable adjunct to armored cavalry operations.

(3) Item: Discovery of rice caches.

Discussion: During Operation CEDAR FALLS it was observed that anytime a large cache of rice had been discovered, a flock of small birds had been frightened away by the approach of friendly troops. Accordingly, any time a flock of birds was noticed, a search for a rice cache was made in the area.

Observation: Flocks of birds should be watched to assist in locating rice caches.

(4) Item: Indications provided by intense booby-trapping.

Discussion: It was learned on Operation CEDAR FALLS that intense booby-trapping of a particular area was a good indication that valuable stores were hidden nearby.

Observation: Analysis of the disposition of booby traps in an area can lead to the discovery of valuable VC stores and materiel.

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(5) Item: ~~IED~~ fires along trails.

Discussion:

The effective use of IED air bursts along trails prevented the VC from thoroughly emplacing mines, thus permitting easy detection by friendly forces.

One squadron uncovered nine poorly emplaced mines in an area that had received air burst IED fires the night before.

Observation: Expeditions use of air burst IED fires may prevent the enemy from properly emplacing mines.

b. Intelligence:

(1) Item: Centralized Interrogation and Document Exploitation.

Discussion: All available Military Intelligence personnel at the centrally located center have the following advantages over scattered MI Detachments located with Battalion size units:

Readily accessible to the commander.

Man hours saved in collaborating PW statements.

Rapid association between documents and PWs.

Rapid dissemination of information to all subordinate, adjacent, and higher elements.

Controlled work load, i.e., the CIC is able to interrogate PWs and exploit documents on a timely basis whereas in separate units one MI Detachment may have an overload while another is idle.

Availability of technical experts.

Economy of space, time, and resources.

Observations: Recommend that centralized interrogation and document exploitation means be utilized during future multi-unit operations.

(2) Items: Use of Military Police in handling POWs.

Discussion: This was the first opportunity the 11th Armored Cavalry Regiment had to use TO&E Military Police units during operations, and it was found that Military Police possess the following advantages over unit police:

Specifically trained in the various techniques used in handling POWs.

Frees combat personnel from a responsibility they are not especially trained for.

Insures the rapid and efficient handling of POWs.

Releases interrogator personnel from the additional requirement of supervising the handling of POWs.

Observation: Military Police personnel, when available, greatly facilitate the processing and safeguarding of POWs during combat operations.

(3) Item: Rapid evacuation and exploitation of detainees, PWs, and Chieu Hoi's.

Discussion: During this operation detainees, PWs, and Chieu Hoi's were evacuated by the fastest means available (generally by air) to the centralized interrogation point. At this location a rapid evaluation of the individual was made. Those personnel who had knowledge of storage locations or fortifications were quickly dispatched to interested units where they could be used as guides. Those Chieu Hoi's who knew or suspected the whereabouts of other possible Chieu Hoi's, were placed in a speaker aircraft and attempted to talk their cohorts into rallying.

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Observations: Rapid evacuation and exploitation of PWs and Rallyers successful in the majority of cases. Recommend this tactic be continued in future operations.

c. Civil Affairs:

Item: Evacuation of captured rice from the battlefield.

Discussion:

During Operation CEDAR FALLS the 11th Armored Cavalry Regiment captured a considerable quantity of rice from widely dispersed caches in the IRON TRIANGLE. Since the 11th Armored Cavalry Regiment could not evacuate the rice due to its combat mission, all possible means of evacuation were considered. Consideration was given to the use of purely administrative transportation such as trucking companies. However, at the time there was insufficient transportation available to move the rice. Efforts were made to have the rice transported by the trucks organic to the 18th ARVN Division, and although the request was not denied outright, the Division set a pick up date so far in the future as to be unacceptable. The 11th Armored Cavalry Regiment then appealed to Province, and after considerable pressure had been applied through advisory channels, the rice was partially extracted from the centralized collection point in the vicinity of PHU LOI.

Observation:

The difficulties in evacuation of foodstuffs by transportation organic to combat units in a combat situation are numerous and complex. The extensive logistical demands of attacking units, coupled with the highly mobile nature of combat operations, made the use of organic transportation impractical.

The use of purely administrative transportation such as trucking companies offers a possible solution, but in a guerilla warfare environment adequate security would be essential for the vehicles, even when operating well behind the zone of contact. Often such security forces will not be available.

The most practical and logical means of foodstuff evacuation in the 11th Armored Cavalry Regiment TAOR is by ARVN's organic transportation units. They have the vehicles necessary for such missions as well as the manpower to provide their own security and labor to load and unload the rice. Such a mission is appropriate to ARVN, with its assigned mission of following up and consolidating US gains as well as participation in the Revolutionary Development Program.

Another solution is to give the mission to Province Headquarters, and have them coordinate the transportation needed through such agencies as public works or RF units, both of which have organic transportation. This type of mission would give either ARVN or RF units an excellent chance for a worthwhile Civic Action Program. To gain GVN cooperation, the US unit should notify the Vietnamese where rice has been captured and consolidated, the amount of rice allocated to them, and give the Vietnamese a reasonable length of time to pick it up. If they fail to pick up the rice within this time and have no valid excuse, the rice or other foodstuffs should be destroyed. That quantity of rice, or its dollar equivalent should be deducted from the provincial food or money allocation for the next month. If the Vietnamese were willing to fulfill their responsibility to their own people, much of the present destruction of rice in Vietnam would be unnecessary. Experience with the Vietnamese has demonstrated that as long as they feel the US will do a task for them, they have little incentive to help themselves. It is felt that the above proposal would provide this much needed incentive.

d. PSYOPS:

Item: Use of loudspeakers on UH-1D helicopters to get VC to Chieu Hoi.

Discussion: During Operation CEDAR FALLS, 30 Chieu Hoi's rallied as the direct result of messages they heard from 11th Armored Cavalry Regiment UH-1D helicopter loudspeaker ships. The speaker ship would fly over areas where the VC were hiding and tell them to give up or they would die. As soon as one VC gave up he was taken up in the speaker ship and he would tell his comrades that they too should give up. It was found that some of them wanted to give up,

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but were afraid they would be shot as they came in because they had no safe conduct passes. So they were told to take off their shirts and wave them over their heads. This worked well and resulted in a group of nineteen coming in all at one time.

Observation: Airborne loudspeaker strips should be used to the maximum during operations to get VC to give up. They are most effective after about two weeks in which the enemy has received continual bombardment from both air and artillery. Using a Ho Chi Minh (Returnee) to talk on the speaker mission is more effective than the unit interpreter.

e. Logistics and Maintenance:

(1) Item: Equipment losses.

Discussions:

Primary equipment losses during the operation were caused by anti-tank mines. The mines destroyed or damaged road wheels, road wheel arms, hubs, bearings, and track, more than any other parts of the vehicles hit.

Observation: Stockage of armored vehicle suspension parts should be increased.

(2) Item: POL consumption factors.

Discussion: The POL consumption factors listed in FM 101-10 or factors based on training and European experience are not valid for search and clear operations in Vietnam owing to the lack of vehicular movement and considerable dismounted action.

Observation: Planning for POL consumption based on FM 101-10 should be modified in accordance with Vietnam counter-insurgency operations experience.

(3) Item: Logistical and Maintenance Support for the Regiment.

Discussion:

During the operation, logistical support was provided to the Regiment on a temporary basis from a 1st Logistical Command Forward Support Area at PHU LOI and at an Ammunition Supply Point at LAI KHE. Maintenance support was provided by the 188th Maintenance Battalion. Logistical and Maintenance Support were adequate only because of the short turn around distances.

Transportation to effect unit distribution of supplies does not exist above squadron level. The Regiment was able to resupply the subordinate units only by using organic vehicles from the squadrons which was possible only because of the short turn around distances and augmentation by Chinook helicopters when they were available.

Observation:

The Regiment needs a Support Command with the necessary assets to support it wherever it may be employed.

The Regiment needs a Direct Support Maintenance unit assigned or attached to provide maintenance support.

f. Signal:

(1) Item: AM Radio Range

Discussion:

AM radio contact is necessary between the Regimental Base Compound and the Regimental Headquarters at all times, even when the two are separated by great distances as they were on Operation CEDAR FALLS. The Antenna Kit AN/GRI-4, attached to organic AM radios would provide the necessary increased range.

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Observation: The Antenna Kit AN/GRA-4 should be issued on the basis of two per squadron and three to Regimental Headquarters.

(2) Item: Overheating of radios.

Discussion:

Twenty-four hour operation of the equipment mounted in the M-577 tracked vehicles and the resultant overheating of radios resulted in many radio breakdowns.

The use of fans blowing directly on the radios will tend to overcome this problem.

Placing the transmitter in STAND-BY position will help alleviate this problem in the AN/VRC-29 radio.

Observations: Use of fans blowing on radios in the M-577 vehicle and use of the STAND-BY capability of the AN/GRC-29 will help overcome radio overheating problems.

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OPERATION OVERVIEW

OPORD 67 OF 25 SEP 67

REFERENCE MAPS: VIETNAM 1:50,000

SERIES 633/III 623/II

ARTY
BASE
II

ACKNOWLEDGE

COBB
COL

OFFICIAL:

COAD
S3

ANKEE

OBJ
IA

OBJ
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OBJ
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
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
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


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Fragord 2, Operations Overlay - Reference Maps, VIETNAM.
1:50,000 Series 6331 III, 6231 II



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
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
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
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ANNEX E
PICTOMAP 1:25,000, VIETNAM
SERIES 6331 III S

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TRAINING AND DEPLOYMENT - AIR CAVALRY TROOP

1. (U) Introduction. The Air Cavalry Troop was alerted for deployment to Southeast Asia in March 1966. Originally organized under TO&E 1-67D (Regimental Aviation Company) the troop was reorganized as an Air Cavalry Troop under TO&E 17-58E. This reorganization constituted a sweeping change for the aviation elements in the Regiment. Not only was the Aviation Company redesignated the Air Cavalry Troop but some of its old missions were deleted while new missions and capabilities were added. The command and liaison function was now to be performed by the new Aviation Platoon of Headquarters & Headquarters Troop of the Regiment and by the three aviation sections of the squadron headquarters. The Air Cavalry Troop gained new firepower for use in suppressive fire roles with the Aero Rifle Platoon adding the capability of light patrol and security forces. The new TO&E is a marked improvement over the old if for no other reason than because of these additional capabilities.

During the month of March 1966, a turn in of all equipment not authorized under the new TO&E was initiated and completed the following month. Personnel with unauthorized skills (Fixed Wing only-Drone) were reassigned by Department of the Army, or retrained by unit request. In late April only a small nucleus of personnel and equipment remained from which to organize the new troop.

New equipment and personnel which had been requisitioned on 06 priority in late March began arriving by mid April. At first, the equipment and personnel arrived in small lots and on individual requisition fills. In early May there was a large increase in personnel input and by the end of that month eighty percent of the authorized strength had been assigned.

Equipment for the troop began arriving in May. In late June authorization was granted by Department of the Army to requisition all needed equipment on an 02 priority. Observation aircraft were issued to the troop in small groups from May to July at which time all authorized OH-23G aircraft were on hand. The UH-1D and UH-1C type aircraft were issued directly from the factory in lots of four to six during the month of July. Training involving the use of aircraft was hampered by the lack of adequate direct support maintenance facilities on station. Concurrent with aviation training personnel were involved in the various areas of training outlined in ATP 17-108.

By late August aircrew and ground personnel training had reached the point where specialized ground and air training could begin. The Aero Rifle Platoon departed for Camp AP Hill, Virginia to begin basic squad, section, and platoon exercises. The aircraft and crews departed Fort Meade for Fort Knox, Kentucky where they received two weeks of training in aerial gunnery. The air and ground units were then reunited at AP Hill in late September to commence combined section, platoon, and troop training. Aerial gunnery courses were conducted for the enlisted gunners at this time. In order to provide for the additional personnel needed as door gunners after deployment, a special authorization was requested from Department of the Army.

The unit training phase culminated in late October with the satisfactory completion of the Annual Training Test (ATT). Upon completion of the ATT the unit returned to Fort Meade to begin making preparations for the approaching overseas move.

POR-POM, requirements were met with the assistance of a special team from Fort Meade Post. The only problem encountered was the forced turn in of a 600 gallon water trailer which was declared unserviceable. An advance party was designated and transportation requests were submitted for it and the main body in accordance with movement dates received from Post Transportation. The aircraft were flown to Aberdeen Proving Grounds for air transport to Sharpe Army Depot, California by the Military Airlift Command. Two officers, and one aircraft technical inspector, and assigned crew chiefs were sent with the aircraft from point of departure at Aberdeen to point of arrival in-country. The minimum essential (Red Circle) items were shipped by air with the main body while bulk equipment was shipped from the POE, Baltimore, without accompanying personnel. On 27 November 1966, the advance party deployed by commercial air and civilian contract flight from Fort Meade direct to Saigon. The movement order for the advance party specified the uniform would be fatigues with web gear and steel helmet. This uniform later on proved to be inappropriate for both commercial air and MAC contract flights. Special authorization had to be obtained from MAC at Travis AFB in order to continue movement without Class B summer uniform.

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The main body departed on three flights on 29 November, 3 December and 5 December. The advance party which had been dispatched earlier was experiencing difficulties preparing the area for the receipt of the main body. Only basic accommodations (tentage) were available; however, enough equipment for the most immediate needs were secured by the supply officer from the 1st Logistical Command. Efforts by the advance party were hindered by the lack of transportation and transportation support. The most critical item needed was a replacement for the 600 gallon water trailer condemned in CONUS just prior to shipment. To date a water trailer has not been issued against the 05 priority requisition submitted on 3 January 1966.

The bulk shipment arrived in-country on 26 January 1967. The aircraft had arrived four days earlier on 22 January. There were no significant problems encountered during the receipt, movement, or unpacking of the bulk items. There was, however, some pilferage of items packed on the trucks. The aircraft were unloaded, inspected, and weapons systems installed with a minimum of difficulty.

In January, while in-country a reorganization of aviation assets within the troop (see Annex A) was effected by a transfer of all observation aircraft, crews, and support tools to the Regimental Aviation Platoon and Squadron Air Sections. In exchange, all UH-1C (armed) helicopters were transferred, with crews, into the troop. It was felt this reorganization would greatly enhance the troop's capabilities as well as eliminate the problem of the reduced combat availability of one fire team at squadron level with only two gunships assigned. The troop now has nineteen UH-1C aircraft. The UH-1C aircraft are assigned to the three light weapons platoons and one heavy weapons platoon. The UH-1D aircraft remained in the Aero Rifle Platoon with the exception of one aircraft designated as permanent C&C and one maintenance aircraft to provide a light recovery capability. This reorganization was complete by 15 January. The Aero Rifle Platoon replaced one infantry squad with a LRRP section of two teams of six men each.

2. (U) Personnel. In March 1966, when the change of TO&E was effected there were approximately 55 EM and 11 officers in the Aviation Company. Six of these officers were only qualified in Fixed Wing aircraft and became excess upon reorganization. By late May about 80% of the authorized officer strength was present for duty and had been primarily assigned to the Air Cavalry Troop.

Enlisted personnel strength rose significantly in June, but the programed unit strength was not reached until mid November with the arrival of augmentation personnel requested to fill door gunner positions.

The problem obtaining authorization for the additional door gunners was the most critical personnel action encountered. It was magnified by the lack of assets from within the command to draw from to satisfy just such unprogramed requirements. This problem was further compounded by the lack of guidance or authorization for door gunner assignments.

By 28 November, all personnel with the exception of the advance party had returned from leave and were ready for deployment. The advance party departed 24 November by air. On 29 November the first group departed Fort Meade for the Republic of Vietnam. The movement was completed by 10 December with the exception of individuals delayed enroute for medical reasons and the unit property book officer who was completing the turnover of station property to Fort Meade. All these individuals arrived in RVN by 15 January 1967.

3. (U) Logistics. Shortly after receiving the alert for deployment to Vietnam the unit acquired a WBL 02 priority, and initiated the necessary action for requisitioning TO&E, PLL, and TA 50-901 equipment to reach a 100% fill on all items prior to departing CONUS. The unit departed for Vietnam with 100% TO&E equipment and 87% fill on PLL. The last item of TO&E equipment arrived two days prior to the Equipment Readiness Deadline.

As of the end of the reporting period the unit has received all of its TO&E equipment with the exception of one water trailer, and is logistically capable of performing its mission.

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4. (U) Aircraft and Aircraft Weapons Systems. The weapons systems were ordered in June through normal supply channels. The authority for these systems was found either in the TO&E or DA General Orders. One group of systems arrived before the aircraft, the M-5 40mm subsystems. The M-2 systems arrived generally with the observation helicopters they were to be mounted on. All remaining systems arrived after the aircraft causing a small delay in the installation process. Experience indicated the need for a knowledgeable individual to be responsible for the continual follow up on outstanding requisitions. This individual would also insure that a complete inventory would indicate any missing items that could be immediately requisitioned.

A PLL was established in accordance with pertinent technical manuals based on records of demands, letters from units in Vietnam, and the usage factor experienced during the training cycle. The aircraft weapons PLL was divorced from the unit's small arms PLL and sent with the aircraft to Sharpe Army Depot. Sharpe reviewed the PLL listing, added additional parts for a 100% fill, compartmentized a conex container, categorized the parts, and secured them in the container for shipment. Preprinted requisition cards were added for each part, to expedite supply transactions. These cards were placed with each part and a master listing of all parts contained in the conex was placed on the inside door. This master listing made reference to the part by a particular bin number.

During the serviceability criteria inspection for overseas deployment, all weapons systems were inventoried, functionally checked, removed from the aircraft (excluding components inside the aircraft) and crated with the type weapons system and serial number of the aircraft stenciled on the crate. All systems were shipped with the aircraft during movement. It might be noted that the machine guns were packed with each system as were the 40mm launchers. Rocket pods were packaged as bulk items but accompanied the aircraft.

The aircraft arrived in-country (Vung Tau Harbor) on 21 January 1967 and were assembled, test flown and released by 23 January. As aircraft were assembled on the aircraft carrier and flown to land for unit pick-up, weapons systems were installed as soon as they landed at VUNG TAU. The systems were functionally checked prior to release. Several of the pylons on the XM-16 system did not function and were immediately turned in for repair. The weapons systems were bore sighted, loaded, and test fired upon their arrival at the base camp. All weapons systems were operational within one week after arrival in-country.

5. (U) Movement. The first coordination for the move began with Post Transportation in the first week of August. Throughout the movement, preparation, and execution, normal channels and procedures as established by Department of the Army were used. In the first week of September, all necessary cubic feet and weight data were submitted to transportation facilities as requested. Some time was consumed in establishing cube and weight on small common items of TO&E equipment which were in use and not in original containers (Decontamination apparatus, special tools, etc.).

During the period 15 September through 23 October no movement preparation was possible because of extended field training and the scheduled unit ATT. From 23 - 30 October POM work was accomplished with the assistance of a POM team from Fort Meade Post. Packing was accomplished 1 through 15 November.

The aircraft were delivered for shipment beginning 13 November. The bulk shipment was delivered to the post on 16 November. The dates of movement had been requested from post transportation, based on the unit equipment readiness date provided by the Department of the Army.

All shipments of equipment were accompanied by unit personnel except the bulk shipment. Some pilferage was experienced on the bulk equipment. Once the equipment arrived in Vietnam it was received and transported to the unit location by unit personnel without any difficulty.

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U N C L A S S I F I E D

ORGANIZATIONAL CHART
TO&E 17-58 (N)*

Commanding Officer.

Headquarters Section: Acft: 1 UH-1D, Veh: 10
(Mess Sect, Motor Pool Sect, Supply Sect)

1st Light Weapons Platoon: Acft: 5 UH-1C, Veh: 0, Arm: M16 subsystem
2nd Light Weapons Platoon: Acft: 5 UH-1C, Veh: 0, Arm: M16 subsystem
3rd Light Weapons Platoon: Acft: 5 UH-1C, Veh: 0, Arm: M16 subsystem
Heavy Weapons Platoon: Acft: 4 UH-1C, Veh: 0, Arm: M-5 subsystem
Aero Rifle Platoon: Acft: 4 UH-1D, Veh: 0
-- Service Platoon: Acft: 1 UH-1D, Veh: 4
-- Operations Section: Acft: 0, Veh: 2
 -- Commo Section: Acft: 0, Veh: 0
 -- Airfield Svc Sect: Acft: 0, Veh: 4

Combat elements. _____

Support elements. - - - - -

* As submitted for approval

Annex A, Inclosure 9

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BASE CAMP DEVELOPMENT

1. (U) General

The selection, planning and construction of a base camp will in most instances confront a newly arrived unit in-country. The Blackhorse Regiment was no exception to the standard procedure of having first organized and moved into a staging area prior to securing a location for its permanent home. Some of the problems encountered by the Blackhorse are outlined in this inclosure with the intent of sharing our experiences so that other units might profit from our mistakes and our successful innovations.

2. (U) Location:

a. The Blackhorse Base Camp (LONG GIAO YS 43509700) is in the Province of LONG KHANH in the Republic of Vietnam.

b. The area of the base camp is characterized by rolling terrain with small streams crisscrossing the area coupled with sporadic outcroppings ranging in height from approximately 250 meters to 840 meters. Geographically the region is located in the Intermediate Lowland Region of Vietnam.

The soil is a general purpose type well suited for agriculture as well as road building and general construction. It is basically clay in composition possessing a good absorbant quality, providing excellent drainage throughout the camp area.

Vegetation varies from dense rain forests to scattered areas of open forest, grasslands and rice fields. Interspersed throughout the area are also vast amounts of rubber. The rain forest areas are comprised of continuous, multi-level canopy forests with heavy undergrowth which precludes extensive mounted cross-country operations but does not prohibit limited operations. Scattered about the area are open forests featuring considerable undergrowth and tall sharp-edged thatch grass (elephant grass) growing to heights of seven feet. Cultivated areas are plentiful throughout the area featuring primarily rubber and coffee plantations. However, large quantities of peanuts, tobacco, and rice are also grown in the region.

Major roads within the area vary from approximately thirty feet to fifty-two feet in width and are usually paved water bound bituminous macadam. Portions of the major roads are poorly drained and surfaces in some areas are rough. Observation and fields of fire are limited along forested areas, and fair to good in open and cultivated areas. Numerous trails criss-cross the region in varying widths. Surface materials are earth and crushed rock or gravel.

3. (U) Site Selection:

a. The basis for future decisions, construction plans, and efforts will hinge on the foresight and professional judgement exercised by the individuals responsible for selecting the tract of land that will eventually house the base camp. Too often, snap judgements, incomplete research, and eagerness to get the task accomplished have resulted in the unnecessary expenditure of man-hours and funds while at the same time detracting from the unit's tactical missions. To assist in minimizing this possibility the following salient points should be considered.

(1) The nature of the terrain to include type of soil, drainage, and availability of surface water for use as a fresh water supply; vegetation available for shade as opposed to the engineer and troop effort required to clear the area.

(2) Acquire sufficient real estate to allow for unforeseen expansion requirements and/or changes in weapons systems.

(3) Is the location of the civilian populace such to prevent the free return of protective fires from the perimeter without fear of hitting innocent civilians.

(4) The accessibility, condition, type and security of supply routes supporting the area will have a direct effect on the speed with which the camp is developed and the future transportation requirements necessary to logistically and administratively support the camp.

4. (U) Plan for Construction:

Simultaneous with the selection of a permanent site, should be the organization of a Base Camp Development Board composed of representatives from each of the units programed to occupy the base camp. In order for the board to function effectively and efficiently as a planning group, a FIRM TROOP LIST must be made available at the earliest possible time along with each unit's real estate requirements. Unit representatives on the board must be knowledgeable of their unit's requirements and be able to speak for the commander. Without this the board can become inundated with trivial matters and become completely ineffectual. The senior headquarters occupying the camp should provide the chairman for the board. Technical advice is provided by the engineer unit who should also be a voting member charged with the mission of developing the camp. Points to be considered by the board include:

a. Priority of construction. It was decided in building the 11th Armored Cavalry Regiment Base Camp that the engineer effort would be directed toward the building of roads and drainage facilities, latrines, showers, and mess halls in that order. This work was to be followed by dispensaries, troop billets, and administrative facilities (headquarters, orderly and supply rooms) with service facilities coming last.

b. Aircraft facilities. Initial plans did not include airport facilities to accommodate Air Force cargo or light observation aircraft utilized by FAC personnel in support of the Regiment. Experience indicated a definite need existed because of administrative (R & R, emergency leave, mail, replacements, and returnees to CONUS) and logistical (repair parts, perishable foodstuffs and emergency medical supplies) requirements. It also enables FAC personnel to be more responsive and flexible to the Regiment's needs.

c. Street layout. The rectangular street layout is the easiest but not always adaptable to existing terrain. In the Regiment's case, it proved to be extremely feasible. Only one problem developed, and that was the width of the roads. Standard road specifications call for a traveled way 22 feet wide. However this was found to be too narrow, especially when it rained. Except for the first road (Blackhorse Drive) constructed, all others were built to 30 feet specifications thus providing more road space for maneuvering in wet weather.

d. Future expansion. Provisions should be made for future camp expansion requirements by setting aside $\frac{1}{4}$ to $\frac{1}{3}$ of the base camp area for that purpose. In conjunction with this, consideration must also be given to the overall troop commitment needed to secure the camp perimeter.

e. Security plans. A direct relationship exists between the perimeter defenses employed and the weapons and equipment available to defend the perimeter. A modest barrier plan was adopted consisting of five bands of triple concertina barbed wire covered by fire from four-man bunkers positioned approximately 100 meters apart depending on the terrain and available fields of fire. Each bunker is equipped with one M60 MG and depending on availability, one M79 grenade launcher.

Night vision devices are incorporated into the overall security plan. One starlite scope for each of the six towers and is provided in at least one bunker on each side of the perimeter. In addition, tanks equipped with Xenon Searchlights and infrared devices are strategically positioned along the camp's perimeter.

Each of the previously mentioned towers are so located to provide overlapping observation and fire from their tower mounted 50 Cal MG's along the entire perimeter. They are designed and constructed to provide maximum observation as well as serve as a fighting position to cover the emplaced barbed wire and mines.

The emplacement of mines has been limited to command detonated claymores controlled from the perimeter bunkers. AP mines have not been installed between the bands of wire because of the number of man-hours required to maintain them and the nature of the equipment defending the perimeter. However, trip flares and other early warning devices have been installed on likely avenues of approach and observation "dead spots."

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In event of the possible penetration of the perimeter, defensive provisions have been made for a reaction force (tracked vehicles) capable of responding to any area within the camp. Gunships are employed either as a supplement to the ground reaction force or as a separate force.

Gunships are also utilized to make surveillance sweeps of the base camp area at the first light and just prior to darkness.

5. (U) Special Features:

The base camp was designed, laid out and constructed to take maximum advantage of the combat potential of the units in the base camp. With this concept in mind several unique innovations were incorporated into the overall camp plan.

First, the combat units (squadrons, engineer battalion and armored engineer company) were located along the perimeter with the three organic howitzer batteries so positioned to provide cross reinforcing fires as well as covering their assigned sector of the perimeter. To supplement their fires (howitzer batteries) a central mortar position has been designated and prepared with dug-in positions to accommodate up to nine 4.2" mortars. Normally the squadron responsible for the security of the camp organizes its mortars in batteries in this central mortar position under squadron control. Should the squadrons have to leave the base camp, the mortars could remain behind and be placed under the operational control of the unit assuming the mission of base camp security.

A second feature was the location of the motor parks on the outer perimeter. This assisted in keeping tracked vehicles out of the cantonment area and helped provide initial protection for the interior of the camp. It also facilitates the movement of reaction forces along the perimeter in case of attack.


6. (U) Problem Areas:

a. The biggest and most unpredictable problem continues to be the lack of a firm troop list. Higher headquarters has been appraised of this deficiency on several occasions by both this headquarters and the 27th Engineer Battalion (C). The arrival of unprogramed units continues to plague the camp. Should the influx continue the perimeter of the camp will have to be extended resulting in an additional expenditure of funds and man-hours.

b. The initial areas selected as possible base camp sites prior to the Regiment's arrival in-country were entirely unsatisfactory for an armored unit. This delayed construction plans by as much as five weeks.

c. The amount of transportation and effort required to support the building of a base camp has placed a tremendous burden on organic resources. This has been primarily caused by the lack of in-country transportation and the relatively low priority assigned to the movement of building materials.

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
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



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
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
----- Base Camp Proper





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
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SECTOR A




SECTOR D



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
SECTOR A



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SECTOR B

SECTOR D



SECTOR C

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MAINT
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C AVE

COMMUNITY
CENTER

A AVE

REGT
HHT

BLACK HORSE DRIVE

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PERIMETER

ROI

506TH
SFS

4TH ST

541ST MI TK 1/11

398 TH
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409TH RRU

AVN TRP

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CLASS V BASIC LOAD (CARRIED ON VEHICLES)

VEHICLE	TYPE AMMUNITION	1st SQDN	2nd SQDN	3rd SQDN
M13 (AGAV)	Cal 50 M1	3000	3000	4000
	7.62mm M1	11000	6100	8000
	Grenade, Frag	80	25	50
	Grenade, CS	20	15	16
	Claymore	3	3	3
	Grenade, Incend	10	5	5
	Flare, Trip	20	10	20
	Grenade, Smoke	10	10	10
	Grenade, Smoke HC	4	5	3
	Flare, Hand Held	4	5	4
M13A1 (Mcd EVAC)	Cal 50 M1	2000	3000	2000
	7.62mm M1	7500	6100	6100
	Grenade, Frag	20	25	25
	Grenade, CS	5	5	5
	Grenade, Incend	4	5	5
	Grenade, Smoke HC	4	1	4
	Flare, Hand Held	4	4	4
M577	M50 7.62mm M1B	3000	1000	2400
	Grenade, CS	10	5	5
	Grenade, Frag	10	25	25
	Grenade, Incend	4	5	15
	Grenade, Smoke	10	25	15
	Flare, Hand Held	4	10	16
	Claymore	3	0	0
	Grenade, Smoke HC	4	10	16
M132	M73 7.62mm M1B	7000	5000	4000
	Grenade, CS	10	5	8
	Grenade, Frag	4	10	25
	Grenade, Incend	4	2	2
	Grenade, Smoke	4	4	4
	Flare, Hand Held	4	4	6
	Claymore	3	0	3
	Grenade, Smoke HC	4	1	2
	Thickner, Incend	1	0	0
	oil 100 lb drum			
	Thickner, Incend	0	15	15
	oil 5 gal Pail			
M132	Grenade, Frag	5	25	25
	Grenade, CS	5	5	10
M58 (VTR)	Cal 50 M1	2500	1500	2000
	Grenade, Smoke	4	4	6
	Grenade, Incend	4	4	4
	Grenade, Smoke HC	4	1	2
	Grenade, CS	10	5	8
	Grenade, Frag	10	25	25
	Flare, Hand Held	4	2	4
M578 (VTR)	Cal 50 M1	2500	1500	2000
	Grenade, Frag	10	25	25
	Grenade, Incend	4	4	4
	Grenade, CS	10	10	10
	Grenade, Smoke	4	4	4
	Grenade, Smoke HC	4	2	4
	Flare, Hand Held	4	4	4

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CLASS V BASIC LOAD (CARRIED ON VEHICLES)

VEHICLE	TYPE AMMUNITION	1st SQDN	2nd SQDN	3rd SQDN
M1A3 (Tank)	Cal 50 MG	1200	1000	2000
	7.62mm M73	7200	7200	8000
	90mm M3	25	25	25
	90mm WP	6	6	6
	90mm Canister	31	31	31
	Grenade, Frag	20	25	25
	Grenade, CS	10	10	10
	Grenade, Incend	4	4	4
	Grenade, Smoke	10	10	10
	Grenade, Smoke HC	4	5	4
	Flare, Hand Held	10	5	6
	Claymore	3	0	3
M106 (Mortar Carrier)	Cal 50 MG	2000	2000	2000
	M60 7.62mm M18	10000	6000	8000
	Grenade, Frag	80	25	25
	Grenade, CS	20	10	5
	Grenade, Incend	4	4	4
	Grenade, Smoke	10	5	10
	Flare, Hand Held	4	4	6
	Grenade, Smoke HC	4	4	4
	Claymore	3	0	3
	Flare, trip	20	10	20
	4.2" HE	58	58	58
	4.2" WP	15	15	15
	4.2" FLum	15	15	15
M108 (105mm Howitzer SP)	Cal 50 MG	500	500	600
	7.62mm M3	800	800	800
	105mm HE	65	65	65
	105mm WP	10	10	10
	105mm FLum	10	10	10
	Flare, Hand Held	4	4	4
	Grenade, Frag	10	25	25
	Grenade, Smoke HC	4	4	4
	Grenade, CS	20	15	10
	Grenade, Incend	4	4	4
	Claymore	3	0	0
	Grenade, Smoke	4	4	4
2 1/2 Ton Trk (Hass)	Cal 50 MG	500	300	600
	Grenade, CS	5	0	0
	Grenade, Frag	15	5	10
	Grenade, Smoke HC	4	0	0
	Flare, Hand Held	4	0	2
	Grenade, Incend	0	1	1
2 1/2 Ton Trk (Supply)	Cal 50 MG	500	300	400
	Grenade, Smoke HC	4	0	0
	Grenade, CS	5	0	0
	Grenade, Frag	40	5	10
	Flare, Hand Held	24	0	0
	Claymore	40	0	0
	Flare, trip	100	0	0
2 1/2 Ton Trk (Maint)	Cal 50 MG	0	300	400
	Flare, Hand Held	4	0	6
	Grenade, Frag	4	5	8
	Grenade, Smoke HC	4	0	4
	Grenade, CS	5	0	4

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CLASS V BASIC LOAD (CARRIED ON VEHICLES)

VEHICLE	TYPE AMMUNITION	1st SQDN	2nd SQDN	3rd SQDN
	Grenade, Incend	4	0	4
5 Ton Trk	Cal 50 HP	0	500	600
	Grenade, Frag	10	5	8
	Grenade, CS	5	0	0
3/4 Ton Trk	7.62mm M50	0	0	1600
	Grenade, Frag	4	5	4
	Grenade, CS	5	0	0
2 1/2 Ton Trk	Grenade, Frag	10	0	8
	Grenade, CS	5	0	0
1/4 Ton Trk	Grenade, Frag	4	5	6
	Grenade, Smoke	0	5	6
	5.56mm Ball	0	100	140
	Cal .45	0	100	100
w/pedestal mt	7.62mm 421	0	1000	0

CLASS V BASIC LOAD (CARRIED BY INDIVIDUALS)

WEAPON	TYPE AMMUNITION	1st SQDN	2nd SQDN	3rd SQDN
M16, rifle	5.56mm	100	140	140
M14, rifle	7.62mm	100	100	140
M2, SCW	Cal .45	180	180	180
M1911, Pistol	Cal .45	21	21	21
M79 (Grenade Launcher)	40mm HE	48*	72*	72*
	40mm Jilum	10*	5*	5*
	40mm Canister	24*	20*	24*

* Carried on the individual's assigned vehicle.

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REORGANIZATION OF AVIATION ELEMENTS

1. (U) General. The 11th Armored Cavalry Regiment trained and deployed to Vietnam under modified TO&E 17-51E. The MT&E provided for two OH-23G's, two UH-1C and six UH-1D helicopters in the Regimental Aviation Platoon and two OH-23G's and two UH-1C's in each Squadron Aviation Section of which there are three. The Air Cavalry Troop is organized under TO&E 17-58E, and conducted its training accordingly. Since it deployed some three months after the Regiment, it has never been employed in its original configuration however, experience gained by the Regiment prior to the Air Cavalry Troop's arrival indicated a re-allocation of Aviation resources was necessary.

2. (U) Requirements for Change. The modified TO&E possessed many fine points which were retained in the reorganization. However, the need for greater aircraft flexibility, for command and control at squadron level, aerial fire support and more versatility in the Air Cavalry Troop necessitated a change.

The two OH-23G's originally in the squadrons were not enough to meet squadron command and control needs. The Regiment's maneuver elements are highly mobile and have their own fire support, but due to terrain, (heavy undergrowth and the lack of distinguishing landmarks) requires the commander to be airborne during operations to maneuver and control his squadron. The OH-23G's have frequently been used as much as 10 hours a day for command and control. The squadrons could not support such a heavy demand with only two OH-23G's because of the time required to receive repair parts. The average availability under such heavy usage was approximately 50%.

The two UH-1C gunships within each squadron assisted them, but were not best suited for their most critical need, that of command and control support. Because of their weight limitations when loaded with ammunition, they were not practical for command and control, nor could the Regiment gain maximum benefit from their inherent capabilities as a gunship because of the decentralized organization. It was also desired to give the Air Cavalry Troop the flexibility and capability to operate interchangeably as a fire support, reconnaissance and security, or ready reaction force type organization.

3. (U) Organization. Changes in organization resulting from the realignment of aircraft placed the nine OH-23G's from the Aero-Scout Platoon of the Air Cavalry Troop in the Regimental and Squadron command and control sections. While all UH-1C gunships were consolidated in the Air Cavalry Troop thus better aligning it to the Regiment's needs. See inclosed provisional organization chart.

4. (U) Capabilities. The organization outlined in paragraph 3, provides the Regiment with the following Aviation capabilities:

a. The Regimental Aviation Platoon provides five OH-23G's for command and control support within the Regimental Headquarters, one UH-1D equipped with a command and control console for the Regimental Commander, and five UH-1D's for general support of the Regiment.

b. The command and control section of each squadron provides the squadron with four OH-23G's.

c. The Air Cavalry Troop provides the Regiment with:

(1) Three Scout/Gunship Platoons, each capable of providing gunship support for a committed squadron, performing reconnaissance operations, providing fire support for rapid reaction forces, or providing fire support for the Aero-Rifle Platoon on independent operations. The immediate firepower in each platoon consists of 30,000 rounds of 7.62mm machinegun ammunition and 70 2.75" rockets.

(2) A Heavy Weapons/Aerial Artillery Platoon for employment against known targets. The immediate firepower organic to the platoon includes 600 40mm grenades and 152 2.75" rockets.

(3) An Aero-Rifle Platoon capable of performing intelligence gathering operations, small scale security operations and small scale reaction force operations.

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5. (U) T&E Changes. Changes concerning aircraft will be minor in nature. A request will accompany the modified T&E deleting one of the three OH-23G's transferred to the Regimental Headquarters, with a simultaneous request that an additional UH-1D to be added to the Air Cavalry Troop Service Platoon. Under the present provisional organization, the service platoon is required to draw upon other aircraft within the troop to accomplish its mission.


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ROSTER OF PERSONNEL RECEIVING AWARDS AND DECORATIONS

UNIT	NAME	GRADE	AWARD
Trp C 1st Sqdn	KEINER, Neil L.	1LT	Distinguished Service Cross
HHT 2nd Sqdn	KEATOR, John H.	SFC	Silver Star
Co H 3rd Sqdn	KEITH, Larry M.	PFC	Silver Star
Co D 1st Sqdn	COOTE, Theodore	Sgt	Silver Star
Trp C 1st Sqdn	CARROLL, Robert W. Jr.	CPT	Silver Star
Trp B 1st Sqdn	LARNEY, John R.	CPT	Silver Star
Trp C 1st Sqdn	RHODES, Jimmy D.	SF4	Silver Star
HHT 11th Armd Cav Regt	KEEHL, Edward R.	MAJ	Legion of Honor
HHT 3rd Sqdn	KAPPEL, Walter	CPT	Distinguished Flying Cross
HHT 11th Armd Cav Regt	KNEISK, George E. Jr.	CPT	Distinguished Flying Cross
HHT 11th Armd Cav Regt	MICHIE, James B.	WO-1	Distinguished Flying Cross
HHT 1st Sqdn	NELSON, Earnest L.	CPT	Distinguished Flying Cross
HHT 11th Armd Cav Regt	PILE, Earnest J.	CPT	Distinguished Flying Cross
HHT 11th Armd Cav Regt	SASKE, Frank Y.	CPT	Distinguished Flying Cross
HHT 2nd Sqdn	ABBET, Charles W.	CPT	Soldier's Medal
Trp B 2nd Sqdn	AMEY, Howard A.	SF4	Soldier's Medal
E Trp 2nd Sqdn	CLARK, William R.	PFC	Soldier's Medal
Trp A 1st Sqdn	CRAWFORD, Albert B.	PFC	Soldier's Medal
HHT 2nd Sqdn	DELA TORRES, Rosalia	PFC	Soldier's Medal
Trp A 1st Sqdn	GEMSON, Danny E.	SF4	Soldier's Medal
Trp A 1st Sqdn	HURVING, Iz, John V.	2LT	Soldier's Medal
HHT 1st Sqdn	MC LAUREN, Thomas J.	PFC	Soldier's Medal
HHT 1st Sqdn	KIMBLE, Walter	CPT	Soldier's Medal
HHT 1st Sqdn	PAUL, John L.	CPT	Bronze Star Medal
Trp I 3rd Sqdn	CAMIDGE, Malcolm B.	SF4	Bronze Star Medal
Co D 1st Sqdn	ALDRIGHT, Carl W.	1LT	Bronze Star Medal
Trp B 1st Sqdn	CROWLEY, Russell	1Sgt	Bronze Star Medal
Trp C 2nd Sqdn	DUNHAM, Russell L.	1Sgt	Bronze Star Medal
Trp I 3rd Sqdn	EXNER, James L.	1LT	Bronze Star Medal
HHT 1st Sqdn	EVANS, Peter H.	CPT	Bronze Star Medal
HHT 1st Sqdn	FRASSE, William K.	1Sgt	Bronze Star Medal
Trp C 1st Sqdn	FRY, David N.	CPT	Bronze Star Medal
Trp C 1st Sqdn	GANNETT, Robert W. Jr.	CPT	Bronze Star Medal
Trp C 1st Sqdn	HAILEY, Russell	PFC	Bronze Star Medal

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UNIT	NAME	GRADE	AWARD
HHT 2nd Sqdn	GREENLAW, James H.	PFC	Air Medal
HHT 1st Sqdn	GUNDERMAN, George L.	CPT	Air Medal
HHT 11th Armd Cav Regt	HASHIMOTO, Robert A.	SFC	Air Medal (1st 2nd 3rd OLC)
HHT 2nd Sqdn	HESS, Robert E.	LTC	Air Medal
HHT 2nd Sqdn	HORNE, Kibbey H.	LTC	Air Medal (1st OLC)
HHT 1st Sqdn	HOWELL, Martin D.	LTC	Air Medal
HHT 11th Armd Cav Regt	HOWELL, Garland W.	SP5	Air Medal
HHT 2nd Sqdn	HUSKEY, James L.	SP4	Air Medal
HHT 11th Armd Cav Regt	INGERSOLL, William H.	SP4	Air Medal
HHT 3rd Sqdn	JOHNSON, James B.	LTC	Air Medal
HHT 11th Armd Cav Regt	JOHNSON, Robert H.	SP4	Air Medal
HHT 1st Sqdn	JONES, Norman A.	SP4	Air Medal
HHT 3rd Sqdn	KARPINIA, Walter	CPT	Air Medal (1st 2nd 3rd OLC)
HHT 11th Armd Cav Regt	KAZARIAN, Edward P.	PFC	Air Medal
HHT 1st Sqdn	KELLY, Richard E.	LTC	Air Medal (1st OLC w wvs)
Air Trp 11th Armd Cav Regt	KERR, John A.	CPT	Air Medal wvs
HHT 11th Armd Cav Regt	KNAPP, Bruce R.	SP5	Air Medal
HHT 3rd Sqdn	LARARI, Walter P.	WO1	Air Medal
HHT 1st Sqdn	LONG, William J.	LTC	Air Medal (2nd OLC)
HHT 11th Armd Cav Regt	MARIGONDA, Joseph T.	LTC	Air Medal (4th OLC)
HHT 2nd Sqdn	NICHIE, James B.	WO1	Air Medal
HHT 1st Sqdn	MOORE, Robert J.	MAJ	Air Medal (1st OLC)
HHT 11th Armd Cav Regt	MORRIS, Julius W.	SP5	Air Medal
HHT 11th Armd Cav Regt	O'BRIEN, John J.	PFC	Air Medal
HHT 3rd Sqdn	O'NEILL, Daniel J. Jr.	SP4	Air Medal (1st OLC)
HHT 11th Armd Cav Regt	PERRY, Thomas C.	LTC	Air Medal (1st OLC)
HHT 3rd Sqdn	PETERSON, Palmer A.	LTC	Air Medal
HHT 11th Armd Cav Regt	PFENFEST, Dewey F.	LTC	Air Medal
HHT 11th Armd Cav Regt	PILZ, Bernard J.	CPT	Air Medal
HHT 11th Armd Cav Regt	RAYMOND, James T.	SP4	Air Medal
HHT 11th Armd Cav Regt	RICHARDSON, Frank E.	SP4	Air Medal
HHT 2nd Sqdn	SCHORR, Gerard J.	CPT	Air Medal
HHT 11th Armd Cav Regt	SECHMAN, Michael C.	SP5	Air Medal (1st OLC)
HHT 11th Armd Cav Regt	SEWELL, Thomas L.	SP5	Air Medal (1st OLC)
HHT 2nd Sqdn	SIPES, Robert V.	SP4	Air Medal (2nd OLC)
Air Trp 11th Armd Cav Regt	SLADE, Charles K.	CPT	Air Medal
HHT 11th Armd Cav Regt	SLOAN, Charles W.	MAJ	Air Medal
HHT 11th Armd Cav Regt	SMITH, William G. Jr.	SP4	Air Medal
HHT 11th Armd Cav Regt	SWAN, Valentine A.	MAJ	Air Medal

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UNIT	NAME	GRADE	AWARD
HHT 11th Armd Cav Regt	THOMAS, Gerald E.	CPT	Air Medal (1st 2nd 3rd OLC)
HHT 1st Sqdn	TORIN, Joseph A.	CPT	Air Medal
Air Trp 11th Armd Cav Regt	TREINAY, Robert N.	CPT	Air Medal
HHT 1st Sqdn	VOTEN, John F.	CPT	Air Medal
HHT 11th Armd Cav Regt	WHITEHEAD, Donald E. Jr.	PFC	Air Medal
HHT 11th Armd Cav Regt	WILKES, Elliot S.	PFC	Air Medal
HHT 11th Armd Cav Regt	WYRONICK, James D.	1LT	Air Medal (2nd 3rd 4th OLC)
Co D 1st Sqdn	ALBRUGH, Charles A.	SP5	Army Commendation Medal
BAERG, Peter Jr.		SP5	Army Commendation Medal
BALLARD, Harold C.		SP5	Army Commendation Medal
BOYD, Willie E.		SP4	Army Commendation Medal
BRUMLEY, Johnny		SP4	Army Commendation Medal
BURR, Charles E.		SP4	Army Commendation Medal
CAMIDGE, Malcolm B.		SP4	Army Commendation Medal
COMBS, R. C.		SP4	Army Commendation Medal
COMEAU, Theodore Jr.		SP4	Army Commendation Medal
DIXON, Stanley E.		SP4	Army Commendation Medal
ELMORE, John		SP4	Army Commendation Medal
FAIRCHILD, Donald E.		SP4	Army Commendation Medal
FANNING, Richard H.		SP4	Army Commendation Medal
FLORIO, Richard D.		SP4	Army Commendation Medal
GALLS, Joe J.		SP4	Army Commendation Medal
GREENFIELD, Marvin		SP4	Army Commendation Medal
GUND RUM, George L.		SP4	Army Commendation Medal
HOLLAND, Edward N.		SP4	Army Commendation Medal
HOFFME, Charles H.		SP4	Army Commendation Medal
JOHNSON, Jack		SP4	Army Commendation Medal
KAZARIAN, Edward P.		SP4	Army Commendation Medal
LAUCKHART, Lane W.		SP4	Army Commendation Medal
MARIN, Lawrence H. Jr.		SP4	Army Commendation Medal
MC CAFFREY, Alfred S.		SP4	Army Commendation Medal
MERRY, Joseph G.		SP4	Army Commendation Medal
MILLER, Frederick W.		SP4	Army Commendation Medal
MITCHELL, Harry E.		SP4	Army Commendation Medal
MOFFREY, Richard		SP4	Army Commendation Medal
POLLARD, Lewis H.		SP4	Army Commendation Medal
POWELL, Floyd		SP4	Army Commendation Medal
RICHARDSON, Charles E.		SP4	Army Commendation Medal
ROMERQUEZ, Edibert		SP4	Army Commendation Medal

UNIT	NAME	GRADE	AWARD
Twp A 1st Sqdn	SABO-CARDAS, Esteban	SP4	Army Commendation Medal
Twp B 1st Sqdn	SANTIAGO, Hector L.	SP4	Army Commendation Medal
How Btry 1st Sqdn	SANTIAGO-RODRIGUEZ, A.	SFC	Army Commendation Medal
Twp A 1st Sqdn	SHULT, Richard A.	SSG	Army Commendation Medal
HHT 1st Sqdn	UNDERWOOD, R. B.	SFC	Army Commendation Medal
HHT 1st Sqdn	VANNETTI, Charles E.	CPT	Army Commendation Medal
Twp C 1st Sqdn	VOTAW, John F.	CPT	Army Commendation Medal
Twp A 1st Sqdn	WAGES, Jimmy D.	SSG	Army Commendation Medal
HHT 1st Sqdn	WAGNER, John J.	SSG	Army Commendation Medal
Co H 3rd Sqdn	WALDROP, Andrew H. Jr.	SP5	Army Commendation Medal
Co D 1st Sqdn	WHEELER, Richard C.	SP4	Army Commendation Medal
Twp I 3rd Sqdn	WORTKINI, James A.	SP4	Army Commendation Medal
Twp B 1st Sqdn	ALBRIGHT, Carl W.	LT	Purple Heart
Twp E 2nd Sqdn	ANDERSON, James H.	SP4	Purple Heart
HHT Armd Cav Regt	ANDERSON, Jerry L.	SSG	Purple Heart
Twp B 1st Sqdn	ASHORD, Herman	PFC	Purple Heart
Twp A 1st Sqdn	ANGLESSE, Charles W.	SP4	Purple Heart
Twp I 3rd Sqdn	BAILEY, John E.	CPT	Purple Heart
Twp A 1st Sqdn	BALL, Russell C.	PFC	Purple Heart
How Btry 1st Sqdn	BARBOSA, John Jr.	SP4	Purple Heart
Co H 3rd Sqdn	BARNES, Kenneth	SP4	Purple Heart
Twp I 3rd Sqdn	BARNHILL, Larry H.	PFC	Purple Heart
MACOV Tm	BASHALI, John H.	PFC	Purple Heart
Twp I 3rd Sqdn	BASIL, Benjamin	MAJ	Purple Heart
Twp I 3rd Sqdn	BAZZEL, Charles J.	SSG	Purple Heart
Twp B 1st Sqdn	BEARD, Carl F.	SP4	Purple Heart
HHT 11th Armd Cav Regt	BISHOP, Larry	PFC	Purple Heart
Twp I 2nd Sqdn	BLANIL, John H.	SP4	Purple Heart
How Btry 1st Sqdn	BOWERS, James J.	SP4	Purple Heart
Twp A 1st Sqdn	BRAYAN, Lawrence	CPL	Purple Heart
HHT 1st Sqdn	BROOKS, Amos	PFC	Purple Heart
Twp I 3rd Sqdn	BROWN, Don L.	SP4	Purple Heart
Twp I 3rd Sqdn	BROWN, Gerald	PFC	Purple Heart
Twp A 1st Sqdn	BURNHALLER, Roger J.	PFC	Purple Heart
Twp A 1st Sqdn	BURTON, Ray L.	PFC	Purple Heart
How Btry, 3rd Sqdn	BUSCH, John E.	PFC	Purple Heart
Twp B 1st Sqdn	BRUNLEY, Johnny E.	SP4	Purple Heart
Twp C 1st Sqdn	CAMPBELL, Malcolm	SP5	Purple Heart
Twp C 1st Sqdn	CARABELLO, Julio	SP4	Purple Heart

UNIT	NAME	GRADE	AWARD
Trp A 1st Sqdn	CARTER, Frederick T.	PTC	Purple Heart (Posthumous)
Trp G 2nd Sqdn	CATTINGI, Jose D.	SP4	Purple Heart
Trp B 1st Sqdn	CHESAREK, William D.	1LT	Purple Heart
Trp I 3rd Sqdn	CHITTIK, Reginal T.	PSG	Purple Heart
Trp B 1st Sqdn	CISNEROS, Robert E.	PVT	Purple Heart
HHT 1st Sqdn	CLEARWATER, Harlie F.	SQT	Purple Heart
Co D 1st Sqdn	COLEAU, Theodore R.	SQT	Purple Heart
HHT 11th Armd Cav Regt	COOK, Charles H.	1LT	Purple Heart
Trp I 3rd Sqdn	COVINGTON, Oscar P.	PTC	Purple Heart
Trp A 1st Sqdn	CRANFORD, Albert B.	SP4	Purple Heart
Trp B 2nd Sqdn	DALLAS, James E.	SP4	Purple Heart
Co D 1st Sqdn	DANIELS, Walter P.	PTC	Purple Heart
Trp B 1st Sqdn	DART, Raymond A.	SP4	Purple Heart
How Btry 1st Sqdn	DAVENPORT, Samuel L.	PTC	Purple Heart
Trp A 1st Sqdn	DELA TORRES, Ronald A.	SP4	Purple Heart
Trp A 1st Sqdn	DELEZ, Roberto	PTC	Purple Heart
Trp I 3rd Sqdn	DILLON, Thomas J.	SP4	Purple Heart
Trp I 3rd Sqdn	DIMEO, John R.	1LT	Purple Heart
HHT 2nd Sqdn	DINAGUI, Robert F.	SP4	Purple Heart
Trp B 1st Sqdn	IRACK, Rodney G.	PTC	Purple Heart
Trp L 3rd Sqdn	DULANY, Robert D.	SP4	Purple Heart
How Btry 1st Sqdn	DUNCAN, Thomas L.	PTC	Purple Heart
Trp I 3rd Sqdn	DUNK, George L.	SP4	Purple Heart
Trp A 1st Sqdn	DURAZO, Jesus P.	PTC	Purple Heart (1st OLC)
Trp I 3rd Sqdn	EBERT, Roger W.	SQT	Purple Heart (1st OLC)
Co M 3rd Sqdn	EDWARDS, Robert	SP5	Purple Heart
Trp C 1st Sqdn	EDWARDS, William F. Jr.	PSG	Purple Heart
Trp A 1st Sqdn	EISENMAN, Richard J.	SP4	Purple Heart
Trp G 2nd Sqdn	FACHLER, Paul H.	PTC	Purple Heart
Trp A 1st Sqdn	FEMINT, Lynn H.	SP4	Purple Heart
Trp A 1st Sqdn	FERGUSON, Gene	PTC	Purple Heart
Trp A 1st Sqdn	FICKLE, Ronald G.	SSG	Purple Heart
Trp A 1st Sqdn	FILLEY, George	PTC	Purple Heart
Trp L 3rd Sqdn	FLOYD, Mary L.	PTC	Purple Heart
HHT 11th Armd Cav Regt	FOSTER, Marvel N.	SP4	Purple Heart
Trp E 2nd Sqdn	GARRIZI, Herbert J.	PTC	Purple Heart (Posthumous)
Trp B 1st Sqdn	GALAVIZ, Feliz Jr.	SP4	Purple Heart (1st OLC)
Trp E 2nd Sqdn	GARCIA, Alexandre Jr.	SP4	Purple Heart (Posthumous)
HHT 2nd Sqdn	GIBB, Gerald	SP5	Purple Heart

UNIT	NAME	GRADE	AWARD
How Btry 3rd Sqdn	GIL, Miguel G.	SSG	Purple Heart
Trp I 3rd Sqdn	GILL, Roger L.	PFC	Purple Heart
How Btry 1st Sqdn	GIPSON, Boyd R.	SP4	Purple Heart
HHT 11th Armd Cav Regt	GOZALES, David R.	SP5	Purple Heart
Co M 3rd Sqdn	GOSS, George H.	SP4	Purple Heart
Trp E 2nd Sqdn	GRIFFIN, Joseph M.	SP4	Purple Heart
How Btry 3rd Sqdn	GRIFFITH, James R.	PFC	Purple Heart
Trp C 1st Sqdn	GUSMAN, Albert L.	PFC	Purple Heart
HHT 1st Sqdn	GUTIERREZ, Anastacie H.	PFC	Purple Heart
Trp C 1st Sqdn	HAILEY, Russell L.	PFC	Purple Heart
Trp B 1st Sqdn	HART, Fred D.	PFC	Purple Heart
Trp E 2nd Sqdn	HAYWOOD, Billie	SP4	Purple Heart
HHT 11th Armd Cav Regt	HESS, Dock C.	SGT	Purple Heart
Trp B 1st Sqdn	HUENIGLAND, Thomas H.	PFC	Purple Heart
Trp E 2nd Sqdn	HORA, Daniel S.	SP4	Purple Heart
Trp L 3rd Sqdn	HOMARD, Carl E.	SGT	Purple Heart
HHT 11th Armd Cav Regt	HUMPHREY, John W.	SGT	Purple Heart
Trp A 1st Sqdn	HURINOWICZ, John V.	SGT	Purple Heart
Trp A 1st Sqdn	JACKSON, Angus N.	LLS	Purple Heart
Trp L 3rd Sqdn	JACKSON, George P.	PFC	Purple Heart
Trp L 3rd Sqdn	JACKSON, Raymond L.	SP4	Purple Heart
Trp E 2nd Sqdn	JACOBS, Joseph L. +	PFC	Purple Heart
Trp E 2nd Sqdn	JARMOSCO, Steve J.	SP4	Purple Heart
Trp B 1st Sqdn	JOHNSON, Gary M.	SSG	Purple Heart
Trp C 1st Sqdn	JOHNSON, Ray E.	SP4	Purple Heart
Trp A 1st Sqdn	JOHNSON, William F.	SP4	Purple Heart
919th Engr Co	JONES, Jerry D.	SP5	Purple Heart
Trp A 1st Sqdn	JONES, Robert E.	SGT	Purple Heart
Trp B 1st Sqdn	JONES, Ward	PFC	Purple Heart
How Btry 1st Sqdn	JUSTICE, Ralph R.	SSG	Purple Heart
Trp G 2nd Sqdn	KANE, Charles W.	SSG	Purple Heart
Trp C 1st Sqdn	KELTNER, Neil L.	LLS	Purple Heart
HHT 11th Armd Cav Regt	KINAPP, Bruce R.	SP5	Purple Heart
Trp G 2nd Sqdn	KRUGEN, Richard H.	PFC	Purple Heart
HHT 1st Sqdn	LAM, Joseph E.	SP4	Purple Heart
Trp I 3rd Sqdn	LANTIP, Gary A.	SP4	Purple Heart
Trp E 2nd Sqdn	LINDLEY, Martin B.	PVT	Purple Heart
Trp I 3rd Sqdn	LOBO, Keith A.	PFC	Purple Heart
			(Posthumous)
			(Posthumous)
			(Posthumous)
			(Posthumous)
			(Posthumous)

UNIT	NAME	GRADE	AWARD
Trp C 1st Sqdn	LUNGH, Darrell R.	SP4	Purple Heart
HHT 3rd Sqdn	MC BRIDE, Frank M.	SP4	Purple Heart
Trp A 1st Sqdn	MC DERNOTT, Raymond E.	SP4	Purple Heart
Co M 3rd Sqdn	MC GAUGHNEY, Paul Jr.	SGT	Purple Heart (Posthumous)
Trp A 1st Sqdn	MC KEEL, Billy W.	SSG	Purple Heart (Posthumous)
Trp G 2nd Sqdn	MC KINNEY, Charles L.	SSG	Purple Heart
HHT 11th Arm Cav Regt	MC LAUGHLIN, Thomas J.	PFC	Purple Heart
541st M.I. Det	MALONE, Wallace J.	SP4	Purple Heart (Posthumous)
Trp G 2nd Sqdn	MAITOS, Vicente	SGT	Purple Heart
Trp A 1st Sqdn	MASSIE, Lance H.	PFC	Purple Heart
Trp A 1st Sqdn	MAWISH, Thomas E.	PFC	Purple Heart (1st OLC)
Co M 3rd Sqdn	MESNICK, James A.	PFC	Purple Heart (Posthumous)
Co D 1st Sqdn	MEYER, Richard D.	SSG	Purple Heart
Trp C 1st Sqdn	MILLER, James B.	SP4	Purple Heart
HHT 1st Sqdn	MILLER, Michael G.	SP5	Purple Heart
Trp G 2nd Sqdn	MILLER, Richard R.	PFC	Purple Heart
Trp C 1st Sqdn	MITCHELL, Terry E.	SSG	Purple Heart
HHT 11th Arm Cav Regt	MONAGHAN, John P.	SGT	Purple Heart
Trp I 3rd Sqdn	MONTANA, Harold L.	PFC	Purple Heart (Posthumous)
Co M 3rd Sqdn	MOSS, John L.	1LT	Purple Heart
Trp I 3rd Sqdn	MOUNT, Harry H. III	SP4	Purple Heart
Trp C 1st Sqdn	MULLEN, Tommy E.	SP4	Purple Heart
Trp C 1st Sqdn	MURRAY, James E.	SP5	Purple Heart
Trp C 1st Sqdn	MURRAY, Leroy D.	SP5	Purple Heart
919th Engr Co	CHOA, Medesto A.	SSG	Purple Heart
Trp I 3rd Sqdn	O'DELL, James L.	SSG	Purple Heart
Co H 1st Sqdn	O'FARRELL, Michael	PFC	Purple Heart
Trp A 1st Sqdn	O'LEARY, Joseph J. Jr.	1LT	Purple Heart
HHT 11th Arm Cav Regt	OSBORNE, Johnnie J.	1LT	Purple Heart
Trp C 1st Sqdn	PALCO, Clement J.	PFC	Purple Heart
Trp I 3rd Sqdn	PARK, Ronald R.	PFC	Purple Heart
Trp G 2nd Sqdn	PARKER, Carl Jr.	SGT	Purple Heart
Trp E 1st Sqdn	PENARCO, Dominio G.	SGT	Purple Heart
Trp L 3rd Sqdn	PENNINGTON, Charles M.	PFC	Purple Heart
Trp A 1st Sqdn	PEREZ, SANTIAGO, Damian	SSG	Purple Heart
HHT 11th Arm Cav Regt	PENINS, Ralph R.	SSG	Purple Heart
Trp G 2nd Sqdn	PERRILL, John L.	PFC	Purple Heart
HHT 1st Sqdn	PETERSON, Terry L.	SP4	Purple Heart
Co M 3rd Sqdn	PIER, Samuel F.	SP5	Purple Heart
		PFC	Purple Heart

UNIT	NAME	GRADE	AWARD
Trp C 1st Sqdn	PIGOTT, Robert E.	SP4	Purple Heart
HHT 11th Armd Cav Regt	PILZ, Bernt J.	CPT	Purple Heart
Trp L 3rd Sqdn	PHILIPS, David C.	PFC	Purple Heart
HHT 11th Armd Cav Regt	POLLARD, Gordon J.	SP5	Purple Heart
Trp F 2nd Sqdn	POWELL, Delbert H.	SGT	Purple Heart
Trp C 1st Sqdn	POWERS, Larry L.	SP4	Purple Heart (Posthumous)
Trp B 1st Sqdn	QUEZADA, Lorenzo	SP4	Purple Heart
Trp E 2nd Sqdn	QUIBAN, Phillip V.	SP4	Purple Heart (1st OLG)
Trp G 2nd Sqdn	PANKL, Albert R.	PFC	Purple Heart
Trp I 3rd Sqdn	RILEY, Therman T.	PFC	Purple Heart
Co D 1st Sqdn	RADOSEVICH, Wilbert J.	1LT	Purple Heart
Trp C 1st Sqdn	RAMIREZ, Louis M.	SP4	Purple Heart
Trp L 3rd Sqdn	REYNOSO, Rene	SP4	Purple Heart (Posthumous)
Trp C 1st Sqdn	RHODES, Jimmy D.	SP4	Purple Heart (Posthumous)
Trp I 3rd Sqdn	ROBERTSON, Alan R.	1LT	Purple Heart
HHT 3rd Sqdn	ROGERS, Charles L.	SSG	Purple Heart
Trp I 3rd Sqdn	ROGERS, Gary D.	SP4	Purple Heart
HHT 11th Armd Cav Regt	ROMAN, Eric R.	SP4	Purple Heart
Trp A 1st Sqdn	ROMAN, Irving A.	PFC	Purple Heart
How Btry, 1st Sqdn	RUBY, Marvin	SP4	Purple Heart
HHT 11th Armd Cav Regt	RUSSELL, Fred C.	SFC	Purple Heart
Trp L 3rd Sqdn	SALAS, Anthony J.	SGT	Purple Heart
Trp B 1st Sqdn	SANDERSON, Sander D.	PFC	Purple Heart
Trp C 1st Sqdn	SANTIAGO, Hector L.	SP4	Purple Heart
How Btry 1st Sqdn	SCOEY, Clarence F.	SGT	Purple Heart
Co B 1st Sqdn	SCOTT, Michael F.	1LT	Purple Heart
HHT 11th Armd Cav Regt	SHAFER, Donald G.	PFC	Purple Heart
Trp A 1st Sqdn	SHAW, Ernest L.	SGT	Purple Heart
Trp C 1st Sqdn	SHEPARD, Steven R.	SP4	Purple Heart
Co H 2nd Sqdn	SHIVE, Timothy J.	PVT	Purple Heart
Trp G 1st Sqdn	SICKLE, Ronald G.	SSG	Purple Heart
Trp G 2nd Sqdn	SKINNER, Bryon B.	SP4	Purple Heart
Trp C 1st Sqdn	SMITH, Albert H.	SSG	Purple Heart (Posthumous)
Trp G 1st Sqdn	SMITH, Bob Jr.	SGT	Purple Heart
Trp G 2nd Sqdn	SMITH, Robert L.	PSQ	Purple Heart
Co M 3rd Sqdn	SPENCER, Gary M.	SP4	Purple Heart
Trp G 2nd Sqdn	STAPLETON, Jerry T.	1LT	Purple Heart
Trp G 2nd Sqdn	STEPHEN, Daniel G.	SP4	Purple Heart
Trp G 2nd Sqdn	STOILES, Leonard	SGT	Purple Heart

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AVFBC-H (11 Apr 67) 1st Ind
SUBJECT: Operational Report - Lessons Learned for Quarterly Period
Ending 31 January 1967

DA, HQ II FFORCEV, APO San Francisco 96266

26 Apr 67

TO: Assistant Chief of Staff for Force Development, Dept of the
Army, Washington, D. C. 20310

1. The Operational Report-Lessons Learned submitted by Headquarters, 11th Armored Cavalry Regiment for the quarter ending 31 January 1967 is considered adequate and is forwarded herewith.

2. This headquarters has reviewed subject report and concurs with the comments and recommendations contained therein.

FOR THE COMMANDER:

1 Incl

/s/
JAMES A. ULVENES
Capt, AGC
Asst. AG

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REGRADED UNCLASSIFIED WHEN SEPARATED
FROM CLASSIFIED INCLOSURES

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